Comments On "Hoover Planned Massive Arrests"
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Dear Patrick:
I have not reviewed the Report or unclassified documents referenced above. I saved it some weeks ago to hard drive and intended to go back into it. Howver, I did review a brief synops of it, and the report verifies how Hoover intended to order mass arrests of “American citizens” in much the same way that U.S. EXECUTIVE AUTHORITY will potentially be used to do the same any time soon if things do not get ‘dis’d’. The missing piece of the puzzle in Hoover’s picture, as well as in Bush’s picture, are the little known facts of ‘law’ which Hoover and Congress were well aware of, but the American people were not. The primary element being the secretive conversion of the status, standing, and legal-political domicile and capacity of the American people of the several Union ‘states’ by virtue of Social Security application for federal benefits and becoming a ‘compelled fiduciary’ for the UNITED STATES. The second element is the fact that Hoover wanted to affect such mass arrests on or within new federal ‘laws’ which were alleged to have been ‘passed’ on June 25, 1948, including Title 18, which is the U.S. Criminal Code. The subject matter of this Yahoo News Release can easily be linked to and supported by the attached definitive research and conclusions that Titles 3, 18, 28, and the Federal Magistrate Act are all illegal and non-Constitutional “enactments” purported to have been made effective by the 80th Congress on June 25, 1948. These four Titles of the USC are core to the progressive elaboration and implementation of the conversion of the Republic united States of America, and its People as slaves, to a military-styled ‘democracy’, operating under the long-established ‘law authority’ of the Lieber Code adopted by Lincoln and maintained by all successor Presidents as Commander(s)-in-Chief. The documents attached are those of a recent case brought before the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court refused to accept the case and dismissed without a word. The conclusions of the research, however, cannot be disputed. There is NO TITLE 3, 18, 28 or FEDERAL MAGISTRATE ACT. Remember, it is most always a Federal Magistrate Judge that enjoins with any Agent as “Applicant” by tender of ‘Application for Search Warrant’ or any other form of ‘Warrant’. This goes to one critical procedural step in admiralty commerce, whereby the Agent is enjoining the court and its ‘officer’ to accept the tender Application, and agree to exercise court authority in the Agent’s making ‘an Offer to Contract’ by delivery and ‘service’ of certain terms and conditions to contract as set forth on the face of the Application and Warrant, in the form of Title 18 or Title 26 violations, or any other ‘applicable law’ which may be cited. That’s right. It is all commerce, and all Warrants are forms of the UNITED STATES making Offers to Contract with the ‘person’ who’ property is to be searched and seized. Agents are usually IRS, FBI, BATF, etc. Not only was Title 18 never passed into law per Constitution muster, none of these other Titles were either.
The specific word art “citizens of the United States” or “U.S. citizen” is absolutely key to the idea of ‘law authority” under Titles 18, 28, and the Federal Magistrate Act. The legal meaning and context of this terminology may be directly linked to the Administrative Procedures Act, Title 5, USC §552a(a)(13), wherein any person entitled to receive federal U.S. retirement benefits is legally defined as being “U.S. personnel”, having the same status as a federal “employee and officer-official”. It is only “federal employees” and “officers” who are ‘taxpayers’ and deemed domiciled and ‘resident’ of the District of Columbia. Only “federal employees and officers” of the UNITED STATES can be brought under investigation for “alleged violations of Title 18”. This limitation on FBI authority is set forth at 28 USC §535, and ties directly to the above provision of Title 5. Title 5 was created by design for expediency of ‘necessity’ after the federal bankruptcy of 1933 in 1934 as keystone construction of the ‘re-organization’ of the entire government in order to begin the process of perfecting the ‘slave state’.
Once registered at birth, the new flesh and blood person comes under alleged authority of the 14th Amendment, one’s legal-political status, standing, and capacity are changed or converted by virtue of a change in ‘domicile’. Without any intention of the parents who register their children for reasons and ‘other purposes’ than those that the United States has in its design, the new born loses ‘original jurisdiction’ and status under the Bill of Rights of the organic Constitution for the united States of America. That’s right. One’s status under presumption of the 14th Amendment is defined to privileges or relative rights, later to be called ‘civil rights’, which are on par with those of the freed slaves resultant from the 13th Amendment. “Civil rights” are not on par with “unalienable” or “inalienable” ‘vested’ Constitutionally protected Rights under the Bill of Rights.
When one applies for Social Security, or is compelled into it by action of the federal government acting through the State and its corporate agents as well as throught one’s parents who act for their children as minors, one is alleged or deemed to have to become a “beneficiary” for federal retirement benefits. The truth of the matter, however, is very different than the presumption that one is in-fact a ‘beneficiary in fact’. By applying for federal Social Security [retirement] benefits by signature or designation at birth on SS-5 Form procedures, one is actually doing something that one does not know about or realize at the time. It goes something like this:
Upon receipt and ‘acceptance’ of the Application, the U.S. Social Security Administration and the “Department of the Treasury-Internal Revenue Service” which are parties to the Application as named in the lower left and right corners of the document, are enjoined to the signatory and signature of the real man as ‘applicant’. The signature line is directly above the ALL CAPS NAME OF THE SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, so the appearance of the signature on the document is that the signature is executed and performed by a bona fide employee, officer, or agent of the Social Security Administration who has ‘law authority’ and ‘capacity’ to sign the document and make the application. “Authority” and “ capacity” go hand in hand. The construction and format of the Application cause one to ‘sign on the line’ giving the appearance and impression that one is doing so ‘for’ the SSA. When ‘accepted’, the U.S. SSA is accepting or agreeing to enter into an agreement, which is a form of compelled performance upon it as set forth under federal statute by legislative act of Congress. The Application is an agreement, which has certain elements of ‘contract’, and parties to the CONTRACT are ‘enjoined’. Terms and conditions of the alleged contract are really not known or even understood by the ‘applicant’, but because the Social Security Act and related regulations are a matter of public law and in the public ‘domain’, everyone is presumed to know the law, and everyone is presumed to understand that if one enters into contract with the UNITED STATES, one may be treated in a manner consistent with the interests of the UNITED STATES. One may also not reserve or retain certain rights, if one had any to begin with, by affirming and agreeing to certain status, privileges, and limited rights under applicable ‘U.S. law’.
The Social Security Administration forwards a copy of the Application to the Department of the Treasury-Internal Revenue Service, which is a private for-profit foreign-owned corporation, which operates as a debt collector, intelligence gathering, investigative, and para-military international business organization. In the federal UNITED STATES, it operates primarily under Title 26, or the Internal Revenue Code. It also works closely with other U.S. Executive investigative and purported ‘law enforcement’ agencies, ie. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, BATF, etc. etc.. These corporate ‘agencies’, ‘instrumentalities’, and business ‘partners’ all operate by private contract law with and for the UNITED STATES. Their jurisdiction and ‘law authority’ are all in admiralty-maritime venue and the ‘laws’ which govern their activities are generally referred to as “revenue” laws, or ‘re venue’ laws.
The Social Security Applicant is the real man, but if already ‘registered’ at birth or having a ‘Birth Certificate’ prior to application, the real man has been entered into the DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA and given ‘resident’ ‘berth’ status as a ‘commercial vessel’ of and under the UNITED STATES. Such registration is in admiralty-maritime venue, and the VESSEL also has additional federal characteristics or capacities ‘at law’ which facilitate that vessel’s commercial capacity, legal duties and obligations, status, standing, and limited immunities to the degree applicable. Hence, the real man being ‘registered’ is on a commercial register of the [federal] “State of ….”, and conveyed to the DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, a federal corporation. The Applicant, presumed to know the law, agrees that he/she is a “citizen of the United States” or “U.S. citizen”, demonstrates such status to the satisfaction of the ‘authorities’ and comes under law regime of the UNITED STATES and its agencies and instrumentalities per 28 USC 3002 (15)(A-C) and 28 USC 1746 (2).
The man and signature of the Applicant drives the process, but once tendered to the government, the government does a slight of hand conversion of the character or nature of the Applicant, and creates a new federal “person” as a matter of Record and Account. This new federal “person” is the same as the VESSEL which is berthed in the DISTRICT, and ‘flagged’ therein. The new federal person is given a name by the UNITED STATES, as a federal ‘agency’ and franchise trust operation, which is spelled in ALL CAPITAL LETTERS, just the way CORPORATE NAMES and COMMERCIAL MARITIME VESSELS are registered within the STATE. The new “person” created by the UNITED STATES is U.S. property, and is wholly owned by the UNITED STATES. Any transaction of the real man by signature from that point on, is done as a ‘registered agent’, and/or compelled fiduciary, or executor for the UNITED STATES FRANCISE TRUST which NAME APPEARS OF RECORD on the SOCIAL SECURITY ACCOUNT as a result of one’s ‘voluntary’ ‘election’ to make ‘application’ [ie. ‘contract for federal benefits’]. Said TRUST NAME is the name of an ESTATE and a COMMERCIAL VESSEL or VEHICLE, which are subject to regulation, licensure, and duty or obligations under the ‘applicable laws of the UNITED STATES’.
The vital-energetic, creative, legal, and political ‘capacity’ of the real man is captured by the UNITED STATES, and directed by regulatory ‘duty’ and constraints, to perform for the benefit of the UNITED STATES. The signature is the same as “Bond”, and by executing signatures, without any qualification as to jurisdiction or venue, or without explicit reservation of rights, one is presumed to have acted for the UNITED STATES and to have waived any rights which could be presumed or asserted to have been applicable to one’s self in one’s private capacity, which one essentially no longer has in the first place.
