CIVIL RIGHTS ACT of 1866 & CIVIL RIGHTS ACT of 1871 - CRA - 42 U.S. Code 21 §§1981, 1981A, 1983, & 1988
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The Civil Rights Act of 1871, also known as the Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871, is an important federal statute in force in the United States. Several of its provisions still exist today as codified statutes, but the most important still-existing provision is . The Act was originally enacted a few years after the American Civil War, along with the 1870 Force Act. One of the chief reasons for its passage was to protect southern blacks from the Ku Klux Klan by providing a civil remedy for abuses then being committed in the South. The statute has been subject to only minor changes since then, but has been the subject of voluminous interpretation by courts.
Section 1983 does not create new civil rights. Instead, it allows individuals to sue state actors in State or federal courts for civil rights violations.[1] To gain federal jurisdiction, i.e., access to a court, the individual must point to a federal civil right that has been allegedly violated. These rights are encoded in the U.S. Constitution and federal statutes.
The document reads:[1]
- Every person who under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, Suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress, except that in any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer's judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable. For the purposes of this section, any Act of Congress applicable exclusively to the District of Columbia shall be considered to be a statute of the District of Columbia.
For most of its history, the Act had very little effect. The legal community did not think the statute served as a check on state officials, and did not often litigate under the statute. However, this changed in 1961 when the Supreme Court of the United States decided Monroe v. Pape.[2] In that case, the Court articulated three purposes that underlay the statute: "1) 'to override certain kinds of state laws'; 2) to provide 'a remedy where state law was inadequate'; and 3) to provide 'a federal remedy where the state remedy, though adequate in theory, was not available in practice.'" Blum & Urbonya, Section 1983 Litigation, p. 2 (Federal Judicial Center, 1998) (quoting Monroe v. Pape). Pape opened the door for renewed interest in Section 1983.
Now the statute stands as one of the most powerful authorities with which State and federal courts may protect those whose rights are deprived. Section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act provides a way individuals can sue to redress violations of federally protected rights, like the First Amendment, Fourteenth Amendment and Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution. Section 1983 prohibits public sector employment discrimination based on race, color, national origin, sex and religion. Section 1983 rarely applies to private employers.
[edit] History
[edit] Legislation
- Main article: Ku Klux Klan
The Ku Klux Klan Act was originally passed because some governors in the South during Reconstruction were unwilling or unable to act against violence by the Ku Klux Klan. In lynching cases, whites were almost never indicted by all-white coroner's juries, and even when there was an indictment, all-white trial juries were extremely unlikely to vote for conviction. In many states, use of black militiamen would ignite a race war. When Republican governor William Woods Holden of North Carolina called out the state militia against the Klan in 1870, the result was a backlash culminating with his impeachment in 1871. Many Southern states had already passed anti-Klan legislation, and, in February 1871, former Union general Benjamin Franklin Butler, a US House of Representatives member from Massachusetts, introduced federal legislation modeled on these acts. Some politicians at the national level professed doubt about Klan activities, but the tide was turned in favor of the bill by the governor of South Carolina's appeal for federal troops, and by reports of a riot and massacre in a Meridian, Mississippi courthouse, during which a black state representative was forced to hide in the woods in order to escape a likely death.
In 1871, Republican President Ulysses S. Grant signed Butler's legislation, the Ku Klux Klan Act.
[edit] Use during Reconstruction
Under the Klan Act during Reconstruction, federal troops were used rather than state militias to enforce the law, and Klansmen were prosecuted in federal court, where juries were often predominantly black (reflecting the local population). Hundreds of Klan members were fined or imprisoned, and habeas corpus was suspended in nine counties in South Carolina. These efforts were so successful that the Klan was destroyed in South Carolina and decimated throughout the rest of the country, where it had already been in decline for several years. The Klan was not to exist again until its recreation in 1915, but it had already achieved many of its goals in the South, such as denying voting rights to Southern blacks.
[edit] Later uses
Although some provisions were ruled unconstitutional in 1882, the Force Act and the Klan Act have been invoked in later civil rights conflicts, including the 1964 murders of Chaney, Goodman, and Schwerner; the 1965 murder of Viola Liuzzo; and in Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic, 506 U.S. 263 (1993), which the court ruled that "The first clause of 1985(3) does not provide a federal cause of action against persons obstructing access to abortion clinics."
