In 2018, the U.S. Navy hopes to take a major step toward fielding a cyber-attack system on a tactically survivable, fighter-size aircraft.

Although researchers are cautious about discussing their cyberwarfare and electronic attack projects, one company states that it is "developing a weapon system that can deliver cyber-effects through free space into an aperture."

That opaque explanation refers to a cyber-weapon, sized for a tactical aircraft or UAV, that can create a long-range data stream -- most likely from an active, electronically scanned array (AESA) emitter. The emitter will function both as radar and the source of these uniquely tailored data streams that could be used for electronic attack and cyber-invasion.

The data beams would be packed with specialized waveforms and algorithms that work like keys to open networks. They would be manufactured by an exciter or techniques generator that functions as part of the radar. The beam is fired into an antenna that electronic surveillance indicates is attached to the target network. It could connect an air defense system, a command-and-control center or a flight of aircraft.

The Navy's sensor of interest in the quest for a combination jamming and cyber-weapon is the Next Generation Jammer. In its first version, the NGJ will be installed on the EA-18G Growler as a replacement pod for the long-serving ALQ-99 jammer. Then the program is likely to morph into an internal system tucked into the centerline cannon bay of the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter. The third step will be integrating the NGJ into various types of unmanned strike aircraft.

Top Pentagon leadership is already pushing for accelerated advances in electronic attack technology.

A Resource Management Decision signed by Pentagon acquisition chief Ashton Carter in late January directed the services toward additional investments in electronic warfare. It calls for the "Navy's acquisition of 26 additional EA-18G Growlers [that will be assigned to four squadrons operating with the USAF's expeditionary air forces]," says an aerospace industry official.

"It funded about $700 million to the Army for its Integrated Electronic Warfare System. Service officials have been directed to develop an architecture for ground and air use of IEWS.

"The Air Force was directed to spend about $400 million on an airborne electronic attack [AEA] pod program," he says. "That means taking existing jammer pod inventory and putting it on different aircraft. For example, it may mean putting the Navy's ALQ-99 pod on F-16s."

For NGJ, there will be a technology enhancement effort that parallels the airframe sequence. It will involve developing versatile AESA antennas, open-architecture exciters that can produce exotic waveforms and algorithms on demand, and stronger power sources in smaller packages (aided by nanotechnologies). A highly automated, electronic attack battle management system also may be added that makes many of the decisions for a pilot with no crew or for an unmanned aircraft with no pilot.

Pentagon officials point to a "data deluge [that] is overwhelming the war­fighter," says Zachary Lemnios, director of defense research and engineering and the Pentagon's chief technology officer.

As for who will take the lead, the Air Force has already ditched two attempts to turn the B-52 into a 200-mi.-plus standoff electronic attack aircraft owing to the projected high costs. The Marines also are dodging mission leadership.

"Our intention is to shift EA to the JSF; and where there is opportunity in unmanned air systems, we will take advantage of that," says Marine Corps Lt. Gen. Duane Thiessen, deputy commandant for programs and resources. "That is probably not going to be a Marine Corps program."

That leaves the Navy to consolidate its hold on the tactical electronic attack mission that it captured with the retirement of the U.S. Air Force's EF-111s. Some indication comes from the way the Navy organized the NGJ program so that it is part of the N-216 intelligence and networking division. Industry analysts suggest that it is recognition that NGJ is a cyber-project and an electronic attack capabilities program.

With the wind blowing to the Navy's advantage, Northrop Grumman is the latest company to offer a look into its planning for the service's NGJ competition. The first phase will be completed this June with a downselect from among the competing teams, which include ITT/Boeing, Raytheon and BAE Systems. No one knows what the NGJ requirements will be or how many technology upgrades and add-ons will finally be involved. But the innovations being offered by industry are impressive.

Northrop Grumman officials recognized the convergence of intelligence, electronic fires and cyber-attack several years ago, and reorganized their efforts into an Information Operations & Electronic Attack division.

"We have the same core set of engineers on a number of different programs," says Dennis Hayden, director of business development for information operations and electronic attack. "We look at NGJ as the gun and cyber-effects as the bullets. We have the flexibility to go from traditional area-suppression jamming to reactive jamming to a very precise location jamming and cyber-effects."

