m there are 993 kg of the isotope U-238, which is not a fissionable material under ordinary circumstances. And there are only 7 kg of the fissile material Uranium-235. To be useful for weapons production, the U-235 content must be enriched.

There are five main enrichment plants in the world: two European consortia, the Russian enrichment facilities, and two major American enrichment plants . The output of these enrichment plants is of two kinds. One stream containin g up to 5% U-235 is the fuel for the majority of civil nuclear power plants. Only the Canadian reactor, CANDU, uses natural uranium. The second stream is 90%-plusU-235 and is used for the construction of atomic weapons. The U-238 - i.e., depleted uranium or DU - has two major uses. Given its very high density and extreme hardness, it is used to produ ce tank-piercing munitions. Shells coated with DU have high penetrating power.

DU is also used in the manufacture of `target rods' in reactors. When bombarded by neutrons, it is transformed into Plutonium 239, the second fissionable element widely used in many nuclear weapons. The source of the

Depleted uranium is also manufactured into a casing for thermonuclear weapons. In a thermonuclear explosion, at some 10 million degrees Celsius,

U-238 will fission. Also, all the metal parts of a thermo-nuclear bomb use U- 238 as a material of construction.

Under the immense neutron flux of an explosion, U-238 fissions, leading to

50% of the bomb's yield. So a thermonuclear weapon that is designated as one megaton gets 500 kilotons of power from the depleted uranium, which isnot properly safeguarded. The result is that the nuclear arsenals of the U. S., Britain, France, and even Russia, countries with enrichment facilities, hav e enriched Canadian uranium. In the case of the former Soviet Union, they hav e provided enrichment services for some Western European countries, using Canadian uranium.

All of the above countries retained most of the DU and used some of it to produce plutonium for weapons. We can therefore say with confidence that there is a little bit of Canadian uranium - or a lot in some cases - in every thermonuclear weapon in the American arsenal, in many of the nuclear weapons of the French and Britisharsenals, and, surprisingly, of the Soviet (now Russian) arsenal. Canada is also directly responsible for the development of nuclear weaponsby India and Pakistan. Our irresponsible sales of CANDU reactors have beena major contribution to nuclear proliferation. Yet we continue to "push" sa les to countries like Turkey and China. In the former case we could have made a contribution to the `Islamic bomb.' In the case of the latter we have no me ans of preventing China from using our technology to manufacture nuclear weapons.

A major controversy has erupted over the extensive use of DU munitions in the Iraq and Kosovo wars. It has been related to the `Gulf War syndrome' an d the `Balkan syndrome.' Cases of illnesses, including cancer in soldiers and civilians (including children) exposed to DU munition dust and fragments, have been widely reported in Iraq, and more recently in NATO countries, many of which have expressed concern. Since the end of the Gulf War of 1991, and again following the end of the Kosovo war, reports have surfaced of a variety of illnesses among the occupying soldiers and the civilian populations of those countries. In theBalkans alone, 31 000 rounds of DU munitions were used in 1999, and between 1994 and 1995 10 800 rounds were fired in Bosnia and around Sarajevo. Predictably, NATO and the U.S. both gave blanket denials that any risk wasinvolved. Yet on January 15, 2001, the U.K. Atomic Energy Authority confirmed the secret 1991 report that DU fragments, shells and dust left in Kuwait were potentially harmful. DU weapons have also been linked to illnesses among peacekeepers in the Balkans.

The German Defense Ministry has called for a moratorium on the use of DU munitions. Italy is particularly concerned, having found 30 soldiers who ha ve fallen ill since serving with NATO in Kosovo. Twelve have cancer and five have died from leukemia. Even the United Nations Environmental Program (UNEP) has found eight targeted areas in Kosovo with elevated radiation levels.

Russia has formally accused NATO of ignoring warnings over the use of DU munitions.

In Iraq, the cancer cases in the south have risen since 1991. Again, a secr et British Defense Ministry report, leaked in 1997, stated that soldiers carry ing out salvage work on vehicles damaged by DU shells could be at risk of developing lung and brain cancer. Many soldiers who served with NATO in the Balkans have variety of symptoms, including hair loss and fatigue, as w ell as cancer.

The denials by officials from NATO have been deceptive and always defensive. To focus on the danger of exposure to external radiation in thecase of DU, while ignoring the real hazard of very small particles entering the body, is either deception or ignorance. For example, very fine particles, having long residence in the lungs, pose a genuine risk of cancer, even though the internal dose may be low. Immediately following the blast from a tank hit by a DU shell, a great many fragments of DU are formed, from large fragments to micron-sized dust. Even after this mixture has fallen to the ground, persons working in this area o r children playing there can inhale these very small particles, or the partic les can enter the body through a cut. Inside the body they can be deadly, radiating directly on naked tissue cells.

New information on t he health impact of using depleted uranium munitions are startling. It has now found its way into the food chain and has been detected in civilian populations in three locations within Kosovo and Bosni a. A survey by the Sunday Herald of Scotland has discovered that DU munitionshave been used or tested in 41 countries worldwide. In fact, NATO dropped 10 000 rounds of DU in Bosnia alone, in 1994 and 1995. What has been termed the `Balkan Syndrome,' - i.e, illnesses related to DU entering the b ody - has now affected soldiers from Italy, Portugal and France. A study by Prof. Nick Priest of Britain's Middlesex University detected DU in the urine of people in one location in Bosnia and two in Kosovo. This was unexpected and confirms the movement of DU in the food chain. At thesame time, there are valid reports of a huge increase in malignant diseases in t he above two countries. Andd the real impact is yet to come in the more distan t future from the inevitable genetic impacts.

In addition, it has now been reported that a small group of Canadian scientists, led by Prof. Patricia Horan of Newfoundland's Memorial Universi ty, have found traces of uranium in 12 of 20 ill Canadian, British, and America n veterans (T. Fennel, Maclean's, March 19th, 2001, pp.18-20). Meanwhile, NATO authorities, as well as British, Canadian, and U.S. sources , have adamantly declared that DU munitions pose no health risk to exposed persons. They use the perennial false argument of the nuclear establishment - that the exposure is not greater than background radiation - as though background radiation is safe, which of course it is not. In fact, all reput able experts agree there is no safe level of exposure, the hazard only limited b y probability. When the exposed population is large enough, some damage will inevitably occur.

The probable mode of exposure is either through inhalation of microscopic particles or through a contaminated food chain. For NATO, this is, once aga in, the `collateral damage' referred to by Timothy McVeigh and always recognized by military advocates. Such damage continued to exact a toll fro m the peoples of Hiroshima and Nagasaki for decades after their atom-bombing.

Scenarios for a disarming first strike against Russia's missiles by the U.S . estimate the `collateral' damage to be 100 million dead civilians. In confl icts involving the U.S., there is always conflict of interest. Suppressing or minimizing the negative impacts is the constant `spin.' Canada bears a large responsibility, since much of the depleted uranium comes from Canadian sources.

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