Such conversion of status, legal standing, and capacity is the base argument that the FBI and the IRS use to investigate or surveil “Americans” at will. If one is presumed to be ‘subject to the exclusive jurisdiction and authority of the UNITED STATES’, one is presumed to be subject to all of the terms, conditions, duties, and obligations of federal legislation, even if it is not published in the Federal Register. The Federal Register Act provides that Congress has a duty to give NOTICE to the people of the several American states by publishing in the Federal Register. However, it has no legal duty to give any notice to those ‘persons’ who are ‘federal employees and officers’, which are deemed ‘res ident’ within the DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, or the federal territories, as “citizens of the UNITED STATES”. Given that most Americans are now deemed ‘U.S. citizens’, and no longer exclusively ‘state nationals’ of the American Republic, Congress can pass all kinds of draconian ‘laws’ which come under the ‘law presumption” and “conclusion” that “until one can present a preponderance of evidence that one is NOT a U.S. citizen, the UNITED STATES (and IT’s AGENCIES, INSTRUMENTALITIES, and PARTNERS enjoined by contract) are presumed to have jurisdiction and authority over any subject matter and any ‘person’”. This phraseology is my own, but is distilled from federal case law. How many Americans can prove with a preponderance of evidence that they are NOT a U.S. ‘citizen’…….almost none.
What’s worse is this: The SS Applicant serves as a signatory and bonding agent for the U.S. FRANCHISE PERSON, which is the actual Account Owner and Holder, which is the UNITED STATES. The real man and signatory does not own or hold the Card, Account, or NAME. He/she is mere fiduciary, executor, and ‘agent’ having Power of Attorney and being ‘Attorney in fact’ for that PERSON. This is where one’s ‘surety’ capacity as a ‘bonding agent’ comes into play. A bondsman, surety, or guarantor, assumes liability and performance for/on obligations of the ‘person’ insured’ or bonded, which may, in its commercial operations, have a duty to perform or to act in accordance with prescribed terms and conditions [statutes, regulations, codes, etc.], and which as a result may cause injury to others or may by virtue of regulatory restraints, duties, and obligations, come under investigation for alleged ‘violation’ of the same as undisclosed “terms and conditions” to contract.
This is how real men and women come under ‘authority’ of investigatory agencies of the UNITED STATES. It is also how the natural or real man comes to serve as a fiduciary and CREDITOR IN FACT for the UNITED STATES ‘RES IDENT TRUST. It has to do with one’s adhesion or affixation to the actual Social Security ‘beneficiary’ which is also a federal ‘employee’ and/or ‘officer’ or ‘person engaged in a ‘trade or business’ ‘within the DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA’ in the ‘performance of a public office’ [ie. ‘public official’]. If one’s signature-bond is affixed thereto, and if one has been priorly ‘registered’, one is deemed to be under and within exclusive ‘law authority’ of the UNITED STATES and to be duty-bound to operate exclusively for the benefit thereof. This was/is all by design and intent. This has never been understood by We the People.
Hence, when a state national of the American states republic is induced or coerced into contract or “association” with the FEDERAL CORPORATION in DOC, he/she becomes a ‘U.S. citizen’ and an ‘employee’ or ‘officer’ of the UNITED STATES, and can be brought under authority of all Titles of the United States Code that are applicable to only ‘persons’ [ie. U.S. franchise ‘citizens’] ‘residing’ in and under authority of the laws of the municipal federal territories.
Title 5, United States Code, is Appended to include a plethora of Executive Orders, which were spawned and issued by FDR, all being linked to HRJ-192 of June 5, 1933 and E.O. 6166 of June 10, 1933.
The Hoover agenda is but a glimpse and fractal of an overall and much greater “Plan”, to be implemented over a long-period of time over multiple generations of the People of the planet and the nations thereof. Titles 26 and 18 are judicially implemented through Title 28; the Federal Magistrate Act is key, as well, because it is usually a Federal Magistrate, having only the ‘law authority’ of a federal park ranger [who can deal with only infractions of violations of federal law on federal lands legally owned and/or ceded to the “United States”], that is enjoined to contract on charging instruments, ie. Affidavits of Cause and Application for Search Warrant, tendered [commercial term] by real men acting as ’agents’ of/for the fiction ‘government’ to make, grant, and issue Search Warrants, which are then to be delivered [commercial term] or ‘served’ [legal term] on the target property. The same is true of Arrest Warrants. All are brought against ‘citizens of the United States’ when involving anyone within the continental limit of the 48 states of the United States of America who was born on the land of one of said states. As a matter of law and jurisdiction, said ‘states’ are deemed to be distinct, diverse, and outside the territorial [jurisdiction] limits of the federal United States, ie. District of Columbia, and are not federal territories under exclusive territorial legislative control [regulation] of Congress or the Executive.
The above attachments are taken from a recent [2007] Supreme Court case, filed on behalf of a number of federal inmates, who’s federal judgments and incarcerations are all brought under alleged authority of the Constitution and the federal Statutes at Title 18. Conclusive research had been done over a period of six years by those who were instrumental in bringing the subject matter of the action forward. Their conclusions are verified and certified by the Clerk of the National Archive and Clerk of Congress, and fully establish that Title 18 was never lawfully enacted on June 25, 1948, which also implies that Titles 3, 28, and the Federal Magistrate Act were not as well. The certified Archive documents of the legislative proceedings were included in this action for certain relief. The Supreme Court just recently ‘denied’ the action, refusing to hear the case, and dismissed it, without any written findings of fact or conclusions of law, which is at the ‘discretion’ of the court not to do so. The case may be dead, but the subject matter is not.
The conversion of the lawful American people of the several republic states, being ‘non-resident aliens’ to the District of Columbia, into corporate ‘citizens of the United States’, within the District of Columbia, as ‘U.S. persons’ or ‘personnel’, ‘res idents of the United States’, who then become corporate FRANCHISE TRUST ‘taxpayers’, deemed to be engaged in an excise taxable privileged [regulated] activity of a ‘trade or business’ in the “performance of a public office or official duty’ is what Title 5 was in-part intended to lay the groundwork for. Americans had to be converted and reclassified under regime of “law authority”, to be brought under or harnessed under the emerging regime of administrative [socialist-fascist] ‘law’, which itself was/is brought about by the declared emergency of 1933 and subsequent Executive, Legislative, and Judicial measures in support thereof.
What is also of subtle significance as related to the “Plan” and the architects of it, who act through U.S. hegemony and superiority as the last ‘super power’, is the recent passing of the Military Commissions Act: See below and take note that the Bill # is 6166, the same number as the draconian E.O. 6166, June 10, 1933:
FINAL VOTE RESULTS FOR ROLL CALL 491
(Republicans in roman; Democrats in italic; Independents underlined)
H R 6166 RECORDED VOTE 27-Sep-2006 4:45 PM
QUESTION: On Passage
BILL TITLE: Military Commissions Act
A friend of mine who is a Biblical researcher shared some recently disclosed information originating with some Biblical scholars recently reporting to the effect that the ‘number of the BEAST’ was/is not in fact “666”, but was wrongly mis-interpreted and is in fact “6166”.
E.O. 6166 is the actual [military-executive] Order which created the current fascist STATE. And, House Resolution (HR) 6166 is the Act that redefines and expands the presumed ‘law authority’ of the fascists, and reiterates E.O. 6166 of June 10, 1933..
Other pending ‘legislation’, if passed, will put the perverbial ‘nail’ in the coffin of the People and the Republic. Both E.O. 6166 and HR 6166 go to Senate Document 43, 1933 and HJR-192 of June 5, 1933, now rescinded, but still acting under full force and effect as “public policy” and “public interest” within the “PUBLIC TRUST”.
In order for any legislative act of Congress to bear on any real man or woman of any American state, ‘they’ had to first convert the People of the states into legislatively controlled and fictionalized ‘persons’ having the same status as a COMMERCIAL FRANCHISE or corporation under presumed exclusive jurisdiction and authority of U.S. municipal-territorial commutarian contract “law” [in admiralty-maritime venue]. Hence, the bankruptcy of 1933 was not a move to subjugate and usurp the alleged ‘states’ of the Union Republic, but to subjugate by inducement, misrepresentation, extreme duress, and obfuscation of material facts, the American People, who’s energy and capacity was needed for all kinds of nefarious purposes besides ‘payment of the public debt. It was a concerted programmatic move to usurp the status and standing of the People under the Laws of Nature and God, on the Land, and to circumvent and controvert any of their Rights under the BILL OF RIGHTS, within the organic Constitution for the united States of America. All of this still operating under force of occupation, known as the “FEDERAL CORPORATION”, sited in the District of Columbia, which itself is controlled fully by private foreign and domestic principals.
FBI origins are executive-administrative by resolution of the Attorney General, known originally as the Bureau of Investigation. It’s history goes to 1912/1913, when the Federal Reserve Bank was secretly being chartered by an illegal act of Congress, which the actual Congress assembled never voted on, much in the same manner as the alleged passage of Titles 3, 18, 28, etc. The actual ‘Federal Bureau of Investigation’ was not legislatively provided for until the passage of 28 USC §535 as stated above.
Even though Titles 18 (U.S. Criminal Code) and 28 (Judicial) are not noticed on the People of the American states by and through publication in the Federal Register, it is now de facto of ‘necessity’ operating on virtually everyone deemed “within the DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA” and any lands deemed ‘federal territory of the UNITED STATES’. Any “U.S. person” is de facto presumed to be instantly subject to the territorial and ‘personam’ jurisdiction AND ‘laws’ of the UNITED STATES, no matter where in the world such ‘person’ may ‘reside’. This is why Title 26 (IRC) of the U.S.C. follow the ‘individual’ anywhere outside the land area of the federal “UNITED STATES”, including its “territories” and DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, because the idea is set in stone that the UNITED STATES IS WITHIN AND OVER YOU, and YOU ARE WITHIN IT. The U.S. courts will not rule or determine otherwise, unless one has standing to argue and compel them to do otherwise, by presentments to CONTRACT in the form and nature of a “preponderance of probative proof of evidence that one is not a U.S. citizen, resident, and/or taxpayer having any duty or liability to the UNITED STATES”.
Although unconstitutional OR “non-constitutional”, by the time of 1948, the law premise of the effectiveness of the organic Constitution had already been substantively diminished to the point of non-force and effect, especially under the Supreme Court decision of Erie RR v. Thompkins, And, Hoover could presume to have the ‘law authority’ to conduct ‘mass arrest’ operations, all the while knowing that Congress had not conformed its legislative proceedings to those standards proscribed by the Constitution and long-established or ‘settled’ legislative mandates. OOPS!!
This is a reiteration of earlier information posted. If you care to cut/paste, that is fine, or you can post as is. I have learned that it takes hearing the same dense stuff over and over again in different ways and under different contexts to eventually have it sink in. The attachments are verified in my own research on the same subject as well, although I and my associates had nothing to do with this law suit or the researcher behind it being filed.
