
From The State Of Oregon: Affidavit For Restoration & Redemption Of Res And Title
________________________________________________________________________
On the soil,
The County of Klamath,
The State of Oregon, de jure.
ss: Statement of Political Will: Demand For Restoration & Redemption of Res and Title
From: Oetjen v. Central Leather Co. (1918), 246 U.S. 297:
"Who is the sovereign, de jure or de facto, of a territory is not a judicial, but is a political question, the determination of which by the legislative and executive departments of any government conclusively binds the judges, as well as all other officers, citizens and subjects of that government. This principle has always been upheld by this court, and has been affirmed under a great variety of circumstances." Jones v. U.S., 137 U.S. 202, 212, 11 S. Ct. 80, 83, 34 L.Ed. 691.
"It is also the result of the interpretation by this court of the principles of international law that when a government which originates in revolution or revolt is recognized by the political department of our government as the de [246 U.S. 297, 303] jure government of the country in which it is established, such recognition is retroactive in effect and validates all the actions and conduct of the government so recognized from the commencement of its existence." Williams v. Bruffy, 96 U.S. 176, 186; see s.c., 65 Fed. 577, 13 C.C.A. 51, 38 L.R.A. 405.
To these principles we must add that:
"Every sovereign state is bound to respect the independence of every other sovereign state, and the courts of one country will not sit in judgment on the acts of the government of another done within its own territory." Underhill v. Hernadez, 168 U.S. 250, 252, 18 S. Ct. 83, 84, 42 L. Ed. 456; American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 29 Sup. Ct. 511, 16 Ann. Cas. 1047.
To-wit: That, I, Gregg Al surnamed Walder, as Oregon, in propria persona, moving sui juris, hereinafter the "Affiant," after being duly affirmed upon My solemn oath in accordance with the Laws of Oregon, approved by the people of Oregon territory, circa C.E. November 9, 1857 and February 14, 1859 et seq., of consanguinity thereto and being of majority capacity and over the age of twenty-one (21) years, a free white natural man living on the soil and land who's dwelling-house is on the soil, Klamath County, Oregon state republic, hereinafter more fully described as:
"Beginning one marine league at sea, due west from the point where the forty-second parallel of north latitude intersects the same; thence northerly, at the same distance from the line of the coast lying west and opposite the state, including all islands within the jurisdiction of the United States, to a point due west and opposite the middle of the north ship channel of the Columbia river, and where it is divided by islands, up the middle of said river, and where it is divided by islands, up the widest channel thereof, to a point near Fort Walla Walla, where the forty-sixth parallel of north latitude crosses said river; thence east, on said parallel, to the middle of the main channel of the Shoshones or Snake river; thence up the middle of the main channel of said river, to the mouth of the Owyhee river; thence due south, to the parallel of latitude forty-two (42 ) degrees north; thence west, along said parallel, to the place of beginning," as approved and adopted by Act of Congress of the United States, circa C.E. February 14, 1859:
Affiant is competent to testify, truthfully, having first hand knowledge of the facts stated herein, except as to those matters which are stated or declared upon Affiant's reason and belief, and as to those matters, believe them to be entirely true, correct, certain and complete, so help Me Yhwh, and not being under any mental or physical incapacity to testify, nor under duress or other external influence, solemnly state and declare:
That, whereas the authority to create a corporation is nowhere expressly given in the original Organic Constitution of circa C.E. 1787, and if it exists must be sought as incidental to some power that is specifically granted, the utility of which is never a question of fact as espoused in Martin v. Hunter, 1 Wheat. 304, previous to the purported rebellion, nor subsequent thereto as expanded in the Legal Tender Cases, 12 Wall. 457, under consideration of Article I, Section 8, Clause 18, to wit: "To make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any Department or Office thereof."
Whereas, Affiant did not and never knowingly, intentionally nor deliberately authorize or ratify the creation of the eo nomine WALDER, GREGG AL (attribution of a legal personality/fictitious entity), or any derivative thereof, to effect the cestui que trust Gregg Al surnamed Walder, as settlor, WALDER, GREGG AL as beneficiary, and the purported UNITED STATES and/or STATE OF OREGON, its agencies or instrumentalities et al., as trustee, nor did Affiant undertake to create a "resulting trust," or otherwise implied or constructive in relation to the original Public Trust, in any action or transaction heretofore arising, by implication, by operation of law, or by Affiant's informed, knowing or intentional acts or conduct, or any combination thereof; and further Affiant does not authorize nor ratify the conversion of Affiant's Lawful given Appellation into the eo nomine WALDER, GREGG AL for the private commercial use and benefit of the purported STATE OF OREGON, its agencies and instrumentalities et al., in a Federal corporate form, in a Federal territorial capacity, whereas Affiant has never received any fair or valuable consideration for the use of the eo nomine WALDER, GREGG AL from said purported STATE OF OREGON DBA and by and through its commercial agencies and instrumentalities et al., having never paid adequate compensation nor securing a deposit of money, having numismatic or intrinsic value in and of itself so as to pass res and title, for compensation for the use and unjust enrichment thereof; and whereas, Affiant reserves the right not to act or perform in relation to a civil person or other corporate entity in the Federal corporate form, in a Federal territorial capacity, pertaining to the compelled use or forced acceptance of the purported WALDER, GREGG AL, under the scheme of limited liability, or by or under any purported derivative appellation; and that upon reason and belief of the purported judicial authority found and judicially recognized in the cases of Dred Scott v. Sanford, 19 How. 393; Rabang v. I.N.S. (CA 9, 1994), 35 F.3d @ fn. 4, cf. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. at 664; accordingly, further state and declare that Affiant is a neutral opposed to war in any form, and rely upon the decisions established in U.S. v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965); Barraza Rivera v. I.N.S., 913 F.2d 1443 (CA 9, 1990); and Roby v. Dept. of the Navy (No. 9535377), 76 F.3d 1052 (CA 9, 1996); and
Whereas, Affiant is not a participant, is a non-combatant in the purported perpetual "Open and Mixed War" as illustrated in: U.S. v. L. Cohen Grocery Co., Mo. 1921, 41 S.Ct. 298, 255 U.S. 81, 65 L.Ed. 516; U.S. v. 43,355 Square Feet of Land in King County Wash., D.C. Wash. 1943, 51 F.Supp. 905; U.S. v. Robel, Wash. 1967, 88 S.Ct. 419, 389 U.S. 258, 19 L.Ed. 2d 508; and any contrary presumption can be only justified where the danger to the government is real, impending and imminent, Schueller v. Drum, D.C.Pa. 1943, 51 F.Supp. 383; Orme v. Northern Trust Co., 1951, 102 N.E.2d 335, 410 Ill. 335, cert. den., 72 S.Ct. 677, 343 U.S. 921, 96 L.Ed. 1334; however, as contrived under the "Bank Holiday of 1933" and it's ratifying Act 12 USCA Section 95b (Proclamation No. 2040, March 9, 1933), concededly loyal Oregonians, American Citizens not involved in espionage or sabatoge, have all Their res and property Titles taken away, Their res removed to a foreign political jurisdiction and municipal corporation venue which "detention has no relationship to that objective and is unauthorized," Ex Parte Mitsuye Endo, Cal. 1944, 65 S.Ct. 208, 323 U.S. 283, 89 L.Ed. 243; but where there is a "taking" there must be just compensation therefor," Oro Fina Consol. Mines v. U.S., 1950, 92 F.Supp. 1016, 118 Ct.Cl. 18, cert. den., 71 S.Ct. 1015, 341 U.S. 948, 95 L.Ed. 1371, reh. den., 72 S.Ct. 23, 342 U.S. 843, 96 L.Ed. 637; and