Today, the Civil Rights Act can be invoked whenever a state or local government official violates a federally guaranteed right. The most common use today is to redress violations of the Fourth Amendment's protection against unreasonable search and seizure. Such lawsuits concern false arrest and police brutality, most notably in the Rodney King case.
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42 USC CHAPTER 21 - CIVIL RIGHTSTITLE 42 - THE PUBLIC HEALTH AND WELFARE
CHAPTER 21 - CIVIL RIGHTS
Sec.
1981. Equal rights under the law.
1981a. Damages in cases of intentional discrimination in employment
1983. Civil action for deprivation of rights.
1988. Proceedings in vindication of civil rights.
Sec. 1981. Equal rights under the law
(a) Statement of equal rights
All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall
have the same right in every State and Territory to make and
enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence, and to the
full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security
of persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall
be subject to like punishment, pains, penalties, taxes, licenses,
and exactions of every kind, and to no other.
(b) "Make and enforce contracts" defined
For purposes of this section, the term "make and enforce
contracts" includes the making, performance, modification, and
termination of contracts, and the enjoyment of all benefits,
privileges, terms, and conditions of the contractual relationship.
(c) Protection against impairment
The rights protected by this section are protected against
impairment by nongovernmental discrimination and impairment under
color of State law.
Sec. 1981a. Damages in cases of intentional discrimination in
employment
(a) Right of recovery
(1) Civil rights
In an action brought by a complaining party under section 706
or 717 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 [42 U.S.C. 2000e-5,
2000e-16] against a respondent who engaged in unlawful
intentional discrimination (not an employment practice that is
unlawful because of its disparate impact) prohibited under
section 703, 704, or 717 of the Act [42 U.S.C. 2000e-2, 2000e-3,
2000e-16], and provided that the complaining party cannot recover
under section 1981 of this title, the complaining party may
recover compensatory and punitive damages as allowed in
subsection (b) of this section, in addition to any relief
authorized by section 706(g) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
from the respondent.
(2) Disability
In an action brought by a complaining party under the powers,
remedies, and procedures set forth in section 706 or 717 of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 [42 U.S.C. 2000e-5, 2000e-16] (as
provided in section 107(a) of the Americans with Disabilities Act
of 1990 (42 U.S.C. 12117(a)), and section 794a(a)(1) of title 29,
respectively) against a respondent who engaged in unlawful
intentional discrimination (not an employment practice that is
unlawful because of its disparate impact) under section 791 of
title 29 and the regulations implementing section 791 of title
29, or who violated the requirements of section 791 of title 29
or the regulations implementing section 791 of title 29
concerning the provision of a reasonable accommodation, or
section 102 of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (42
U.S.C. 12112), or committed a violation of section 102(b)(5) of
the Act, against an individual, the complaining party may recover
compensatory and punitive damages as allowed in subsection (b) of
this section, in addition to any relief authorized by section
706(g) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, from the respondent.
(3) Reasonable accommodation and good faith effort
In cases where a discriminatory practice involves the provision
of a reasonable accommodation pursuant to section 102(b)(5) of
the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 [42 U.S.C.
12112(b)(5)] or regulations implementing section 791 of title 29,
damages may not be awarded under this section where the covered
entity demonstrates good faith efforts, in consultation with the
person with the disability who has informed the covered entity
that accommodation is needed, to identify and make a reasonable
accommodation that would provide such individual with an equally
effective opportunity and would not cause an undue hardship on
the operation of the business.
(b) Compensatory and punitive damages
(1) Determination of punitive damages
A complaining party may recover punitive damages under this
section against a respondent (other than a government, government
agency or political subdivision) if the complaining party
demonstrates that the respondent engaged in a discriminatory
practice or discriminatory practices with malice or with reckless
indifference to the federally protected rights of an aggrieved
individual.
(2) Exclusions from compensatory damages
Compensatory damages awarded under this section shall not
include backpay, interest on backpay, or any other type of relief
authorized under section 706(g) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
[42 U.S.C. 2000e-5(g)].