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APPENDIX
TABLE OF CONTENTS
App. Page(s)
Journal of the House of Representatives of the
Eightieth Congress, First Session (1947) …………………………..........................…..1-6
Journal of the Senate of the
First Session (1947) …………………………………………………………………...7-11
Journal of the House of Representatives of the
Eightieth Congress, Second Session (1948) …………………………………………12-30
Journal of the Senate of the
Second Session (1948) ……………………………………………………………….31-44
93 Congressional Record, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1947) ……………………. ……..................45-49
94 Congressional Record, 80th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1948) …………………………...................50-66
House Report No. 304, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., April 24, 1947 ……………...................................67
House Document No. 769, 79th Cong., 2nd Sess., Constitution,
of the United States, Eightieth Congress (G.P.O. 1947) …………... ……..................68-80
House Document No. 355, 59th Cong., 2nd Sess., Hinds’ Precedents
of the House of Representatives of the
Volumes IV and V (G.P.O. 1907) …………………………………. ……................81-102
Senate Report No. 1620, 80th Cong., 2nd Sess., June 14, 1948 ……………………………103-104
House Concurrent Resolutions 218 and 219, 80th Cong., 2nd Sess.,
June 20, 1948, 62 Stat. 1435-1436 ………………………………… ……..............105-106
Certified Copy of H.R. 3190, passed by the House of Representatives
on May 12, 1947, and certified as truly enrolled on
June 18, 1948 ……………………………………………………………………...107-113
Certified Copy of H.R. 3190, as signed into Public Law 80-772 and
received at Department of State on June 25, 1948 ………………… ……..............114-117
Judgment/Commitment Orders of Petitioners …………REMOVED………………….....118-181
APPENDIX
JUDGMENTS, CUSTODIANS AND PLACES OF CONFINEMENT
Petitioner Yorie Von Kahl is in the custody of the United States Attorney General (hereafter “USAG”) pursuant to a Judgment and Commitment Order (hereafter “J & C”) issued in Case No. C3-83-16-03, pursuant to which he is in the immediate custody of R. V. Veach, Warden of the United States Penitentiary (hereafter “USP”) at Terre Haute, Indiana. See J & C (App. 118). See also 18 U.S.C. § 4082(a).
Petitioner Brian Edward Ratigan is in the custody of the United States Bureau of Prisons (hereafter “USBOP”) pursuant to a J & C issued in Case No. 2:97CR00066-001, pursuant to which he is in the immediate custody of Frederick Menifee, Warden of USP Pollock, Louisiana. See J & C (App. 119-121). See also 18 U.S.C. § 3621(a).
Petitioner Salvatore Leone is in the custody of the USBOP pursuant to a J & C issued in Case No. 1:95CR00960-001, pursuant to which he is in the immediate custody of Joe Driver, Warden of USP Hazelton,
Petitioner Raymond L. Bledsoe is in the custody of the USAG pursuant to a J & C issued in Case No. 83-00023-01-CR-W-5, pursuant to which he is in the immediate custody of J. M. Wilner, Deputy Warden of the Federal Correctional Institution (hereafter “FCI”) at Florence, Colorado. See J & C (App. 124). See also 18 U.S.C. § 4082(a).
Petitioner Daniel Angel Rodriguez is in the custody of the USBOP pursuant to a J & C issued in Case No. CR 94-402-CR-Propst, pursuant to which he is in the immediate custody of Frederick Menifee, Warden of USP Pollock,
Petitioner Mark Anthony Clark is in the custody of the USBOP pursuant to a J & C issued in Case No. 5:95-CR-0019-01-C, pursuant to which he is in the immediate custody of John B. Fox, Warden of USP Beaumont, Texas. See J & C (App. 127-129). See also 18 U.S.C. § 3621(a).
Petitioner Larry Eugene George is in the custody of the USBOP pursuant to J & Cs issued in Case Nos. 4:98-CR-046-A (1) and 4:98-CR-101-A (1), pursuant to which he is in the immediate custody of Joseph Scibana, Warden of FCI El Reno, Oklahoma. See J & Cs (App. 130-131). See also 18 U.S.C. 3621(a).
Petitioner Gary L. Settle is in the custody of the USBOP pursuant to a J & C issued in Case No. 93-12-Cr-Orl-19, pursuant to which he is in the immediate custody of Michael Garrett, Warden of the Federal Correctional Complex, USP I Coleman, Florida. See J & C (App. 132-133). See also 18 U.S.C. § 3621(a).
Petitioner Charles Bruce Nabors is in the custody of the USBOP and the USAG pursuant to J & Cs issued in Case Nos. 4:92CR00252-001 and LR-CR-84-51-02 and a parole violator warrant issued under LR-CR-84-51-02, pursuant to which he is in the immediate custody of R. V. Veach, Warden of USP Terre Haute, Indiana. See J & Cs & Warrant Authorities (App. 134-141). See also 18 U.S.C. §§ 3621(a) & 4082(a).
Petitioner Kevin Leroy McLaughlin is in the custody of the USBOP pursuant to J & Cs issued in Case Nos. 5:93CR40037-002-SAC and 95CR40050-001, pursuant to which he is in the immediate custody of R. V. Veach, Warden of USP Terre Haute, Indiana. See J & Cs (App. 142-143). See also 18 U.S.C. 3621(a).
Petitioner Warren Allen Dittrich is in the custody of the USBOP pursuant to a J & C issued in Case No. 4:95CR00068-001, pursuant to which he is in the immediate custody of R. V. Veach, Warden of USP Terre Haute, Indiana. See J & C (App. 144-145). See also 18 U.S.C. § 3621(a).
Petitioner Tony Emery is in the custody of the USBOP pursuant to a J & C issued in Case No. 4:97CR06004-001, pursuant to which he is in the immediate custody of R. V. Veach, Warden of USP Terre Haute, Indiana. See J & C (App. 146-147). See also 18 U.S.C. § 3621(a).
Petitioner William Anthony Johnson is in the custody of the USBOP pursuant to a J & C issued in Case No. 3:02CR-68-01-R, pursuant to which he is in the immediate custody of R. V. Veach, Warden of USP Terre Haute, Indiana. See J & C (App. 148-150). See also 18 U.S.C. § 3621(a).
Petitioner Ronald Titlbach is in the custody of the USBOP pursuant to a J & C issued in Case No. CR 00-25-1-LRR, pursuant to which he is in the immediate custody of R. V. Veach, Warden of USP Terre Haute, Indiana. See J & C (App. 151-152). See also 18 U.S.C. § 3621(a).
Petitioner Benjamin F. Shipley, Jr. is in the custody of the USBOP pursuant to a J & C issued in Case No. 2:97CR20005-001, pursuant to which he is in the immediate custody of R. V. Veach, Warden of USP Terre Haute, Indiana. See J & C (App. 153-154). See also 18 U.S.C. § 3621(a).
Petitioner Joseph P. Ryncarz is in the custody of the USBOP pursuant to a J & C issued in Case No. 2:01CR00015-001, pursuant to which he is in the immediate custody of R. V. Veach, Warden of USP Terre Haute, Indiana. See J & C (App. 155-156). See also 18 U.S.C. § 3621(a).
Petitioner Lonnie L. Graves is in the custody of the USBOP pursuant to a J & C issued in Case No. 1:05-CR-00049-001, pursuant to which he is in the immediate custody of W. Elaine Chapman, Warden (under Warden A. F. Beeler) of FCI Medium (II) Butner, North Carolina. See J & C (App. 157-159). See also 18 U.S.C. § 3621(a).
Petitioner Troy Lawrence, Sr. is in the custody of the USBOP pursuant to a J & C issued in Case No. 02-CR-200-1, pursuant to which he is in the immediate custody of R. V. Veach, Warden of USP Terre Haute, Indiana. See J & C (App. 160-162). See also 18 U.S.C. § 3621(a).
Petitioner Jeremiah J. Kerby is in the custody of the USBOP pursuant to J & Cs issued in Case Nos. CR01-4013-001-DEO, and 8:02CR336, pursuant to which he is in the immediate custody of R. V. Veach, Warden of USP Terre Haute, Indiana. See J & Cs (App. 163-166). See also 18 U.S.C. 3621(a).
Petitioner Guy J. Westmoreland is in the custody of the USBOP pursuant to a J & C issued in Case No. 3:98CR30022-02-WDS, pursuant to which he is in the immediate custody of R. V. Veach, Warden of USP Terre Haute, Indiana. See J & C (App. 167-169). See also 18 U.S.C. § 3621(a).
Petitioner James K. Vest is in the custody of the USBOP pursuant to a J & C issued in Case No. 94-00037-04-CR-W-8, pursuant to which he is in the immediate custody of R. V. Veach, Warden of USP Terre Haute, Indiana. See J & C (App. 170-172). See also 18 U.S.C. § 3621(a).
Petitioner Darryl L. Wilson is in the custody of the USBOP pursuant to a J & C issued in Case No. 02 CR 895-25, pursuant to which he is in the immediate custody of R. V. Veach, Warden of USP Terre Haute, Indiana. See J & C (App. 173-176). See also 18 U.S.C. § 3621(a).
Petitioner Anthony Antoine Hartwell is in the custody of the USBOP pursuant to a J & C issued in Case No. CR 99-CR-50057-01-FL, pursuant to which he is in the immediate custody of R. V. Veach, Warden of USP Terre Haute, Indiana. See J & C (App. 177-178). See also 18 U.S.C. § 3621(a).
Petitioner Donald W. Engelking is in the custody of the USBOP pursuant to a J & C issued in Case No. CR-5-89-0081-C(1), pursuant to which he is in the immediate custody of R. V. Veach, Warden of USP Terre Haute, Indiana. See J & C (App. 179-181). See also 18 U.S.C. § 3621(a).