Whereas, Affiant rejects and otherwise denies any inference or presumption of subject matter jurisdiction by or under operation of the political corporation UNITED STATES, STATE OF OREGON et al., its agencies or instrumentalities, in a Federal corporate form, in a Federal territorial capacity, in pursuance of pertinent discovery and disclosure, as well as applicable Evidentiary Rules, at all times material hereto, and further deny Affiant is or ever was a cestui que trust or beneficiary through the forced or compelled acceptance of any right, privilege [mort-main], benefit or other emolument by or under color of any law appertaining to the purported XIVth Article in Amendment to the corporate charter of the purported UNITED STATES, STATE OF OREGON, its agencies and instrumentalities et. al., in a Federal corporate form, in a Federal territorial capacity, by reason of the authority cited in Deyett v. Turner, 439 P.2d 266, 276 (Utah, 1967); State v. Phillips, 540 P.2d 936 (1975); 11 S.C.L.Q. 484; and 28 Tul. L. Rev. 22; and
Whereas, from circa C.E. July 28, 1868 (post Civil-War), the "States" had relinquished all of their sovereignty except for a mere proprietary interest; in effect they became debtor corporations to the corporate political United States; Moore's Digest on International Law, Vol. 1, Sections 96-110; U.S. v. Powers Heirs, 11 How. 570; U.S. v. Heirs Rillieus, 14 how. 189; and Leitensdorfer v. Webb, 2 How. 176 affirming id. at 1 NM 34; and the District of Columbia became the seat of power and authority by escheat [2 Bla. Com. 244], as that word is used in treaties with foreign powers, with respect to the ownership, disposition and inheritance of property, according to Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 270; and
Whereas, Affiant did not and does not now consent, grant, bargain, sell, gift, negotiate, authorize nor ratify the use of the eo nomine WALDER, GREGG AL by the purported UNITED STATES, STATE OF OREGON, its agencies or instrumentalities et al., whereas Affiant politically withholds and strenuously denies any grant of power, or power of attorney, express or implied, for the purported UNITED STATES, STATE OF OREGON et al. to function, or make a use of a foreign executive/legislative political jurisdiction, in a Federal corporate form, in a Federal territorial capacity, within the mandated boundaries of Oregon republic aforesaid, and further deny any devolution of Federal power in Oregon republic by or under the purported authority STATE OF OREGON, its agencies or instrumentalities et al., or by or under operation of the purported OREGON SESSION LAWS 1973, Chapter 836, pages 2707-2708, sections 10 through 14, in particular sections 11(2) and 13, purportedly pertaining to The State of Oregon de jure as the purported STATE OF OREGON, its agencies and instrumentalities et al., more specifically described as "this state," or by or under operation of the purported STATE OF OREGON' purported ratification of the XIVth Amendment under color of H.J.R. 13, May 21, 1973, in a Federal corporate form, in a Federal territorial capacity; and further, at all times material hereto, Affiant claims and exercises His "Right of Property," by and through duly executed or otherwise Lawful commutative contracts, and that strictly as a quid pro quo, value for value, without prejudice, as judicially recognized and established in the following cases: Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 261 U.S. 545, 546 (1923); and Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 14 (1914), being cited herein for the proposition that:
"Included in the right of personal liberty and the right of private property---partaking of the nature of each---is the right to make contracts for the acquisition of property. Chief among such contracts is that of personal employment by which labor and other services are exchanged for money or other forms of property. If this right be struck down or arbitrarily interfered with, there is a substantial impairment of liberty in the long established constitutional sense. The right is as essential to the laborer as to the capitalist, to the poor as to the rich; for the vast majority of persons have no other honest way to begin to acquire property, save by working for money. An interference with this liberty so serious as that now under consideration and so disturbing of equality of right, must be deemed to be arbitrary, unless it be supportable as a reasonable exercise of the police power of the State;" and
"Property does not have rights. People have rights. The right to enjoy property without unlawful deprivation, no less than the right to speak or the right to travel is in truth a "personal" right, whether the "Property" in question be a welfare check, a home, or a savings account. In fact, a fundamental interdependence exists between the personal right to liberty and the personal property right. Neither could have meaning without the other. That rights in property are basic civil rights has long been recognized. Congress recognized these rights in 1871 when it enacted the predecessor of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3). We do no more than reaffirm the judgment of Congress today." Lynch v. Household Finance Corp., 405 U.S. 538 (1972); and
Whereas, Affiant did not and does not authorize or ratify the Conference of Governors, past, present or future, to pledge, or hypothecate a lien against, the full faith and credit of the people of the several states, nor Their res or Property titles, to the aid and comfort of the UNITED STATES aforesaid, and through the Council of State Governments, to accomodate the purported National Emergency as evidenced by the Declaration of Interdependence of circa C.E. January 22, 1937, publicly published in the book "The Book of the States," Volume II, at page 144; and
Whereas, this same Congress persona non grata, the purported Congress of the UNITED STATES, a political corporation, is constitutionally enjoined and estopped from imposing a "bill of pains and penalties" upon and against Affiant, an American Citizen domiciled on Oregon soil, nor can this same political corporation [Congress of the District of Columbia, or New Columbia] impinge upon Affiant's right to work and earn an honest living in Oregon republic, that is prohibited by Article I, Section 9; of the municipal charter of the District of Columbia, and as judicially ruled in Losier v. Sherman, 157 Kan. 153, 138 P.2d 272, 273; and State v. Graves, 352 Mo. 1102, 182 S.W.2d 46, 54; and any such Trespass is void ab initio and unconstitutional; and
Whereas, Affiant states and declares that since there is no political nor legal requirement for Affiant to obtain, or maintain a Social Security Account Number (F.I.C.A./T.I.N.), such an account number being "voluntary," and any such account being heretofore legally terminated by or under the purported authority of Treasury Regulation 26 C.F.R. § 301.6109-1(d)(1), Ch. 1 (4-1-93 Edition), 20 C.F.R. § 404.1905, Ch. III (4-1-93 Edition), TN 6 10-84, SI 02301.265A., B., and C., effective May 30, 1997, nunc pro tunc, circa C.E. September 12, 1968, Affiant cannot legally be compelled to make a/any voluntary election under color of Title 5 U.S.C.S. § 5517, nor enter into a totalization agreement, express or implied, per 20 C.F.R., Chapter 111 (4-1-93 Edition), §§ 404.1901 et seq., and any "involuntary contributions made in lieu of payment of a tax" into the aforesaid account, or accounts, entitles Affiant to the restoration and redemption thereof in a lump sum (treble principal amount, plus interest in arrears, lawful money of account), or for recoupment or replevin of the same property and rights in and to said property, as judicially decided in Rosenman et al. v. U.S. (1945) 323 U.S. 658; Ford v. U.S. (CA 5, 1980), 618 F.2d 357; Thomas v. Merchantile National Bank at Dallas (CA 5, 1953), 204 F.2d 943; Hill v. U.S. (CA 3, 1959), 263 F.2d 885; Colt's Mfg. Co. v. Commissioner (CA 2, 1962), 306 F.2d 929; U.S. v. Miller (CA 10, 1963), 315 F.2d 354; Fortugno v. C.I.R. (CA 3, 1965), 353 F.2d 429; Ameel v. U.S. (CA 6, 1970), 426 F.2d 1270; U.S. v. Dubuque Packing Co. (CA 8, 1956, 233 F.2d 453; Estate of M. Karl Goetz v. U.S. (W.D.Mo., 1968), 286 F. Supp. 128; and Plankington v. U.S. (CA 7, 1959), 267 F. Supp. 278; and