(3) Limitations
The sum of the amount of compensatory damages awarded under
this section for future pecuniary losses, emotional pain,
suffering, inconvenience, mental anguish, loss of enjoyment of
life, and other nonpecuniary losses, and the amount of punitive
damages awarded under this section, shall not exceed, for each
complaining party -
(A) in the case of a respondent who has more than 14 and
fewer than 101 employees in each of 20 or more calendar weeks
in the current or preceding calendar year, $50,000;
(B) in the case of a respondent who has more than 100 and
fewer than 201 employees in each of 20 or more calendar weeks
in the current or preceding calendar year, $100,000; and
(C) in the case of a respondent who has more than 200 and
fewer than 501 employees in each of 20 or more calendar weeks
in the current or preceding calendar year, $200,000; and
(D) in the case of a respondent who has more than 500
employees in each of 20 or more calendar weeks in the current
or preceding calendar year, $300,000.
(4) Construction
Nothing in this section shall be construed to limit the scope
of, or the relief available under, section 1981 of this title.
(c) Jury trial
If a complaining party seeks compensatory or punitive damages
under this section -
(1) any party may demand a trial by jury; and
(2) the court shall not inform the jury of the limitations
described in subsection (b)(3) of this section.
(d) Definitions
As used in this section:
(1) Complaining party
The term "complaining party" means -
(A) in the case of a person seeking to bring an action under
subsection (a)(1) of this section, the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission, the Attorney General, or a person who
may bring an action or proceeding under title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq.); or
(B) in the case of a person seeking to bring an action under
subsection (a)(2) of this section, the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission, the Attorney General, a person who may
bring an action or proceeding under section 794a(a)(1) of title
29, or a person who may bring an action or proceeding under
title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 [42
U.S.C. 12111 et seq.].
(2) Discriminatory practice
The term "discriminatory practice" means the discrimination
described in paragraph (1), or the discrimination or the
violation described in paragraph (2), of subsection (a) of this
section.
Sec. 1983. Civil action for deprivation of rights
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the
District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any
citizen of the United States or other person within the
jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges,
or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable
to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other
proper proceeding for redress, except that in any action brought
against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such
officer's judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted
unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was
unavailable. For the purposes of this section, any Act of Congress
applicable exclusively to the District of Columbia shall be
considered to be a statute of the District of Columbia.
Sec. 1988. Proceedings in vindication of civil rights
(a) Applicability of statutory and common law
The jurisdiction in civil and criminal matters conferred on the
district courts by the provisions of titles 13, 24, and 70 of the
Revised Statutes for the protection of all persons in the United
States in their civil rights, and for their vindication, shall be
exercised and enforced in conformity with the laws of the United
States, so far as such laws are suitable to carry the same into
effect; but in all cases where they are not adapted to the object,
or are deficient in the provisions necessary to furnish suitable
remedies and punish offenses against law, the common law, as
modified and changed by the constitution and statutes of the State
wherein the court having jurisdiction of such civil or criminal
cause is held, so far as the same is not inconsistent with the
Constitution and laws of the United States, shall be extended to
and govern the said courts in the trial and disposition of the
cause, and, if it is of a criminal nature, in the infliction of
punishment on the party found guilty.
(b) Attorney's fees
In any action or proceeding to enforce a provision of sections
1981, 1981a, 1982, 1983, 1985, and 1986 of this title, title IX of
Public Law 92-318 [20 U.S.C. 1681 et seq.], the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act of 1993 [42 U.S.C. 2000bb et seq.], the Religious
Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 [42 U.S.C.
2000cc et seq.], title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 [42
U.S.C. 2000d et seq.], or section 13981 of this title, the court,
in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the
United States, a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs,
except that in any action brought against a judicial officer for an
act or omission taken in such officer's judicial capacity such
officer shall not be held liable for any costs, including
attorney's fees, unless such action was clearly in excess of such
officer's jurisdiction.
(c) Expert fees
In awarding an attorney's fee under subsection (b) of this
section in any action or proceeding to enforce a provision of
section 1981 or 1981a of this title, the court, in its discretion,
may include expert fees as part of the attorney's fee.