I. PRAYER FOR RELIEF
Petitioners request this Court to grant their Petition for writs of habeas corpus and declare unconstitutional and void ab initio: (1) Public Law 80-772 which purported to enact Title 18, United States Code, Act of June 25, 1948, Chapter 645, 62 Stat. 683 et seq., and (2) more specifically, Section 3231 thereof, 62 Stat. 826, which purported to confer upon “the district courts of the United States … original jurisdiction … of all offenses against the laws of the United States.” These legislative Acts violated the Quorum, Bicameral and/or Presentment Clauses mandated respectively by Article I, § 5, Cl. 1, and Article I, § 7, Cls. 2 and 3, of the Constitution of the
II. JURISDICTION OF THIS COURT TO ISSUE ORIGINAL WRIT
“[F]ederal court [habeas] jurisdiction is conferred by the allegation of an unconstitutional restraint” for which “[t]he jurisdictional prerequisite is … detention simpliciter.” Fay v. Noia, 372
This Court has explicit jurisdiction to entertain and grant writs of habeas corpus to address unconstitutional custody and restraint. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(a) (“Writs of habeas corpus may be granted by the Supreme Court …”). See also 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a) (“The Supreme Court … may issue all writs necessary or appropriate in aid of [its] jurisdiction[] and agreeable to the usages and principles of law.”). In construing Section 14 of the 1789 Judiciary Act, now 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a), this Court recognized that an original writ of habeas corpus issues from the United States Supreme Court as part of its appellate jurisdiction. Ex parte Bollman, 8
III. CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED
Article I, § 1, commands and declares that “[a]ll legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States, which shall consist of a Senate and House of Representatives.”
Article I, § 5, Cl. 1, commands, in relevant part, that “a Majority of each [House of Congress] shall constitute a Quorum to do Business,” excepting therefrom permission to “adjourn from day to day” and “to compel Attendance of its Members, in such Manner, and under such Penalties as each House may provide.”
Article I, § 7, Cl. 2, commands, in relevant part, that “[e]very Bill which shall have passed both Houses, shall, before it becomes a Law, be presented to the President of the
Article I, § 7, Cl. 3, commands, in relevant part, that “[e]very … Resolution … to which the Concurrence of the Senate and House of Representatives may be necessary … shall be presented to the President of the United States; and before the Same shall take Effect, shall be approved by him, or being disapproved by him, shall be repassed by two thirds of the Senate and House of Representatives, according to the Rules and Limitations prescribed in the case of a Bill.”
Title 1, United States Code, Section 106, Act of July 30, 1947, Chapter 388, Title I, Ch. 2, § 106, 61 Stat. 634, Pub.L. 80-278, provides, in relevant part, that “[w]hen [a] bill … shall have passed both Houses, it shall be printed and shall then be called the enrolled bill … and shall be signed by the presiding officers of both Houses and sent to the President of the United States.”
IV. STATEMENT OF FACTS
Each Petitioner has been tried, convicted, sentenced, and committed into Executive custody by order of United States District Courts acting pursuant to the grant of original jurisdiction purportedly created by Public Law 80-772, Title 18, United States Code, Section 3231. By virtue of the commitment orders, each Petitioner has been committed into the custody of the Attorney General (Petitioners Kahl and Bledsoe) or into the custody of the Bureau of Prisons (all other Petitioners).[1] (App. 118-181) See 18 U.S.C. § 4082(a) (repealed) and § 3621(a) (enacted
The text of the bill, H.R. 3190 as amended, which became Public Law 80-772 (enacting Title 18, United States Code, and especially Section 3231), was passed only by the Senate and never passed by the House of Representatives. Moreover, that bill was never certified as enrolled, and was surreptitiously signed by the Speaker of the House and President pro tempore of the Senate under purported authority of a concurrent resolution agreed to by a Congress denounced by President Truman as a “’body dominated by men with a dangerous lust for power and privilege,’” 27 Encyclopedia Americana 175 (2005), without quorums of the respective Houses sitting. Finally, that bill was mistakenly signed by the President of the
For those reasons, Public Law 80-772 which purportedly enacted Title 18, United States Code, Act of June 25, 1948, Chapter 645, 62 Stat. 683 et seq. and Section 3231 thereof, 62 Stat. 826, purporting to confer upon “the district courts of the United States … original jurisdiction … of all offenses against the laws of the United States” violates Article I, § 5, Cl. 1, and Article I, § 7, Cls. 2 and 3, and are therefore unconstitutional and void ab initio. Each respective district court, which acted against each respective Petitioner, did so without jurisdiction, each judgment and commitment order is void ab initio, and each imprisonment thereunder is fundamentally unconstitutional and unlawful.
A. H.R. 3190 In The First Session Of The 80th Congress
H.R. 3190 was introduced and committed to the Committee of the entire House of Representatives on the State of the
As passed and enrolled by the House of Representatives H.R. 3190 included at section 3231, Subtitled “District Courts,” the following text:
Offenses against the
H.R. 3190 as passed by the H. of Rep., p. 367, § 3231 (App. 110). See
On
B. H.R. 3190 In Second Session Of The 80th Congress
The Senate Committee on the Judiciary reported amendments to H.R. 3190 on
“[T]he amendments were considered and agreed to en bloc” and then “ordered to be engrossed.” 94 Cong. Rec. 8721-8722 (June 18, 1948) (App. 51-52), Senate Journal,
The House received the proposed amendments. The Clerk “read the Senate amendments” collectively into the record with which the House concurred. 94 Cong. Rec. 8864-8865 (June 18, 1948) (App. 53-54); House Journal,
C. Congress Agreed By Resolution To Continue Legislative Business By A Single Officer Of Each House During Adjournment
On
That notwithstanding the adjournment of the two Houses until
See Concurrent Resolutions, supra, H.Con.Res. 219, June 20, 1948, 62 Stat. 1436.
Congress adjourned on
D. Post-Adjournment Signing Of H.R. 3190 By Single Officers Of The Houses And Presentment To And Approval Thereof By The President Pursuant To H.Con.Res. 219
With both Houses adjourned, with no quorum, disassembled and dispersed, Mr. LeCompte, the Chairman of the Committee on House Administration reported that that committee had found H.R. 3190 “truly enrolled.” House Journal, legislative day of June 19, 1948, p. 776 (recorded under heading “BILLS AND JOINT RESOLUTIONS ENROLLED SUBSEQUENT TO ADJOURNMENT”) (App. 22).[7] He attached his certificate of enrollment to the original H.R. 3190 passed by the House on
E. The Signatories Of H.R. 3190 Knew the Enacting Clause Was False When Signed
Public Law 80-772 stated that the enactment proceeded “by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
V. REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRITS
A. Exceptional Circumstances For Not Making Application To The Respective District Courts
This case potentially affects tens of thousands of federal prisoners by challenging the district courts’ jurisdiction to adjudicate every federal criminal offense coming before them pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231. The effects will reach matters of national and international concern involving the integrity of the legislative and judicial branches. Finally, federal district court judges have a potential conflict of interest precluding them from hearing the claims presented by 28 U.S.C. § 455 and Due Process of Law.
Although not “political questions” in themselves and resolvable by the federal courts, INS v. Chadha, 462
This Court has discretion to hear this petition in the first instance. See 28 U.S.C. § 2241(b). See, e.g., Ex parte Abernathy, 320 U.S. 219 (1943) (Per Curiam). Although such discretion is “sparingly” exercised, Sup. Ct. Rule 20.1, this case presents factors which compel exercise of this discretion: namely, the interests involved; the significant impact of the issues; and the preservation of the integrity of the Judicial Branch of government. See Sunal v. Large, 332
1. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF PUBLIC LAW 80-772 AFFECTS ALL FEDERAL CRIMINAL CASES SINCE 1948
Petitioners are challenging Public Law 80-772, Act of
2. CITIZENS OR SUBJECTS OF FOREIGN NATIONS AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS WILL BE AFFECTED BY THE OUTCOME OF THIS CASE
Foreign nations have turned their citizens, subjects, or denizens over to the United States via extradition treaties for trial in United States district courts pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231. Thus, the rights of those prisoners and collateral effects must be presumed. Finally, the dignity of the
3. POTENTIAL INTERESTS OF DISTRICT JUDGES IN THE OUTCOME OF THE INSTANT CLAIMS PROHIBITING THEIR HEARING THESE PETITIONS PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 455 AND DUE PROCESS OF LAW AND REQUIRING UNDER THE RULE OF NECESSITY THAT THIS COURT PROCEED TO DO SO
Federal Courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, e.g., Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994), and a ruling that Public Law 80-772 is unconstitutional will arguably render every federal district court judge civilly liable for every exercise of jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231. See Stump v. Sparkman, 435
“[T]he sensitivity of the issues” requires “address[ing] the applicability of [28 U.S.C.] § 455 with the same degree of care and attention … employ[ed] [upon an] assert[ion] that the District Court[s] lacked jurisdiction or that § 455 mandates disqualification of all [district] judges … without exception.”
“[A]rgu[ably] … a [district] judge will feel the motivation to vindicate a prior conclusion,” Liteky, 510
Due process of law “demarks the outer boundaries of judicial disqualifications,” Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 475
“Although it is clear that the District Judge[s] and all Justices of this Court have a[] [probable] interest in the outcome in [this] case[], there is no doubt whatever as to this Court’s jurisdiction or that of the District Courts under 28 U.S.C. § [2241 (a)].” Will, 449
The Justices of the Supreme Court are furthest from the operation of Section 3231 and have no peer pressures. Thus, “’[t]he biasing influence … [is] too remote and insubstantial to violate constitutional constraints.’”
The “Rule of Necessity” requires some court hear these constitutional challenges. Will, supra. Another aspect of that Rule requires in a case of choice selection of the “lesser of two evils.” United States v. Bailey, 444
B. Public Law 80-772 Is Unconstitutional And Void Because H.R. 3190 Never Passed Both Houses As Required By Article I, Section 7, Clause 2
1. THE LEGAL PRINCIPLES
This case presents the “profoundly important issue,”[10] of the constitutionality of an act of Congress[11] – matters “’of such public importance as to justify deviation from normal appellate practice and to require immediate determination by this Court.’” Clinton, 524
Although “[a]ll legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the
An act of Congress “does not become a law unless it follows each and every procedural step chartered in Article I, § 7, cl. 2, of the Constitution.” Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 511 U.S. 244, 263 (1994) (citing INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 946-951 (emphasis added)); Clinton, 524 U.S. at 448 (noting requisite “steps” taken before bill may “’become a law’” and holding that a procedurally defective enactment cannot “’become a law’ pursuant to the procedures designed by the Framers of Article I, § 7, of the Constitution”).