Whereas, Statutes creating a [rebuttable] presumption, that deny every meaningful opportunity for rebuttal violates Due Process of Law. United States v. Good, 114 S.Ct. 492 at 496 (1993); and see: Heiner v. Donnan, 285 U.S. 312 (1932) to wit: "If a legislative body is without power to enact as a rule of evidence a statute denying a litigant the right to prove the facts of his case, certainly the power cannot be made to emerge by putting the enactment in the guise of a rule of substantive law," Heiner v. Donnan, supra, 285 U.S. 312 (1932); and
Whereas, Affiant did not and does not maintain "citizenship" or "residence" within the purported STATE OF OREGON, its agencies or instrumentalities et al., as that term is defined at Title 26 U.S.C. § 280A(d), nor does Affiant maintain a "Home" as that term is defined at Title 26 U.S.C. §§ 280A(f)(1), 162(a)(2), nor 911(d)(3), or by or under authority of any other purported legislative, political or executive enactment, rule of law, or rule of necessity, STATE or FEDERAL, not-with-standing the forced or compelled acceptance of any Federally mandated use of the private copyrighted intellectual property of the United States' Postal Service in circumventing, annulling, abrogating, supplanting, or otherwise doing away with the Oregon republic or the express Political Will of the inhabitants thereof, by, for or under operation of any domestic or foreign personal or property taxing schemes, or other transfers or assignments of property interests, in a Federal corporate form, in a Federal territorial capacity, and including but not limited to that demonstrated under color of law, color of any law, or color of office, at Title 4 U.S.C. §§ 103, 110 [Buck Act] and 12 U.S.C. § 355, inter alia; and
Whereas, Affiant did not and does not authorize nor ratify the compelled benefit of unjust enrichment by the compelled use or resulting benefit of the repudiated debt or other obligations of the United States, a Federal [POLITICAL] Corporation, circulated as fiat Money to "discharge" debt [see: Stanek v. White (1927) 172 Minn. 390, 215 N.W. 784] as distinguished from and wholly inapposite to "extinguishment" as mandated upon the several States of the union pursuant to the authority of Article One, Section Ten of the Constitution of The United States of America, circa C.E. September 17, 1787, authored and sponsered by Roger Sherman, and as Amended in Addition circa C.E. February 21, 1871, Forty First Congress, Session III, ch. 61 and 62, 16 Stat. 419 at or near page 800; and further, Affiant, as Oregon, did not and does not politically authorize or ratify the Corporation The State of Oregon de jure, the several Counties or the political subdivisions thereof, or any other State of the several States of the union, The United States of America, or the United States as a Federal [POLITICAL] Corporation, to act, operate or function in any unjust enrichment capacity {to prosecute or campaign for commercia belli} or purported military or business form, Federal corporate, commercial or otherwise, than that form Organically established and ordained for each State, the United States, or Oregon circa C.E. November 9, 1857 and February 14, 1859 et seq., upon the soil-Oregon, as the duly consituted "civil" form ordained and established by the people Themselves; and in addition, Affiant, as Oregon, did not and does not authorize or ratify any purported employer, employee or other entity, acting as agent, agency or political subdivision of any purported Federal corporate or commercial business form of Oregon, Federal or otherwise, to make use of said purported business or commercial form to obtain or procure benefits from the United States, of unjust enrichment for the account, or accounts, of Affiant, or for Affiant's use or benefit; moreover, Affiant, as Oregon, did not and does not authorize or ratify the United States, to circulate the repudiated debt or other obligations of the United States (a Federal Corporation of Congress) as a compelled benefit of "discharge" [see: Stanek v. White, 172 Minn. 390, 215 N.W. 784, October 14, 1927] in the form of the debt obligations of the United States, and thereby create a purported presumption of fact, or by or under operation of law, Affiant's purported participation in unjust enrichment through the compelled use and purportedly unconditional acceptance of said worthless debt or other obligations or benefits of the United States, under the diabolical scheme and purpose of depriving Affiant of all allodial res (legal interest in real and personal property), including but not limited to Affiant's unalienable incorporeal hereditaments of personalty (pignus, servitus, hereditas and dominium, juris et de jure in pursuance of the Sacred Trust, droit droit dominium jura in re), or American Citizenship by natural live birth and consanguinity aforesaid, whereas Affiant declares any such erroneous presumption of fact is "without prejudice" as to any purported unjust enrichment on His part, and non-assumpsit to all others; and
Whereas, Affiant, under the "Compelled Benefits Doctrine," a real live flesh and blood man cannot be held liable for benefits that He is compelled to accept, for reasons beyond His control, or otherwise, especially if it is a compelled economic benefit, see: MAYNARD MEHL v. JOHN H. NORTON, No. 31,338, Supreme Court of Minnesota, 201 Minn. 203; 275 N.W. 843; 1937 Minn. LEXIS 851; 113A.L.R. 1055, November 5, 1937; W. H. Shearon v. Travis Henderson, Guardian, etc., SUPREME COURT OF TEXAS, 38 Tex. 245; 1873 Tex. LEXIS 241, 1873; JO ELAINE BAILEY WOODLAND, Appellant v. SHIRLEY WISDOM,Appellee, No. 06-97-00083-CV, COURT OF APPEALS OF TEXAS, SIXTH DISTRICT, TEXARKANA, 975 S.W.2d 712; 1998 Tex. App. LEXIS 5038; Charles L. Black Aycock et al, Appellants v. F. H. Pannill,Sr., et al, Appellees, COURT OF APPEALS OF TEXAS, ELEVENTH DISTRICT, EASTLAND, 853 S.W.2d 161; 1993 Tex. App. LEXIS 989; F. M. SMITH, Appellant, v. TEXAS COMMERCE BANK - CORPUS CHRISTI, N.A., ET AL., Appellees., COURT OF APPEALS OF TEXAS, THIRTEENTH DISTRICT, CORPUS CHRISTI, 822 S.W.2d 812; 1992 Tex. App. LEXIS 209; FRANCES JACKSON ROGERS, Appellant, v. DAVID ORMAN ROGERS,JR., Appellee, COURT OF APPEALS OF TEXAS, Thirteenth District, Corpus Christi, 806 S.W.2d 886; 1991 Tex. App. LEXIS 646; and
Whereas, Affiant did not and does not accept, authorize or ratify, the empty title of nobility "citizen of the United States," nor citizenship thereof, either certified or exemplified by the agency of the people of the states, not-with-standing majority rule, by operation of or under the apparent authority of the constitution of The United States of America, circa C.E. September 17, 1787, and as Amended in Addition circa C.E. February 21, 1871, Forty First Congress, Session III, ch. 61 and 62, 16 Stat. 419 at or near page 800, specifically the XIVth Article of Amendment in Addition thereto, to wit:
THE UNITED STATES FEDERAL STATUTES ANNOTATED, Vol. IX, page 388, Am. XIV, § 1, VII (1), to wit:
"VII. "Subject to the Jurisdiction Thereof"---1. In General---The real object of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution, in qualifying the words, "All persons born in the United States," by the addition, "and subject to the jurisdiction thereof," would appear to have been to exclude, by the fewest and fittest words, besides children of members of the Indian tribes, standing in a peculiar relation to the national government, unknown to the common law, the two classes of cases---children born of alien enemies in hostile occupation, and children of diplomatic representatives of a foreign state---both of which, as has already been shown, by the law of England, and by our own law, from the time of the first settlement of the English colonies in America, had been recognized exceptions to the fundamental rule of citizenship by birth within a country;"
In addition, from the UNITED STATES FEDERAL STATUTES, Vol. IX, page 387, Am. XIV, § 1, VI (2), it is further stated and declared:
"VI. Distinction between Citizenship of United States and of a State. 2. Clause Reverses Previous Rule of Citizenship. Prior to the adoption of this amendment, strictly speaking, there were no citizens of the United States, but only some one of them. Congress had the power "to establish a uniform rule of naturalization," but not the power to make a naturalized alien a citizen of any state. But the states generally provided that such persons might on sufficient residence therein, become citizens thereof, and then the courts held, ab convenienti, rather than otherwise, that they became ipso facto citizens of the United States. But the amendment declares the law positively on the subject, and reverses this order of procedure, by making citizenship of a state consequent on citizenship of the United States; for, having declared what persons are citizens of the United States, it does not stop there, and leave it in the power of a state to exclude any such person who may reside therein from its citizenship, but adds "and such persons shall also be citizens of "the state" wherein they reside;" and
Further, From the Annotated Constitution aforesaid, XIVth Amendment:
Although Sec. 4 ''was undoubtedly inspired by the desire to put beyond question the obligations of the Government issued during the Civil War, its language indicates a broader connotation. . . . '[T]he validity of the public debt'. . . [embraces] whatever concerns the integrity of the public obligations,'' and applies to government bonds issued after as well as before adoption of the Amendment." [Footnote 74] Perry v. United States, 294 U.S. 330, 354 (1935), in which the Court concluded that the Joint Resolution of June 5, 1933 {HJR 192, codified at 31 USC § 5118], insofar as it attempted to override the gold-clause obligation in a Fourth Liberty Loan Gold Bond ''went beyond the congressional power;'' and
Whereas, Affiant did not and does not authorize nor ratify the Revised Statutes of 1878 et al., in particular section 1999, one of the purported RECONSTRUCTION ACTS, purportedly that under color of law, color of any law, or color of office, of the Attorney General's Office circa C.E. June 12, 1867, approved circa C.E. July 2, 1862, by Henry Stanbery, former Attorney General, whom colluded with Congress and the High Office of President to dispense with "American Citizenship" and the sovereign elector capacity of Oregonians in exchange for the privilege of becoming a registered [or qualified] voter or elector which, by a purported "rule of necessity," and according to the laws and usages of war on land, arbitrarily forced or compelled the purported abandonment of all Oregonians' res and legal interests in real and personal property in exchange for the privilege of a political and elective franchise, by the purported agency of the people of the states, in a Federal corporate form, and in a Federal territorial capacity, wholly situate within the boundaries of and upon the soil-Oregon republic aforesaid [extraterritoriality], under the purported authority of cf. Udny v. Udny, L.R. 1 H.L. Sc. 457, Id. @ 18 S.Ct. 456, 483, 42 L.Ed. 890 (1898-1934) cf., to wit:
"The federal state shall constitute a sole person in the eyes of international law," to wit: "The political existence of the state is independent of recognition by other states. Even before recognition the state has the right to defend its integrity and independence, to provide for its conservation and prosperity, and consequently to organize itself as it sees fit, to legislate upon its own interests, administer its services, and define the jurisdiction and competence of its courts;" and
"There can be no doubt as to the rule of construction according to which we must interpret this grant of power. It is a grant of power to military authority, over civil rights and citizens, in time of peace. It is a new jurisdiction, never granted before, by which, in certain particulars and for certain purposes, the established principle that the military shall be subordinate to the civil authority is reversed;" and
Congress was not satisfied with the organic law or constitution under which this [National] civil government was established:
"That constitution was to be changed in only one particular to make it acceptable to Congress, and that was in the matter of the elective franchise. The purpose, the sole object of this act, is to effect that change, and to effect it by the agency of the people of the State, or such of them as are made voters by means of elections provided for in the act, and in the meantime to preserve order and to punish offenders, if found necessary, by military commissions."
The rule of construction to be applied to such a grant of power is thus stated in Dwarris on Statutes, p. 652: "A statute creating a new jurisdiction ought to be construed strictly;" and
Whereas, Affiant did not and does not authorize nor ratify the transfer nor assignment of either the res, legal interest or Title to all His real and personal property, nor does Affiant authorize or ratify said legal interests (res) thereof appertaining, to arbitrarily "vest" in or otherwise escheat to the Alien Property Custodian of the purported United States as evidenced by 93 C.J.S., Section 25, War and National Defense; Foster v. U.S., 98 F. Supp. 349, 120 Ct. Cl. 93, cert. den., 72 S.Ct. 365, 342 U.S. 919, 96 L.Ed. 687; with respect to the ownership, disposition, and inheritance of property, Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 270; not-with-standing any such forced or compelled transfer or assignment or other purported abandonment of Affiant's Allodial Title and res, is a legitimate function of Congress, the Alien Property Custodian, or even the President, past present or future, under the purported War Powers Acts, cf. Udny v. Udny, L.R. 1 H.L. Sc. 457, Id. @ 18 S.Ct. 456, 483, 42 L.Ed. 890 (1898) aforesaid; and
Whereas, Affiant states and declares that the trustees, as STATE OF OREGON, an Agency of the United States' Government, have a known legal duty, as well as a "fiduciary duty" not to misrepresent material facts concerning Oregonians' Right of Property and the holding of any legal interest, or res, therein, such as the levy of a forced loan or conversion thereof by subordinating "debt" in favor of foreign interests, which rule of law is well established by a virtual plethora of case precedence too numerous to list herein, but may best be described by resort to but two cases, Bruun v. Hanson (CA 9, 1939), 103 F.2d 685; and State Bar Association v. Douglas (Neb., 1987) 416 N.W.2d 515; cf. 65 C.J. 652, § 520; and
Whereas, Affiant, in exercise of the "prudent man test," has exercised every reasonable attempt to remove His res and Allodial Titles from the purported foreign, political, legislatively created, executive controlled, jurisdiction and venue aforesaid, which continued "detention" has no relationship to the aforesaid stated objectives and is unauthorized," Ex Parte Mitsuye Endo, Cal. 1944, 65 S.Ct. 208, 323 U.S. 283, 89 L.Ed. 243; and knowing where there is a "taking" there must be a just compensation therefor. Oro Fina Consol. Mines v. U.S., 1950, 92 F.Supp. 1016, 118 Ct.Cl. 18, cert. den., 71 S.Ct. 1015, 341 U.S. 948, 95 L.Ed. 1371, reh. den., 72 S.Ct. 23, 342 U.S. 843, 96 L.Ed. 637; because Affiant is not an "enemy" thereto, the term "enemy" as used in the original Organic Constitution applies only to subjects of a foreign power in a state of Open and Mixed War against the Fifty (50) states comprising the union and the National Government aka "The United States of America," by the authority cited in 4 Sawy. 457; 4 Story 614; and 11 Johns 549; and "Treason" being defined at c. 645, 62 Stat. 807 (circa C.E. June 25, 1948); P.L. 103-322, Title XXXIII, Section 330016(2)(J), 108 Stat. 2148 (September 13, 1994), currently codified at 18 U.S.C. Section 2381; and
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From The State Of Oregon: Affidavit For Restoration &
Redemption Of Res And Title
From: Gregg Al Walder | q7w77y8a@wyoming.com
( The following document is proof that what was done to the people of Australia by the government of Britain, is the same thing that was done to the people of the united States by the government of Britain, namely, that we are all slaves of colonies of the UK. )
________________________________________________________________________
On the soil,
The County of Klamath,
The State of Oregon, de jure.