An analysis of alternatives proposed 15 different system configurations. Seven were chosen. Two were primarily ALQ-99 upgrades, four were AESA-based solutions that did not press the performance envelope, and the last was a far-reaching approach. However, the Navy recently indicated it is looking at three new configurations that may fall into the advanced-technology category, which would produce a cyber-attack capability sooner.

The core of the AESA problem is that the radar has the basic attributes needed for electronic attack -- narrow beams, directional precision and multiple tones; but current devices operate in a relatively narrow band of frequencies. Moreover, for EA and cyber-ops, an AESA needs to be capable of periodic frequency-modulated continuous-wave (FMCW) operations. CW means an AESA can operate very close to 100% duty cycle. A radar application has a much lower duty cycle. Hardware, software and available power modifications are needed to make it possible.

Another AESA hurdle is that arrays are flat, so that it is difficult to create uniform 360-deg. coverage "You are not going to get a full field of view with any single array," says Christopher Falco, program manager for the Northrop Grumman NGJ. "There is tremendous roll off [loss of range and accuracy] as you try to steer it electronically at the edge of an array. You need multiple arrays, but you need to minimize their number while selecting your band breaks and frequency overlaps to fit the mission. You can electronically manipulate the size of your antenna, but that is expensive and requires a lot of processing power. You want to make it as simple as possible."

Northrop Grumman is working on a company-financed flexible AESA antenna array to provide the needed flexibility. It is being designed to meet an emerging demand for advanced weapons effects.

"Two of the biggest jumps in capability [in sensors compared with the current F-22 and F-35] are the field of regard and instantaneous field of view," says Maris Lapins, director of Northrop Grumman's NGJ programs. "If you slew your sensor or radiator 360 deg., that's the field of regard. A lot of that [flexibility in FOV and FOR] is tied up in the trade space. Some of those parameters drive cost and complexity. NGJ is a complex problem. How it affects your concept of operations and the impact for force mix all gets wrapped together in defining the capability," he adds.

"The more sophisticated the requirement is, the more cyber-effects can come into play," says Falco. The demand for cyber-effects projected at long range is considered inevitable. "Absolutely, that's a given," he notes.

"Technology and the battlefield are going to change considerably," says Hayden. "There are going to be many things that have to be tailored to meet new circumstances."

The solution, say company researchers, is a flexible AESA design entwined with an exciter or techniques generator that is digitally programmable on the fly. That exciter is totally digital with no need for RF conversion at the exciter level.

An adaptable exciter is needed for the "generation of an arbitrary waveform to [match] any kind of [emission] pattern with agile injection and repetition of signals. That's unlike the current [system] that has fixed patterns," says Falco.

"We will tell you that in the world of the exciter, the holy grail is to get a universal design that can generate all the waveforms that you could possibly imagine," says Falco.

"We have a technology that we are developing with our own funds -- the Mission Adaptable Exciter High-Fidelity Method [MAEHFM] that would allow us to be more flexible," says Lapins.

MAEHFM digital technology eliminates spurious signals, harmonics and resonance from other frequencies that are produced in the course of frequency conversions.

Another part of the task will be reaching deeper into the electromagnetic spectrum to find enemy signals.

"I think that is an absolute," says Falco. "The enemy knows what we can do so they are always out there looking for a new or different way to exploit. Network communications frequency ranges are changing and expanding every couple of years. We have new problems as we start chasing up into the higher bands. Modern radar threats are pulse-to-pulse and frequency agile. We need to be able to react as that change comes out of [an enemy] radar. Those are the things we worry about more and more for the future.

"As for frequency range, we're not going into millimeter wave just yet," he says. "But you've got to believe that's going to be a growth path on NGJ."

Finally, there is the question of how to control all that cyber- and electronic attack capability, particularly if some of it is unmanned. "You are foolish if you don't consider a distributed EW battle-management [BM] schema," says Lapins.

"I think there has to be an almost organic solution for an EW BM architecture," says Hayden, as the aircrews decrease to one (F-35) from four (EA-6B) and two (EA-18G), and finally to none. "Who is going to be controlling the EA activity so that the evolution takes place naturally?" asks Falco. "For a pilot only (or a UAV), you need some type of coordinated approach."

Photo: USAF

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March 31, 2010