The Constitution requires “three procedural steps”: (1) a bill containing its exact text was approved by a majority of the Members of the House of Representatives; (2) the Senate approved precisely the same text; and (3) that text was signed into law by the President. “If one paragraph of that text had been omitted at any one of those three stages, [the] law [in question] would not have been validly enacted.” [13] Clinton, 524
The text of H.R. 3190 passed by the House of Representatives was the text as it existed on the date of passage – i.e.,
C. Permitting Post-Adjournment Legislative Business Pursuant To H.Con.Res. 219 Violated The Quorum, Bicameral And Presentment Requirements Of Article I Of The Constitution
After Congress adjourned on
The bill signed was the Senate’s amended H.R. 3190 – a bill never certified as “truly enrolled,” compare Pub.L. 80-772, Enactment Clause & signature pages with H.R. 3190, certified as “truly enrolled,” supra, and H.Con.Res. 219 never authorized the signing of unenrolled bills after adjournment. See H.Con.Res. 219, supra, 62 Stat. 1436.
Article I, § 5, Clause 1 mandates a quorum of both Houses of Congress “to do Business.” This constitutional requirement has been enforced by practice, Rules of the Houses, custom, Supreme Court holdings and duly enacted statutes.
1 U.S.C. § 101 requires every “enacting clause of all Acts of Congress” to state: “’Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled.’” Although the bill after passage by “both Houses” must be “enrolled” following which it “shall be signed by the presiding officers of both Houses and sent to the President of the United States,”[14] 1 U.S.C. § 106, the actual procedure is regulated by House rules and established practice. Following passage the “chairman of the Committee on House Administration … affixes to the bills examined a certificate that the bill has been found truly enrolled,”[15] House Doc. No. 769, supra, Stages of a Bill, § 983, No. 16, p. [483] (App. 79), after which the “enrolled bill is first laid before the House of Representatives and signed by the Speaker … after which it is transmitted to the Senate and signed by the President of that body.” Id., No. 17, p. [484][16] (App. 80).
The Supreme Court in Marshall Field & Co. v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649 (1892), defined the essence of this procedure:
The signing by the Speaker of the House of Representatives, and, by the President of the Senate, in open session, of an enrolled bill is an official attestation by the two houses of such bill as one that has passed Congress. It is a declaration by the two houses, through their presiding officers, to the President, that a bill, thus attested, has received, in due form, the sanction of the legislative branch of the government, and that it is delivered to him in obedience to the constitutional requirement that all bills which pass Congress shall be presented to him.
143 U.S. at 672 (emphasis added). 1 U.S.C. § 106 codified this implicit constitutional requirement. Reading 1 U.S.C. §§ 101 and 106 together requires that all acts must occur at least through presentment to the President while Congress is in session. That the enrolled bill must be “layed before the House” prior to signing by the Speaker and then “transmitted to the Senate” before the signing by the President of that body concludes that the respective Houses must be in session during this transaction.[17]
An “adjournment terminates the legislative existence of Congress.” Pocket Veto Case, 279 U.S. at 681. “’Th[e] expression, a “house,” or “each house,” [when] employed … with reference to the faculties and powers of the two chambers … always means … the constitutional quorum, assembled for the transaction of business, and capable of transacting business.’” 279 U.S. at 683, quoting I Curtis’ Constitutional History of the United States, 486 n. 1. Moreover, the term “’House’” means “the House in session,” 279 U.S. at 682, and “’as organized and entitled to exert legislative power,’ that is, the legislative bodies ‘organized conformably to law for the purpose of enacting legislation.’” Id. (quoting Missouri Pacific Railway Co. v. Kansas, 248 U.S. 276, 281 (1919)). See also House Doc. No. 355, supra, Hinds’ Precedents, § 2939, p. 87 (“’The House is not a House without a quorum’”) (App. 87).
No “attestation” or “declaration by the two houses … to the President,” Field & Co., 143 U.S. at 672, that H.R. 3190 had “passed” Congress during the adjournment was possible because no such “houses” constitutionally existed. See also United States National Bank of Oregon v. Independent Insurance Agents of America, 508 U.S. 439, 455 n. 7 (1993) (noting that the rule established in Field & Co., 143 U.S. at 672, made statutory by 1 U.S.C. § 106 turned upon “the ‘enrolled bill,’ signed in open session by the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President of the Senate”). Longstanding precedence of the House affirms this. House Doc. No. 355, supra, Hinds’ Precedents, Vol. IV, § 2951, pp. 90-91 (upon “disclos[ure] … that there is not a quorum .., [t]he House thereby becomes constitutionally disqualified to do further business”) (excepting from disqualification the exceptions stated in Art. I, § 5, Cl. 1) (emphasis added) (App. 88-89); id., § 3458, p. 322 (“The Speaker may not sign an enrolled bill in the absence of a quorum.”) (App. 93); id. at § 3486, pp. 332-333 (recognizing enrollment and presentment to the President to be legislative business required to be completed before adjournment) (App. 95-96); id. at § 3487, p. 333 n. 3 (presentment to the President is legislative “business” which must be completed before adjournment) (App. 96); id. at § 4788, p. 1026 (“The presentation of enrolled bills” to the President of the United States is a “transact[ion]” of “business” of the “House.”) (App. 100).
Once a bill has passed the House of Representatives it must be printed as an “engrossed bill” which then “shall be signed by the Clerk of the House … sent to the other House, and in that form shall be dealt with by that House and its officers, and, if passed, returned signed by said Clerk.” 1 U.S.C. § 106. In the immediate case H.R. 3190 was passed by the House of Representatives on May 12, 1947, engrossed and sent to the Senate and there referred to the Senate’s Committee on the Judiciary. See 93 Cong. Rec. 5048-5049, 5121; Senate Journal, May 13, 1947, p. 252. However, it was not dealt with nor passed “in that form.”
Instead, amendments were proposed which were “agreed to en bloc,” read into the record and “ordered to be engrossed,” 94 Cong. Rec. 8721-8722. Then, “the [amended] bill was read the third time and passed.” 94 Cong. Rec. 8722; Senate Journal, June 18, 1948, p. 506. The House then concurred in the amendments en bloc. 94 Cong. Rec. 8864-8865; House Journal, June 18, 1948, p. 704.[18]
“The House in which a bill originates enrolls it,” House Doc. No. 769, supra, Stages of a Bill, No. 15, p. [483] (App. 79), and, in the case of House bills, the “chairman of the Committee on House Administration … affixes to the bills examined a certificate that the bill has been found truly enrolled,” Id., No. 16, p. [483], after which it is “laid before the House … signed by the Speaker [then] transmitted to the Senate and signed by the President of that body.” Id., No. 17, p. [484]. Unequivocally, “[t]he Speaker may not sign an enrolled bill in the absence of a quorum.” House Doc. No. 355, supra, Hinds’ Precedents, § 3458, p. 322. Cf., id., § 2939, p. 87 (“The House is not a House without a quorum.”).
The constitutional “quorum” issue is precluded from the Field & Co.’s “enrolled bill rule” by its terms – i.e., “[t]he signing … in open session, of an enrolled bill,” 143 U.S. at 672 (emphasis added), which in any case only applies in “the absence of [a] constitutional requirement binding Congress.” United States v. Munoz-Flores, supra, 495 U.S. at 391 n. 4. Moreover, just as “§ 7 gives effect to all of its Clauses in determining what procedures the Legislative and Executive branches must follow to enact a law,” id., 495 U.S. 386 (emphasis by Court), so too does Article I, § 5, Cl. 1 “provid[e] that no law could take effect without the concurrence of the prescribed majority of the Members of both Houses,” INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 949-950, as to all legislative “Business.” Cf. United States v. Ballin, 144 U.S. 1, 3-5 (1892) (to determine whether constitutionally mandated quorum was present for legislative action the Court “assume[s]” the Journals of the Houses are to be considered to decide the issue).
The bill signed by the Officers of the Houses presented to and signed by the President of the United States was the Senate’s amended bill, which never passed the House. H.Con.Res. 219 only “authorized [the] sign[ing] [of] enrolled bills … duly passed by the two Houses and found truly enrolled,” H.Con.Res. 219, supra, 62 Stat. 1436, voiding the signatures on the amended bill.[19]
Having not been enrolled, certified as truly enrolled, or signed by the Speaker of the House with a quorum present, the bill was rendered constitutionally void. House Doc. No. 769, supra, Constitution of the United States, § 55, p. [19] (“[w]hen action requiring a quorum was taken in the ascertained absence of a quorum … the action was null and void”) (App. 74); House Doc. No. 355, supra, Hinds’ Precedents, §§ 3497 & 3498, pp. 344-345 (such a bill is “not in force” and is “not a valid statute”) (App. 97-98). Cf., id., Hinds’ Precedents, § 2962, p. 94 (to vacate legislative act “the absence of a quorum should appear from the Journal”) (App. 90).
Art. I, § 7, mandates that a bill that has passed both Houses “’shall before it becomes a Law, be presented to the President of the United States …,’” Art. I, § 7, Cl. 2; INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 945, which “can only contemplate a presentment by the Congress in some manner, [because] … [a]t that point the bill is necessarily in the hands of the Congress.” United States v. Kapsalis, 214 F.2d 677, 680 (7th Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 906 (1955) (emphasis added). Thus, presentment is clearly part of the legislative procedure required as essential to enactment of a bill as law. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 945, 947, 951; La Abra Silver Mining Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 423, 454 (1899) (“After a bill has been presented to the President, no further action is required by Congress in respect of that bill, unless it be disapproved by him. …”) (emphasis added). See House Doc. No. 355, supra, Hinds’ Precedents, Vol. IV, § 4788, p. 1026 (recognizing that “the presentation of enrolled bills” to the President is a “transact[ion]” of “business” of “the House”); id., § 3486, p. 332 (recognizing presentment required prior to adjournment); id., § 3487, p. 333 note 3 (when bill is enrolled or signed by presiding officers “too late to be presented to the President before adjournment” signing and presentment must continue at next session as a “resumption of [legislative] business”). Clearly presentment is part of the constitutionally mandated “Business,” Art. I, § 5, Cl. 1, to be “exercised in accord with [the] single, finely wrought and exhaustively considered, procedure” “prescri[bed] … in Art. I, §§ 1, 7.” INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 951.