ss: Statement of Political Will: Demand For Restoration & Redemption of Res and Title
From: Oetjen v. Central Leather Co. (1918), 246 U.S. 297:
"Who is the sovereign, de jure or de facto, of a territory is not a judicial, but is a political question, the determination of which by the legislative and executive departments of any government conclusively binds the judges, as well as all other officers, citizens and subjects of that government. This principle has always been upheld by this court, and has been affirmed under a great variety of circumstances." Jones v. U.S., 137 U.S. 202, 212, 11 S. Ct. 80, 83, 34 L.Ed. 691.
"It is also the result of the interpretation by this court of the principles of international law that when a government which originates in revolution or revolt is recognized by the political department of our government as the de [246 U.S. 297, 303] jure government of the country in which it is established, such recognition is retroactive in effect and validates all the actions and conduct of the government so recognized from the commencement of its existence." Williams v. Bruffy, 96 U.S. 176, 186; see s.c., 65 Fed. 577, 13 C.C.A. 51, 38 L.R.A. 405.
To these principles we must add that:
"Every sovereign state is bound to respect the independence of every other sovereign state, and the courts of one country will not sit in judgment on the acts of the government of another done within its own territory." Underhill v. Hernadez, 168 U.S. 250, 252, 18 S. Ct. 83, 84, 42 L. Ed. 456; American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 29 Sup. Ct. 511, 16 Ann. Cas. 1047.
To-wit: That, I, Gregg Al surnamed Walder, as Oregon, in propria persona, moving sui juris, hereinafter the "Affiant," after being duly affirmed upon My solemn oath in accordance with the Laws of Oregon, approved by the people of Oregon territory, circa C.E. November 9, 1857 and February 14, 1859 et seq., of consanguinity thereto and being of majority capacity and over the age of twenty-one (21) years, a free white natural man living on the soil and land who's dwelling-house is on the soil, Klamath County, Oregon state republic, hereinafter more fully described as:
"Beginning one marine league at sea, due west from the point where the forty-second parallel of north latitude intersects the same; thence northerly, at the same distance from the line of the coast lying west and opposite the state, including all islands within the jurisdiction of the United States, to a point due west and opposite the middle of the north ship channel of the Columbia river, and where it is divided by islands, up the middle of said river, and where it is divided by islands, up the widest channel thereof, to a point near Fort Walla Walla, where the forty-sixth parallel of north latitude crosses said river; thence east, on said parallel, to the middle of the main channel of the Shoshones or Snake river; thence up the middle of the main channel of said river, to the mouth of the Owyhee river; thence due south, to the parallel of latitude forty-two (42 ) degrees north; thence west, along said parallel, to the place of beginning," as approved and adopted by Act of Congress of the United States, circa C.E. February 14, 1859:
Affiant is competent to testify, truthfully, having first hand knowledge of the facts stated herein, except as to those matters which are stated or declared upon Affiant's reason and belief, and as to those matters, believe them to be entirely true, correct, certain and complete, so help Me Yhwh, and not being under any mental or physical incapacity to testify, nor under duress or other external influence, solemnly state and declare:
That, whereas the authority to create a corporation is nowhere expressly given in the original Organic Constitution of circa C.E. 1787, and if it exists must be sought as incidental to some power that is specifically granted, the utility of which is never a question of fact as espoused in Martin v. Hunter, 1 Wheat. 304, previous to the purported rebellion, nor subsequent thereto as expanded in the Legal Tender Cases, 12 Wall. 457, under consideration of Article I, Section 8, Clause 18, to wit: "To make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any Department or Office thereof."
Whereas, Affiant did not and never knowingly, intentionally nor deliberately authorize or ratify the creation of the eo nomine WALDER, GREGG AL (attribution of a legal personality/fictitious entity), or any derivative thereof, to effect the cestui que trust Gregg Al surnamed Walder, as settlor, WALDER, GREGG AL as beneficiary, and the purported UNITED STATES and/or STATE OF OREGON, its agencies or instrumentalities et al., as trustee, nor did Affiant undertake to create a "resulting trust," or otherwise implied or constructive in relation to the original Public Trust, in any action or transaction heretofore arising, by implication, by operation of law, or by Affiant's informed, knowing or intentional acts or conduct, or any combination thereof; and further Affiant does not authorize nor ratify the conversion of Affiant's Lawful given Appellation into the eo nomine WALDER, GREGG AL for the private commercial use and benefit of the purported STATE OF OREGON, its agencies and instrumentalities et al., in a Federal corporate form, in a Federal territorial capacity, whereas Affiant has never received any fair or valuable consideration for the use of the eo nomine WALDER, GREGG AL from said purported STATE OF OREGON DBA and by and through its commercial agencies and instrumentalities et al., having never paid adequate compensation nor securing a deposit of money, having numismatic or intrinsic value in and of itself so as to pass res and title, for compensation for the use and unjust enrichment thereof; and whereas, Affiant reserves the right not to act or perform in relation to a civil person or other corporate entity in the Federal corporate form, in a Federal territorial capacity, pertaining to the compelled use or forced acceptance of the purported WALDER, GREGG AL, under the scheme of limited liability, or by or under any purported derivative appellation; and that upon reason and belief of the purported judicial authority found and judicially recognized in the cases of Dred Scott v. Sanford, 19 How. 393; Rabang v. I.N.S. (CA 9, 1994), 35 F.3d @ fn. 4, cf. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. at 664; accordingly, further state and declare that Affiant is a neutral opposed to war in any form, and rely upon the decisions established in U.S. v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965); Barraza Rivera v. I.N.S., 913 F.2d 1443 (CA 9, 1990); and Roby v. Dept. of the Navy (No. 9535377), 76 F.3d 1052 (CA 9, 1996); and
Whereas, Affiant is not a participant, is a non-combatant in the purported perpetual "Open and Mixed War" as illustrated in: U.S. v. L. Cohen Grocery Co., Mo. 1921, 41 S.Ct. 298, 255 U.S. 81, 65 L.Ed. 516; U.S. v. 43,355 Square Feet of Land in King County Wash., D.C. Wash. 1943, 51 F.Supp. 905; U.S. v. Robel, Wash. 1967, 88 S.Ct. 419, 389 U.S. 258, 19 L.Ed. 2d 508; and any contrary presumption can be only justified where the danger to the government is real, impending and imminent, Schueller v. Drum, D.C.Pa. 1943, 51 F.Supp. 383; Orme v. Northern Trust Co., 1951, 102 N.E.2d 335, 410 Ill. 335, cert. den., 72 S.Ct. 677, 343 U.S. 921, 96 L.Ed. 1334; however, as contrived under the "Bank Holiday of 1933" and it's ratifying Act 12 USCA Section 95b (Proclamation No. 2040, March 9, 1933), concededly loyal Oregonians, American Citizens not involved in espionage or sabatoge, have all Their res and property Titles taken away, Their res removed to a foreign political jurisdiction and municipal corporation venue which "detention has no relationship to that objective and is unauthorized," Ex Parte Mitsuye Endo, Cal. 1944, 65 S.Ct. 208, 323 U.S. 283, 89 L.Ed. 243; but where there is a "taking" there must be just compensation therefor," Oro Fina Consol. Mines v. U.S., 1950, 92 F.Supp. 1016, 118 Ct.Cl. 18, cert. den., 71 S.Ct. 1015, 341 U.S. 948, 95 L.Ed. 1371, reh. den., 72 S.Ct. 23, 342 U.S. 843, 96 L.Ed. 637; and