The “draftsmen” of the Constitution “took special pains to assure these [legislative] requirements could not be circumvented. During the final debates on Art. I, § 7, Cl. 2, James Madison expressed concern that it might easily be evaded by the simple expedient of calling a proposal a ‘resolution’ or ‘vote’ rather than a ‘bill.’ As a consequence, Art. I, § 7, Cl. 3, … was added.” INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 947 (citing 2 Farrand, supra, 301-302, 304-305).
Whether actions authorized under a resolution are “an exercise of legislative powers depends not on their form but upon ‘whether they contain matter which is properly to be regarded as legislative in its character and effect.’” INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 952 (quoting S. Rep. No. 1335, 54th Cong., 2d Sess., 8 (1897)). “If the power is legislative, Congress must exercise it in conformity with the bicameralism and presentment requirements of Art. I, § 7.” Metropolitan, 501 U.S. at 276. See also Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. at 756 (Stevens, J., concurring) (“It is settled, however, that if a resolution is intended to make policy that will bind the Nation, and thus is ‘legislative in its character and effect,’ S. Rep. No. 1335, 54th Cong., 2d Sess., 8 (1897) – then the full Article I requirements must be observed. For ‘the nature or substance of the resolution, and not its form, controls the question of its disposition.’ Ibid.”).
“’Congress,’” of course, “’cannot grant to an officer under its control what it does not possess.’” Metropolitan, 501 U.S. at 275 (quoting Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. at 726). Congress does not possess the “’capab[ility] of transacting business’” and is not “’entitled to exert legislative power,’” when its “legislative existence” has been “terminate[d]” by an “adjournment.” Pocket Veto Case, 279 U.S. at 681-683 (citations omitted). “The limitation of the power of less than a quorum is absolute,” House Doc. No. 355, supra, Hinds’ Precedents, Vol. V, Ch. CXL, § 6686, p. 851 (App. 102), and includes the signing of an enrolled bill by the Speaker of the House, id., Vol. IV, Ch. XCI, § 3458, p. 322, and presentment to the President of the United States. id., Ch. XCII, §§ 3486, 3487 & 3497, pp. 332, 333 note 3, 344 & 345 (App. 95-98). Wright v. United States, 302 U.S. 583, 600 (1938) (Stone, J., concurring) (“The houses of Congress, being collective bodies, transacting their routine business by majority action are capable of acting only when in session and by formal action recorded in their respective journals, or by recognition, through such action, of an established practice.”) Thus, “Congress,” as defined by the Constitution and Supreme Court, never “presented” any version of H.R. 3190 to the President of the United States.
Whether the action taken under H.Con.Res. 219 was an “exercise of legislative power” depends upon whether it was essentially “legislative in purpose and effect.” INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 952. “In short, when Congress ‘[takes] action that ha[s] the purpose and effect of altering the legal rights, duties, and relations of persons … outside the Legislative Branch,’ it must take that action by the procedures authorized in the Constitution.” Metropolitan, 501 U.S. at 276, quoting INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 952-955. “If Congress chooses to use a [] resolution … as a means of expediting action, it may do so, if it acts by both houses and presents the resolution to the President,” Consumer Energy Council of America v. F.E.R.C., 673 F.2d 425, 476 (D.C. Cir. 1982), aff’d mem. sub nom., Process Gas Consumers Group v. Consumer Energy Council of America, 463 U.S. 1216 (1983).
The inescapable conclusion as to the “purpose and effect” of H.Con.Res. 219 was to enact a bill the text of which at the time of adjournment on June 20, 1948, had not been passed by both Houses, enrolled, certified as “truly enrolled,” or signed by the officers of the Houses or presented to the President of the United States with quorums sitting. In other words, H.Con.Res. 219 unconstitutionally permitted post-adjournment legislative business to proceed without Congress and upon an unpassed bill. Congress did not follow the procedures mandated by Art. I, § 7, Cl. 2 and attempted to supersede the quorum requirements of Art. I, § 5, Cl. 1 via a concurrent resolution to carry forth legislative business with no legislature. The 80th Congress surreptitiously provided a bill, the text of which had never passed either House “’mask[ed] under … [the] indirect measure,’” Metropolitan, supra, 501 U.S. at 277 (quoting Madison, The Federalist No. 48, p. 334 (J. Cooke 1961 ed.)), of a resolution purporting to authorize continuing legislative action during adjournment with no quorum and no Congress of an extra-congressional bill. Public Law 80-772 did not “become a Law” as required by the constitutional procedures mandated under Article I, § 5, Cl. 1, and Article I, § 7, Cls. 2 and 3, and is unconstitutional and void ab initio.
“[W]hen action requiring a quorum was taken in the ascertained absence of a quorum … the action [is] null and void,” House Doc. No. 769, supra, Constitution of the United States, § 55, p. [19] (citing Hinds’ Precedents, Vol. IV, § 2964), and “a bill … not actually passed [although] signed by the President [is to be] disregarded [requiring] a new bill [to be] passed.” House Doc. No. 769, § 103, p. [34] (citing Hinds’ Precedents, Vol. IV, § 3498) (App. 75).
D. The District Court Orders Committing Petitioners To Executive Custody Pursuant To § 3231 (Of The Unconstitutional Public Law 80-772) Were Issued Ultra Vires, Are Unconstitutional And Coram Non Judice, And their Imprisonments Are Unlawful
“The challenge in this case goes to the subject-matter jurisdiction of the [respective district] court[s] and hence [their] power to issue the order[s],” United States Catholic Conference v. Abortion Rights Mobilization, Inc., 487 U.S. 72, 77 (1988), committing Petitioners to imprisonment in Executive custody. Thus, the “question is, whether … [the district courts’] action is judicial or extra-judicial, with or without the authority of law to render [the] judgment[s],” Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 657, 718 (1838), and to issue the commitment orders.
Subject-matter jurisdiction means “’the courts’ statutory or constitutional power to adjudicate the case,’” United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 630 (2002), quoting Steel Co. v. Citizens For A Better Environment, 523 U.S. 83, 89 (1998); Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) at 718 (“Jurisdiction is the power to hear and determine the subject-matter in controversy between parties to a suit, to adjudicate or exercise any judicial power over them.”); Reynolds v. Stockton, 140 U.S. 254, 268 (1891) (“Jurisdiction may be defined to be the right to adjudicate concerning the subject matter in a given case.”). “Subject-matter limitations on federal jurisdiction serve institutional interests by keeping the federal courts within the bounds the Constitution and Congress have prescribed.” Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 583 (1999).[20]
“’Without jurisdiction the court cannot proceed at all in any cause … and when it ceases to exist, the only function of the court is that of announcing the fact and dismissing the cause.’” Steel Co. v. Citizens, 523 U.S. at 94, quoting Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506, 514 (1869); Willy v. Coastal Corp., 503 U.S. 131, 137 (1992) (“lack of subject-matter jurisdiction … precludes further adjudication”). This Court has asserted over and over that “[t]he requirement that jurisdiction be established as a threshold matter ‘spring[s] from the nature and limits of the judicial power of the United States’ and is ‘inflexible and without exception.’” Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 94-95, quoting Mansfield, C. & L.M.R. Co. v. Swan, 111 U.S. 379, 382 (1884); See also Insurance Corp. of Ireland, Ltd., 456 U.S. at 702.
Because subject-matter jurisdiction “involves a court’s power to hear a case, [and thus] can never be forfeited or waived … correction [is mandatory] whether the error was raised in district court” or not. United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. at 630 (citation omitted); Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 94-95 (citing cases). When a district court did “not have subject-matter jurisdiction over the underlying action … [its] process[es] [are] void and an order of [punishment] based [thereupon] … must be reversed.” United States Catholic Conf., 487 U.S. at 77; Willy v. Coastal Corp., 503 U.S. at 139 (“[T]he [punishment] order itself should fall with a showing that the court was without authority to enter the decree.”); Ex parte Fisk, 113 U.S. 713, 718 (1885) (“When … a court of the United States undertakes, by its process … to punish a man … [respecting] an order which that court had no authority to make, the order itself, being without jurisdiction, is void, and the order punishing … is equally void.”)
Habeas corpus review “is limited to the examination of the jurisdiction of the court whose judgment of conviction is challenged.” INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 311-314 (2001); Bowen v. Johnston, 306 U.S. 19, 23 (1939). A “court ‘has jurisdiction to render a particular judgment only when the offense charged is within the class of offenses placed by the law under its jurisdiction.’” 306 U.S. at 24 (emphasis added). If it is found that the court lacked jurisdiction to try petitioner, the judgment is void and the prisoner must be discharged. Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 U.S. 651, 654 (1884).
Petitioners have established that the text of H.R. 3190 signed by respective House officers and the President of the United States: (1) failed to pass the House of Representatives, and (2) that the legislative process continued after Congress adjourned by single officers of each House acting pursuant to H.Con.Res. 219 without quorums in either House, all of which violated Article I, Section 5, Clause 1; Article I, Section 7, Clause 2, and/or Article I, Section 7, Clause 3 – and any of which rendered Public Law 80-772 unconstitutional and void ab initio. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 180 (1803) (“a law repugnant to the constitution is void; and … courts, as well as other departments, are bound by that instrument”). Therefore, because “the offense[s] charged … [were] placed by the law under [the] jurisdiction,” of the respective district courts below pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231 of Public Law 80-772, which is unconstitutional, and “void, the court was without jurisdiction and the prisoner[s] must be discharged.” Yarbrough, 110 U.S. at 654. Since Public Law 80-772 has never been enacted as required by Article I, Section 5, Clause 1, and Article I, Section 7, Clauses 2 and 3 thereof, rendering void ab initio the jurisdiction by which the respective district courts acted to convict, enter judgment, and order Petitioners imprisoned in Executive custody, the district courts’ actions were “’ultra vires,’” Ruhrgas AG, 526 U.S. at 583 (quoting Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 101-102), and “coram non judice.” Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) at 720.