Whereas, Affiant rejects and otherwise denies any inference or presumption of subject matter jurisdiction by or under operation of the political corporation UNITED STATES, STATE OF OREGON et al., its agencies or instrumentalities, in a Federal corporate form, in a Federal territorial capacity, in pursuance of pertinent discovery and disclosure, as well as applicable Evidentiary Rules, at all times material hereto, and further deny Affiant is or ever was a cestui que trust or beneficiary through the forced or compelled acceptance of any right, privilege [mort-main], benefit or other emolument by or under color of any law appertaining to the purported XIVth Article in Amendment to the corporate charter of the purported UNITED STATES, STATE OF OREGON, its agencies and instrumentalities et. al., in a Federal corporate form, in a Federal territorial capacity, by reason of the authority cited in Deyett v. Turner, 439 P.2d 266, 276 (Utah, 1967); State v. Phillips, 540 P.2d 936 (1975); 11 S.C.L.Q. 484; and 28 Tul. L. Rev. 22; and
Whereas, from circa C.E. July 28, 1868 (post Civil-War), the "States" had relinquished all of their sovereignty except for a mere proprietary interest; in effect they became debtor corporations to the corporate political United States; Moore's Digest on International Law, Vol. 1, Sections 96-110; U.S. v. Powers Heirs, 11 How. 570; U.S. v. Heirs Rillieus, 14 how. 189; and Leitensdorfer v. Webb, 2 How. 176 affirming id. at 1 NM 34; and the District of Columbia became the seat of power and authority by escheat [2 Bla. Com. 244], as that word is used in treaties with foreign powers, with respect to the ownership, disposition and inheritance of property, according to Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 270; and
Whereas, Affiant did not and does not now consent, grant, bargain, sell, gift, negotiate, authorize nor ratify the use of the eo nomine WALDER, GREGG AL by the purported UNITED STATES, STATE OF OREGON, its agencies or instrumentalities et al., whereas Affiant politically withholds and strenuously denies any grant of power, or power of attorney, express or implied, for the purported UNITED STATES, STATE OF OREGON et al. to function, or make a use of a foreign executive/legislative political jurisdiction, in a Federal corporate form, in a Federal territorial capacity, within the mandated boundaries of Oregon republic aforesaid, and further deny any devolution of Federal power in Oregon republic by or under the purported authority STATE OF OREGON, its agencies or instrumentalities et al., or by or under operation of the purported OREGON SESSION LAWS 1973, Chapter 836, pages 2707-2708, sections 10 through 14, in particular sections 11(2) and 13, purportedly pertaining to The State of Oregon de jure as the purported STATE OF OREGON, its agencies and instrumentalities et al., more specifically described as "this state," or by or under operation of the purported STATE OF OREGON' purported ratification of the XIVth Amendment under color of H.J.R. 13, May 21, 1973, in a Federal corporate form, in a Federal territorial capacity; and further, at all times material hereto, Affiant claims and exercises His "Right of Property," by and through duly executed or otherwise Lawful commutative contracts, and that strictly as a quid pro quo, value for value, without prejudice, as judicially recognized and established in the following cases: Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 261 U.S. 545, 546 (1923); and Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 14 (1914), being cited herein for the proposition that:
"Included in the right of personal liberty and the right of private property---partaking of the nature of each---is the right to make contracts for the acquisition of property. Chief among such contracts is that of personal employment by which labor and other services are exchanged for money or other forms of property. If this right be struck down or arbitrarily interfered with, there is a substantial impairment of liberty in the long established constitutional sense. The right is as essential to the laborer as to the capitalist, to the poor as to the rich; for the vast majority of persons have no other honest way to begin to acquire property, save by working for money. An interference with this liberty so serious as that now under consideration and so disturbing of equality of right, must be deemed to be arbitrary, unless it be supportable as a reasonable exercise of the police power of the State;" and
"Property does not have rights. People have rights. The right to enjoy property without unlawful deprivation, no less than the right to speak or the right to travel is in truth a "personal" right, whether the "Property" in question be a welfare check, a home, or a savings account. In fact, a fundamental interdependence exists between the personal right to liberty and the personal property right. Neither could have meaning without the other. That rights in property are basic civil rights has long been recognized. Congress recognized these rights in 1871 when it enacted the predecessor of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3). We do no more than reaffirm the judgment of Congress today." Lynch v. Household Finance Corp., 405 U.S. 538 (1972); and
Whereas, Affiant did not and does not authorize or ratify the Conference of Governors, past, present or future, to pledge, or hypothecate a lien against, the full faith and credit of the people of the several states, nor Their res or Property titles, to the aid and comfort of the UNITED STATES aforesaid, and through the Council of State Governments, to accomodate the purported National Emergency as evidenced by the Declaration of Interdependence of circa C.E. January 22, 1937, publicly published in the book "The Book of the States," Volume II, at page 144; and
Whereas, this same Congress persona non grata, the purported Congress of the UNITED STATES, a political corporation, is constitutionally enjoined and estopped from imposing a "bill of pains and penalties" upon and against Affiant, an American Citizen domiciled on Oregon soil, nor can this same political corporation [Congress of the District of Columbia, or New Columbia] impinge upon Affiant's right to work and earn an honest living in Oregon republic, that is prohibited by Article I, Section 9; of the municipal charter of the District of Columbia, and as judicially ruled in Losier v. Sherman, 157 Kan. 153, 138 P.2d 272, 273; and State v. Graves, 352 Mo. 1102, 182 S.W.2d 46, 54; and any such Trespass is void ab initio and unconstitutional; and