The convictions and judgments thereupon “being without jurisdiction, [are] void, and the order[s] punishing … [are] equally void.” Ex parte Fisk, 113 U.S. at 718; United States Cath. Conf., 487 U.S. at 77; Willy v. Coastal Corp., 503 U.S. at 139. This is precisely the office and function of habeas corpus – i.e., to “examin[e] … the jurisdiction of the court whose judgment of conviction is challenged,” Bowen v. Johnston, 306 U.S. at 23, and where, as here, those courts were clearly “without jurisdiction … the prisoner[s] … must be discharged.” Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 U.S. at 654. See also Ex parte Lange, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 163, 166 (1874).
CONCLUSION
For these reasons, Petitioners pray that the said writs of habeas corpus issue and that they be immediately discharged from their unlawful imprisonment.
Petitioner Yorie Von Kahl declares under penalties of perjury that the facts stated or alleged herein are true and correct pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1746.
Executed this ______ day of _________________, 2007
Respectfully submitted,
James W. Parkman, III
505 North 20th Street, Suite 825
Birmingham, AL 35203
Telephone No.: (205) 244-1115
Facsimile No.: (205) 244-1171
ASB No.: 7770K27J
Counsel of Record
Barry A. Bachrach (#025490)
The Law Office of Barry Bachrach
62 Paxton Street
Leicester, MA 01524
Telephone No.: (508) 892-1533
Facsimile No.: (508) 892-1633
Of Counsel
[1] Petitioner Nabors is also detained in addition to his current Judgment/Commitment Order No. 4:92CR00252-001 by a “detainer” for parole violation for a pre-November 1, 1987, offense for which the U.S. Parole Commission is acting custodian for the Attorney General. See U.S. Parole Detainer and Judgment/Commitment Order No. LR-CR-84-51-02 (App. 137-141). See 18 U.S.C. §§ 4210 & 4211 (repealed Pub.L. 98-473, Title II, Ch. II, §§ 218(a)(5), 235(b)(2) and (b)(3)).
[2] The Senate Journal for May 13, 1947, was approved by the Senate on May 14, 1947, Senate Journal, p. 259 (App. 11), and the House Journal for May 12, 1947, was approved by the House on May 13, 1947. House Journal, p. 346 (App. 6). The Journals of the two Houses are admissible as evidence when properly certified. 28 U.S.C. § 1736. See also House Doc. No. 355, 59th Cong., 2nd Sess., Hinds’ Precedents of the House of Representatives, § 2810, p. 34 (G.P.O. 1907) (“Certified extracts of the Journal are admitted as evidence in the courts of the United States.”) (App. 85). Cf. Fed. R. Evid. Rule 902(5); see 28 U.S.C. § 2072(a) and (b).
[3] The Senate approved its Journal for June 14, 1948. Senate Journal, June 15, 1948, pp. 461-462 (App. 35-36).
[4] The House approved the Journal for June 18, 1948, House Journal, p. 714 (June 19, 1948, approving Journal for “legislative day of … June 17, 1948” – i.e., calendar day of June 18, 1948) (App. 18); id. at p. 669 (showing Friday, June 18, 1948, as “legislative day of Thursday, June 17, 1948”) (App. 15), and the Senate approved its Journal for June 18, 19 and 20, 1948. Senate Journal, July 26, 1948, p. 593 (App. 44).
[5] The House sat from June 19 through June 20, 1948, adjourning at 6:56 A.M., House Journal, June 19, 1948, p. 775 (App. 21), and approved the Journal of the 19th. House Journal, July 26, 1948, pp. 792-793 (reconvention by Presidential Proclamation) (App. 28-29).
[6] The House Journal for July 26, 1948, was approved, House Journal, July 27, 1948, p. 797 (App. 30), and the Senate Journal for July 26, 1948, was approved. Senate Journal, July 27, 1948, p. 593 (App. 44).
[7] Mr. LeCompte’s announcement was reported upon reconvention by the President’s Proclamation on July 26, 1948. 94 Cong. Rec. 9363 (App. 60).
[8] That same day President Truman signed into law Public Law 80-773 enacting into positive law Title 28, United States Code. Act of June 25, 1948, Ch. 646, § 1, 62 Stat. 869. That Act positively repealed the former criminal jurisdiction granted to the district courts. id., § 39 et seq., 62 Stat. 991 et seq. (positive repeal listing former 28 U.S.C. § 41, ¶ 2 in schedule of repealed statutes).
[9] The cause in Will was brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(2), which unlike § 2241(a) only permits original jurisdiction in the District Courts. In contrast, this Court has full jurisdiction to proceed in the first instance to hear these petitions.
[10] Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 439 (1998).
[11] INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 929 (1983).
[12] Clinton, 524 U.S. at 447, “twice had full argument and briefing,” as did INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 943-944 (“The important issues have been fully briefed and twice argued.”) “[T]he importance of the question,” Metropolitan Washington Airports Authority v. Citizens for Abatement of Aircraft Noise, Inc., 501 U.S. 252, 263 (1991), has always been noted. Wright v. United States, 302 U.S. 583, 586 (1938) (“the importance of the question”); Pocket Veto Case, 279 U.S. 655, 673 (1929) (“the public importance of the question presented”); Missouri Pacific Railway Co. v. Kansas, 248 U.S. 276, 279 (1919) (“the importance of the subject”).
[13] “All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States, which shall consist of a Senate and House of Representatives.” Art. I, § 1 of the Constitution.
“… [A] Majority of each [House] shall constitute a Quorum to do Business …” Art. I, § 5, Cl. 1.
“Every Bill which shall have passed [both Houses], shall, before it becomes a Law, be presented to the President of the United States; If he approves he shall sign it …” Art. I, § 7, Cl. 2.
“Every … Resolution … to which the Concurrence of [both Houses] may be necessary (except on a question of Adjournment) shall be presented to the President of the United States; and before the Same shall take Effect, shall be approved by him …” Art. I, § 7, Cl. 3.
[14] 1 U.S.C. § 106 contains an exception for enrollment “[d]uring the last six days of a session,” but no exception for enrolling, signing or presenting a bill to the President otherwise than during the sitting of both Houses.
[15] Formerly, the “chairman of the Committee on Enrolled Bills” performed this critical task in the legislative business of enacting a bill, which has always required the enrolled bill to be “placed before the House and signed by the Speaker.” See House Doc. No. 355, 59th Cong., 2nd Sess., Hinds’ Precedents of the House of Representatives, Ch. XCI, § 3429, notes 3 & 5, p. 311 (G.P.O. 1907) (App. 92). See House Doc. No. 769, supra, Preface, p. [VI] (“The rulings of the Speakers of the House and of the Chairman of the Committee of the Whole are to the rules of the House what the decisions of the courts are to the statutes … [which are] embodied in the monumental work[s] of Hinds and Canon.”) (App. 71).
[16] The Supreme Court not only takes judicial notice of the legislative history of a bill, Alaska v. American Can Co., 358 U.S. 224, 226-227 (1959), but will both judicially notice and “h[o]ld” Congress and its legislative committees “to observance of its rules.” Yellin v. United States, 374 U.S. 109, 114 (1963).
[17] “[T]he Constitution has left it to Congress to determine how a bill is to be authenticated as having passed” and “the courts accept as passed all bills authenticated in the manner provided by Congress.” United States v. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385, 391 n. 4 (1990) (citing Field & Co. v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649 (1892), in which case the Court established the so-called “enrolled bill rule” – a rule not applicable in this case, but a ruling that supports Petitioners’ claims.)
[18] This contravenes the procedures of the House of Representatives for the 80th Congress. “When a bill with Senate amendments comes before the House, the House takes up each amendment by itself ….” House Doc. No. 769, Stages of a Bill in the House, § 983, No. 13, p. [483].
[19] On July 26, 1948, “Mr. LeCompte, from the Committee on House Administration, reported that that committee had examined and found” that H.R. 3190 had been “truly enrolled.” 94 Cong. Rec. 9363. The version of H.R. 3190 certified as “truly enrolled” by Mr. LeCompte, is the House version passed on May 12, 1947, with the text of the original § 3231 – the text of which was never passed by the Senate – to which his certificate of enrollment is attached. (App. 107-113). The statutory mandate after final passage and printing to “call[]” the bill in such final form “the enrolled bill,” 1 U.S.C. § 106, Act of July 30, 1947, Ch. 388, Ch. 2, 61 Stat. 634, is determined by the certificate “affixe[d] to the bill,” House Doc. No. 769, Stages of a Bill, supra, No. 16, all of which is required before the “sign[ing] by the presiding officers of both Houses and sen[ding] to the President of the United States.” 1 U.S.C. § 106.
[20] “Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction … Jurisdiction of the lower federal courts is further limited to those subjects encompassed within a statutory grant of jurisdiction.” Insurance Corp. of Ireland Ltd. v. Compagnie des Bauxite de Guinea, 456 U.S. 694, 701 (1982); Kline v. Burke Constr. Co., 260 U.S. 226, 234 (1922) (all lower federal courts “derive[] [their] jurisdiction wholly from the authority of Congress”); United States v. Hudson & Goodwin, 11 U.S. 32, 33 (1812) (federal courts “possess no jurisdiction but what is given to them by the power that creates them.”). United States v. Hall, 98 U.S. 343, 345 (1879) (federal “courts possess no jurisdiction over crimes and offenses … except what is given to them by the power that created them”); Hudson & Goodwin, 11 U.S. at 33-34. See also, e.g., United States v. Wiltberger, 18 U.S. 76, 95-105 (1820) (“the power of punishment is vested in the legislative, not the judicial department,” criminal statutes are to be construed strictly, “probability” cannot serve to “enlarge a statute” and an offense not clearly within the terms of a statute precludes federal court jurisdiction).
QUESTIONS PRESENTED
A. Whether this Court should exercise its original jurisdiction over this matter in the unique and exceptional circumstances presented and in light of the significant constitutional issues of public import.
B. Whether Public Law 80-772, Act of
C. Whether permitting post-adjournment legislative business pursuant to H.Con.Res. 219 violated the Quorum, Bicameral and Presentment Requirements of Article I of the Constitution.
D. Whether post-adjournment signing of H.R. 3190 by Single Officers of the Houses and presentment to and approval thereof by the President pursuant to H.Con.Res. 219 violated provisions of Article I of the Constitution.
E. Whether a purported bill signed by the Officers of both Houses of Congress and presented to the President post-adjournment and in absence of quorums, which was not certified as truly enrolled nor the enrolled bill in fact, a clear violation of Title 1, United States Code, Section 106, House Rules and Precedents prohibiting such acts, rendered the bill signed into Public Law 80-772 null and void.
F. Whether the District Court Orders committing Petitioners to Executive Custody pursuant to Section 3231 of the unconstitutional Public Law 80-772 were issued ultra vires, are unconstitutional and coram non judice, and their imprisonments are unlawful.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
QUESTIONS PRESENTED ……………………………………………….
TABLE OF CONTENTS …………………………………………………..
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ……………………………………………….
I. PRAYER FOR RELIEF..……………………………………
II. JURISDICTION OF THIS COURT TO ISSUE
ORIGINAL WRIT …………………………………………..
III. CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY
PROVISIONS INVOLVED …...............................................
IV. STATEMENT OF FACTS …………………………………
A. H.R. 3190 In The First Session Of The 80th Congress..
B. H.R. 3190 In Second Session Of The 80th Congress…
C. Congress Agreed By Resolution To Continue
Legislative Business By A Single Officer Of
Each House During Adjournment ………………......
D. Post-Adjournment Signing Of H.R. 3190 By
Single Officers Of The Houses And Presentment
To And Approval Thereof By The President
Pursuant To H.Con.Res. 219.……………………….
E. The Signatories Of H.R. 3190 Knew The Enacting
Clause Was False When Signed…………………….
V. REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRITS……………….
A. Exceptional Circumstances For Not Making
Application To The Respective District Courts ……
1. The Constitutionality Of Public Law
80-772 Affects All Federal Criminal
Cases Since 1948 …………………………..
2. Citizens Or Subjects Of Foreign Nations
And International Affairs Will Be Affected
Page
By The Outcome Of This Case ……………..
3. Potential Interests Of District Judges In
The Outcome Of The Instant Claims
Prohibiting Their Hearing These Petitions
Pursuant To 28 U.S.C. § 455 And Due
Process Of Law And Requiring Under
The Rule Of Necessity That This Court
Proceed To Do So……………………………
B. Public Law 80-772 Is Unconstitutional And Void
Because H.R. 3190 Never Passed Both Houses
As Required By Article I, Section 7, Clause 2………
1. The Legal Principles ………………………..
C. Permitting Post-Adjournment Legislative
Business Pursuant To H.Con.Res. 219 Violated
The Quorum, Bicameral And Presentment
Requirements Of Article I Of The Constitution ……
D. The District Court Orders Committing
Petitioners To Executive Custody Pursuant
To § 3231 (Of The Unconstitutional Public
Law 80-772) Were Issued Ultra Vires, Are
Unconstitutional And Coram Non Judice,
And Their Imprisonments Are Unlawful …………..
CONCLUSION ……………………………………………………………..
APPENDIX
Judgments, Custodians And Places Of Confinement ………………………
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page(s)
Cases
Ex parte Abernathy, 320 U.S. 219 (1943) ………………………………….
Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 475
Ex parte Bollman, 8
Bowen v.
Bowsher v. Synar, 478
Bradley v. Fisher, 80
Clinton v. City of
Consumer Energy Council of
(D.C. Cir. 1982) …………………………………………………….
Fay v. Noia, 372
Felkner v. Turpin, 518
Ex parte Fisk, 113 U.S. 713 (1885) …………………………………………
Gomez v.
Ex parte Grossman, 267 U.S. 87 (1925) …………………………………....
Ex parte Hudgings, 249 U.S. 378 (1919) …...................................................
INS v. Chadha, 462
INS v. St. Cyr, 533
Insurance Corp. of Ireland Ltd. v. Compagnie des Bauxite de Guinea,
456
Kennedy v. Sampson, 511 F.2d 430 (D.C. Cir. 1974) ……………………..
Page(s)
Kline v. Burke Constr. Co., 260
Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511
La Abra Silver Mining Co. v.
Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 511
Ex parte Lange, 85
Liljeberg v. Health Services Acquisition Corp., 486
Liteky v.
Mansfield, C. & L.M.R. Co. v. Swan, 111
Marbury v. Madison, 5
Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc., 446
Marshall Field & Co. v.
Ex parte McCardle, 74
Metropolitan Washington Airports Authority v. Citizens for
Abatement of Aircraft Noise, Inc., 501
Missouri Pacific Railway Co. v.
In re Murchison, 349
Offutt v.
Pocket Veto Case, 279
Process Gas Consumers Group v. Consumer Energy Counsel of
Reynolds v.
Page(s)
Richardson v.
Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526
Steel Co. v. Citizens for A Better Environment, 523
Stump v. Sparkman, 435
Sunal v. Large, 332
Tumey v.
487
1381 (1952)………………………….................................................
United States National Bank of
Agents of
Ex parte
Willy v. Coastal Corp., 503
Page(s)
Wright v.
Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 U.S. 651 (1884) ………………………………….
Yellin v.
Ex parte Yerger, 75
1 U.S.C. § 101 ………………………………………………………………
1 U.S.C. § 106 ………………………………………………………………
18 U.S.C. § 3231 ……………………………………………………………
18 U.S.C. § 3621(a) …………………………………………………………
18 U.S.C. § 4082(a) …………………………………………………………
18 U.S.C. § 4210 ……………………………………………………………
18 U.S.C. § 4211 ……………………………………………………………
28 U.S.C. § 41, ¶ 2 (1940 ed.) ………………………………………………
28 U.S.C. § 455 ……………………………………………………………..
28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(2) ……………………………………………………...
28 U.S.C. § 1651(a) …………………………………………………………
28 U.S.C. § 1736 ……………………………………………………………
28 U.S.C. § 1746 ……………………………………………………………
28 U.S.C. § 2072(a) and (b) ………………………………………………...
28 U.S.C. § 2241(a) and (b) …………………………………………………
Statutes
Act of
Pub.L. 80-278) ………………………………………………………
Page(s)
Act of
Act of
Act of
Act of
Pub.L. 80-773) ………………………………………………………
Public Law
Pub.L. 80-278 (Title I, Ch. 388, Ch. 2, § 106, July 30, 1947, 61 Stat. 634) ..
Pub.L. 80-772 (Ch. 645, § 1, June 25, 1948, 62 Stat. 683 et seq.) …………..
Pub.L. 80-772 (Ch. 645, § 1, June 25, 1948, 62 Stat 826) ………………….
Pub.L. 80-773 (Ch. 646, § 1, June 25, 1948, 62 Stat. 869) …………………
Pub.L. 80-773 (Ch. 646 § 39 et seq., June 25, 1948, 62 Stat. 991 et seq.) …..
House Concurrent Resolutions
H.Con.Res. 218 (June 20, 1948, 62 Stat. 1435-36) …………………………
H.Con.Res. 219 (June 20, 1948, 62 Stat. 1436) …………………………….
DOCUMENTS/REPORTS OF CONGRESS
House of Representatives Doc. No. 355, 59th Congress, 2nd Session,
Hinds’ Precedents of the House of Representatives of the
VOLUME IV
Chapter LXXXIII, THE JOURNAL AND ITS
APPROVAL,
§ 2810 ……………………………………………….
Chapter LXXXV, THE QUORUM,
§ 2939 ……………………………………………….
Page(s)
§ 2951 ……………………………………………….
§ 2962 ……………………………………………….
§ 2964 ……………………………………………….
Chapter XCI, BILLS, RESOLUTIONS, AND
ORDERS,
§ 3429 ……………………………………………….
§ 3458 ……………………………………………….
Chapter XCII, APPROVAL OF BILLS BY THE
PRESIDENT,
§ 3486 ……………………………………………….
§ 3487 ……………………………………………….
§ 3497 ……………………………………………….
§ 3498 ……………………………………………….
Chapter CVII, THE COMMITTEE OF THE WHOLE,
§ 4788 ………………………………………………
VOLUME V
Chapter CXL, SESSIONS AND ADJOURNMENTS,
§ 6686 ………………………………………………
House of Representatives Doc. No. 769, 79th Congress, 2nd Session,
Constitution,
Representatives of the
(G.P.O. 1947)……………………………………………………….
PREFACE ………………………………………………….
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES ……………
STAGES OF A BILL OF THE HOUSE …………………...
Page(s)
House of Representatives Report No. 304, 80th Congress, 1st Session
(April 24, 1947) …………………………………………………….
Senate Report No. 1620, 80th Congress, 2nd Session (June 14,
legislative day,
RECORDS OF THE HOUSE OF CONGRESS
93 Congressional Record Proceeding and Debates of the 80th
Congress, First Session (1947) ……………………………………..
94 Congressional Record Proceeding and Debates of the 80th
Congress, Second Session (1948) …………………………………..
Journal of the House of Representatives of the
Eightieth Congress, First Session (1947) (G.P.O. 1947)…………....
Journal of the House of Representatives of the
Eightieth Congress, Second Session (1948) (G.P.O. 1949) …………
Journal of the Senate of the
Session of the Eightieth Congress (1947) (G.P.O. 1948) ……………
Journal of the Senate of the
Session of the Eightieth Congress (1948) (G.P.O. 1949) ……………
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES
Article I, § 1 …………………………………………………………………
§ 5, Cl. 1 ………………………………………………………….
§ 7, Cl. 2 ………………………………………………………….
§ 7, Cl. 3 ………………………………………………………….
§ 9, Cl. 2 ………………………………………………………….
Article III ……………………………………………………………………
FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE
Rule 902(5) ………………………………………………………………….
Page(s)
UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT RULES
Rule 11 ………………………………………………………………………
Rule 20.1 …………………………………………………………………….
OTHER AUTHORITIES
27 Encyclopedia
I Curtis’ Constitutional History of the
SENATE DOCUMENTS (PDF)
http://www.fourwinds10.com/resources/uploads/pdf/SENATE_DOC 43_1933.pdf