Whereas, Affiant states and declares that since there is no political nor legal requirement for Affiant to obtain, or maintain a Social Security Account Number (F.I.C.A./T.I.N.), such an account number being "voluntary," and any such account being heretofore legally terminated by or under the purported authority of Treasury Regulation 26 C.F.R. § 301.6109-1(d)(1), Ch. 1 (4-1-93 Edition), 20 C.F.R. § 404.1905, Ch. III (4-1-93 Edition), TN 6 10-84, SI 02301.265A., B., and C., effective May 30, 1997, nunc pro tunc, circa C.E. September 12, 1968, Affiant cannot legally be compelled to make a/any voluntary election under color of Title 5 U.S.C.S. § 5517, nor enter into a totalization agreement, express or implied, per 20 C.F.R., Chapter 111 (4-1-93 Edition), §§ 404.1901 et seq., and any "involuntary contributions made in lieu of payment of a tax" into the aforesaid account, or accounts, entitles Affiant to the restoration and redemption thereof in a lump sum (treble principal amount, plus interest in arrears, lawful money of account), or for recoupment or replevin of the same property and rights in and to said property, as judicially decided in Rosenman et al. v. U.S. (1945) 323 U.S. 658; Ford v. U.S. (CA 5, 1980), 618 F.2d 357; Thomas v. Merchantile National Bank at Dallas (CA 5, 1953), 204 F.2d 943; Hill v. U.S. (CA 3, 1959), 263 F.2d 885; Colt's Mfg. Co. v. Commissioner (CA 2, 1962), 306 F.2d 929; U.S. v. Miller (CA 10, 1963), 315 F.2d 354; Fortugno v. C.I.R. (CA 3, 1965), 353 F.2d 429; Ameel v. U.S. (CA 6, 1970), 426 F.2d 1270; U.S. v. Dubuque Packing Co. (CA 8, 1956, 233 F.2d 453; Estate of M. Karl Goetz v. U.S. (W.D.Mo., 1968), 286 F. Supp. 128; and Plankington v. U.S. (CA 7, 1959), 267 F. Supp. 278; and
Whereas, Statutes creating a [rebuttable] presumption, that deny every meaningful opportunity for rebuttal violates Due Process of Law. United States v. Good, 114 S.Ct. 492 at 496 (1993); and see: Heiner v. Donnan, 285 U.S. 312 (1932) to wit: "If a legislative body is without power to enact as a rule of evidence a statute denying a litigant the right to prove the facts of his case, certainly the power cannot be made to emerge by putting the enactment in the guise of a rule of substantive law," Heiner v. Donnan, supra, 285 U.S. 312 (1932); and
Whereas, Affiant did not and does not maintain "citizenship" or "residence" within the purported STATE OF OREGON, its agencies or instrumentalities et al., as that term is defined at Title 26 U.S.C. § 280A(d), nor does Affiant maintain a "Home" as that term is defined at Title 26 U.S.C. §§ 280A(f)(1), 162(a)(2), nor 911(d)(3), or by or under authority of any other purported legislative, political or executive enactment, rule of law, or rule of necessity, STATE or FEDERAL, not-with-standing the forced or compelled acceptance of any Federally mandated use of the private copyrighted intellectual property of the United States' Postal Service in circumventing, annulling, abrogating, supplanting, or otherwise doing away with the Oregon republic or the express Political Will of the inhabitants thereof, by, for or under operation of any domestic or foreign personal or property taxing schemes, or other transfers or assignments of property interests, in a Federal corporate form, in a Federal territorial capacity, and including but not limited to that demonstrated under color of law, color of any law, or color of office, at Title 4 U.S.C. §§ 103, 110 [Buck Act] and 12 U.S.C. § 355, inter alia; and
Whereas, Affiant did not and does not authorize nor ratify the compelled benefit of unjust enrichment by the compelled use or resulting benefit of the repudiated debt or other obligations of the United States, a Federal [POLITICAL] Corporation, circulated as fiat Money to "discharge" debt [see: Stanek v. White (1927) 172 Minn. 390, 215 N.W. 784] as distinguished from and wholly inapposite to "extinguishment" as mandated upon the several States of the union pursuant to the authority of Article One, Section Ten of the Constitution of The United States of America, circa C.E. September 17, 1787, authored and sponsered by Roger Sherman, and as Amended in Addition circa C.E. February 21, 1871, Forty First Congress, Session III, ch. 61 and 62, 16 Stat. 419 at or near page 800; and further, Affiant, as Oregon, did not and does not politically authorize or ratify the Corporation The State of Oregon de jure, the several Counties or the political subdivisions thereof, or any other State of the several States of the union, The United States of America, or the United States as a Federal [POLITICAL] Corporation, to act, operate or function in any unjust enrichment capacity {to prosecute or campaign for commercia belli} or purported military or business form, Federal corporate, commercial or otherwise, than that form Organically established and ordained for each State, the United States, or Oregon circa C.E. November 9, 1857 and February 14, 1859 et seq., upon the soil-Oregon, as the duly consituted "civil" form ordained and established by the people Themselves; and in addition, Affiant, as Oregon, did not and does not authorize or ratify any purported employer, employee or other entity, acting as agent, agency or political subdivision of any purported Federal corporate or commercial business form of Oregon, Federal or otherwise, to make use of said purported business or commercial form to obtain or procure benefits from the United States, of unjust enrichment for the account, or accounts, of Affiant, or for Affiant's use or benefit; moreover, Affiant, as Oregon, did not and does not authorize or ratify the United States, to circulate the repudiated debt or other obligations of the United States (a Federal Corporation of Congress) as a compelled benefit of "discharge" [see: Stanek v. White, 172 Minn. 390, 215 N.W. 784, October 14, 1927] in the form of the debt obligations of the United States, and thereby create a purported presumption of fact, or by or under operation of law, Affiant's purported participation in unjust enrichment through the compelled use and purportedly unconditional acceptance of said worthless debt or other obligations or benefits of the United States, under the diabolical scheme and purpose of depriving Affiant of all allodial res (legal interest in real and personal property), including but not limited to Affiant's unalienable incorporeal hereditaments of personalty (pignus, servitus, hereditas and dominium, juris et de jure in pursuance of the Sacred Trust, droit droit dominium jura in re), or American Citizenship by natural live birth and consanguinity aforesaid, whereas Affiant declares any such erroneous presumption of fact is "without prejudice" as to any purported unjust enrichment on His part, and non-assumpsit to all others; and
Whereas, Affiant, under the "Compelled Benefits Doctrine," a real live flesh and blood man cannot be held liable for benefits that He is compelled to accept, for reasons beyond His control, or otherwise, especially if it is a compelled economic benefit, see: MAYNARD MEHL v. JOHN H. NORTON, No. 31,338, Supreme Court of Minnesota, 201 Minn. 203; 275 N.W. 843; 1937 Minn. LEXIS 851; 113A.L.R. 1055, November 5, 1937; W. H. Shearon v. Travis Henderson, Guardian, etc., SUPREME COURT OF TEXAS, 38 Tex. 245; 1873 Tex. LEXIS 241, 1873; JO ELAINE BAILEY WOODLAND, Appellant v. SHIRLEY WISDOM,Appellee, No. 06-97-00083-CV, COURT OF APPEALS OF TEXAS, SIXTH DISTRICT, TEXARKANA, 975 S.W.2d 712; 1998 Tex. App. LEXIS 5038; Charles L. Black Aycock et al, Appellants v. F. H. Pannill,Sr., et al, Appellees, COURT OF APPEALS OF TEXAS, ELEVENTH DISTRICT, EASTLAND, 853 S.W.2d 161; 1993 Tex. App. LEXIS 989; F. M. SMITH, Appellant, v. TEXAS COMMERCE BANK - CORPUS CHRISTI, N.A., ET AL., Appellees., COURT OF APPEALS OF TEXAS, THIRTEENTH DISTRICT, CORPUS CHRISTI, 822 S.W.2d 812; 1992 Tex. App. LEXIS 209; FRANCES JACKSON ROGERS, Appellant, v. DAVID ORMAN ROGERS,JR., Appellee, COURT OF APPEALS OF TEXAS, Thirteenth District, Corpus Christi, 806 S.W.2d 886; 1991 Tex. App. LEXIS 646; and
Whereas, Affiant did not and does not accept, authorize or ratify, the empty title of nobility "citizen of the United States," nor citizenship thereof, either certified or exemplified by the agency of the people of the states, not-with-standing majority rule, by operation of or under the apparent authority of the constitution of The United States of America, circa C.E. September 17, 1787, and as Amended in Addition circa C.E. February 21, 1871, Forty First Congress, Session III, ch. 61 and 62, 16 Stat. 419 at or near page 800, specifically the XIVth Article of Amendment in Addition thereto, to wit:
THE UNITED STATES FEDERAL STATUTES ANNOTATED, Vol. IX, page 388, Am. XIV, § 1, VII (1), to wit:
"VII. "Subject to the Jurisdiction Thereof"---1. In General---The real object of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution, in qualifying the words, "All persons born in the United States," by the addition, "and subject to the jurisdiction thereof," would appear to have been to exclude, by the fewest and fittest words, besides children of members of the Indian tribes, standing in a peculiar relation to the national government, unknown to the common law, the two classes of cases---children born of alien enemies in hostile occupation, and children of diplomatic representatives of a foreign state---both of which, as has already been shown, by the law of England, and by our own law, from the time of the first settlement of the English colonies in America, had been recognized exceptions to the fundamental rule of citizenship by birth within a country;"
In addition, from the UNITED STATES FEDERAL STATUTES, Vol. IX, page 387, Am. XIV, § 1, VI (2), it is further stated and declared:
"VI. Distinction between Citizenship of United States and of a State. 2. Clause Reverses Previous Rule of Citizenship. Prior to the adoption of this amendment, strictly speaking, there were no citizens of the United States, but only some one of them. Congress had the power "to establish a uniform rule of naturalization," but not the power to make a naturalized alien a citizen of any state. But the states generally provided that such persons might on sufficient residence therein, become citizens thereof, and then the courts held, ab convenienti, rather than otherwise, that they became ipso facto citizens of the United States. But the amendment declares the law positively on the subject, and reverses this order of procedure, by making citizenship of a state consequent on citizenship of the United States; for, having declared what persons are citizens of the United States, it does not stop there, and leave it in the power of a state to exclude any such person who may reside therein from its citizenship, but adds "and such persons shall also be citizens of "the state" wherein they reside;" and
Further, From the Annotated Constitution aforesaid, XIVth Amendment:
Although Sec. 4 ''was undoubtedly inspired by the desire to put beyond question the obligations of the Government issued during the Civil War, its language indicates a broader connotation. . . . '[T]he validity of the public debt'. . . [embraces] whatever concerns the integrity of the public obligations,'' and applies to government bonds issued after as well as before adoption of the Amendment." [Footnote 74] Perry v. United States, 294 U.S. 330, 354 (1935), in which the Court concluded that the Joint Resolution of June 5, 1933 {HJR 192, codified at 31 USC § 5118], insofar as it attempted to override the gold-clause obligation in a Fourth Liberty Loan Gold Bond ''went beyond the congressional power;'' and
Whereas, Affiant did not and does not authorize nor ratify the Revised Statutes of 1878 et al., in particular section 1999, one of the purported RECONSTRUCTION ACTS, purportedly that under color of law, color of any law, or color of office, of the Attorney General's Office circa C.E. June 12, 1867, approved circa C.E. July 2, 1862, by Henry Stanbery, former Attorney General, whom colluded with Congress and the High Office of President to dispense with "American Citizenship" and the sovereign elector capacity of Oregonians in exchange for the privilege of becoming a registered [or qualified] voter or elector which, by a purported "rule of necessity," and according to the laws and usages of war on land, arbitrarily forced or compelled the purported abandonment of all Oregonians' res and legal interests in real and personal property in exchange for the privilege of a political and elective franchise, by the purported agency of the people of the states, in a Federal corporate form, and in a Federal territorial capacity, wholly situate within the boundaries of and upon the soil-Oregon republic aforesaid [extraterritoriality], under the purported authority of cf. Udny v. Udny, L.R. 1 H.L. Sc. 457, Id. @ 18 S.Ct. 456, 483, 42 L.Ed. 890 (1898-1934) cf., to wit:
"The federal state shall constitute a sole person in the eyes of international law," to wit: "The political existence of the state is independent of recognition by other states. Even before recognition the state has the right to defend its integrity and independence, to provide for its conservation and prosperity, and consequently to organize itself as it sees fit, to legislate upon its own interests, administer its services, and define the jurisdiction and competence of its courts;" and
"There can be no doubt as to the rule of construction according to which we must interpret this grant of power. It is a grant of power to military authority, over civil rights and citizens, in time of peace. It is a new jurisdiction, never granted before, by which, in certain particulars and for certain purposes, the established principle that the military shall be subordinate to the civil authority is reversed;" and
Congress was not satisfied with the organic law or constitution under which this [National] civil government was established:
"That constitution was to be changed in only one particular to make it acceptable to Congress, and that was in the matter of the elective franchise. The purpose, the sole object of this act, is to effect that change, and to effect it by the agency of the people of the State, or such of them as are made voters by means of elections provided for in the act, and in the meantime to preserve order and to punish offenders, if found necessary, by military commissions."
The rule of construction to be applied to such a grant of power is thus stated in Dwarris on Statutes, p. 652: "A statute creating a new jurisdiction ought to be construed strictly;" and
Whereas, Affiant did not and does not authorize nor ratify the transfer nor assignment of either the res, legal interest or Title to all His real and personal property, nor does Affiant authorize or ratify said legal interests (res) thereof appertaining, to arbitrarily "vest" in or otherwise escheat to the Alien Property Custodian of the purported United States as evidenced by 93 C.J.S., Section 25, War and National Defense; Foster v. U.S., 98 F. Supp. 349, 120 Ct. Cl. 93, cert. den., 72 S.Ct. 365, 342 U.S. 919, 96 L.Ed. 687; with respect to the ownership, disposition, and inheritance of property, Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 270; not-with-standing any such forced or compelled transfer or assignment or other purported abandonment of Affiant's Allodial Title and res, is a legitimate function of Congress, the Alien Property Custodian, or even the President, past present or future, under the purported War Powers Acts, cf. Udny v. Udny, L.R. 1 H.L. Sc. 457, Id. @ 18 S.Ct. 456, 483, 42 L.Ed. 890 (1898) aforesaid; and
Whereas, Affiant states and declares that the trustees, as STATE OF OREGON, an Agency of the United States' Government, have a known legal duty, as well as a "fiduciary duty" not to misrepresent material facts concerning Oregonians' Right of Property and the holding of any legal interest, or res, therein, such as the levy of a forced loan or conversion thereof by subordinating "debt" in favor of foreign interests, which rule of law is well established by a virtual plethora of case