FourWinds10.com - Delivering Truth Around the World
Custom Search

FTR #671 Update on the Meltdown, Part 4: Germany, the Underground Reich and the Global Financial Crisis

Davy Emory

Smaller Font Larger Font RSS 2.0

y;nomic col­lapse would open up great oppor­tu­ni­ties for a “new world order,” led by a newly ascen­dant Ger­many. Devel­op­ing the the­sis that the events fore­seen in 1950 may have actu­ally been engi­neered by the Fed­eral Repub­lic [of Ger­many], much of the broad­cast fea­tures analy­sis attribut­ing the finan­cial col­lapse of 2008 to delib­er­ate fis­cal pol­icy enacted by the Ger­man dom­i­nated Euro­pean Cen­tral Bank.

Com­par­ing Ger­man eco­nomic pol­icy in the imme­di­ate pre-Hitler period with that pur­sued by Ger­many dur­ing the first decade of the Euro­pean Mon­e­tary Union, author Sara Moore sees par­al­lel and delib­er­ate defla­tion­ary stances as cen­tral to both the onset of the Great Depres­sion and the 2008 global finan­cial col­lapse. Moore’s the­sis main­tains that delib­er­ately low ECB inter­est rates insti­tuted after the incep­tion of the Euro led to a global cap­i­tal flow to the U.S. Fol­low­ing the ECB’s mul­ti­ple rate increases in the mid­dle of this decade, Moore sees that cap­i­tal flow revers­ing, help­ing to pre­cip­i­tate the cur­rent debacle.

After analy­sis of par­al­lels between 1930 Ger­many and the con­tem­po­rary Fed­eral Repub­lic, we review the con­ti­nu­ity between the eco­nomic pol­icy advo­cated by Pan-German the­o­reti­cian Friedrich List and those pur­sued by the Third Reich and the con­tem­po­rary Fed­eral Repub­lic. Specif­i­cally, the pro­gram notes that List’s the­ory for a German-dominated cen­tral Euro­pean eco­nomic union was imple­mented by the Third Reich and then insti­tu­tion­al­ized by the Fed­eral Repub­lic in the form of the Euro­pean Mon­e­tary Union.

After not­ing jour­nal­ist Dorothy Thompson’s 1940 account of Germany’s plans for a Nazi-controlled U.S. fea­tur­ing liaisons with key U.S. indus­trial fig­ures, the broad­cast reviews the Nazis 1944 plan­ning for the post­war, includ­ing their high regard for Bush family-controlled busi­nesses.

Of par­tic­u­lar inter­est for read­ers of this descrip­tion is an arti­cle not included in the orig­i­nal pro­gram. A recent Daily Mail story chron­i­cles the August 10, 1944 meet­ing at which Third Reich indus­tri­al­ists and SS offi­cers set forth the Nazi plans to go under­ground and per­pet­u­ate their empire through eco­nomic, not mil­i­tary, dom­i­nance. Not­ing the polit­i­cal con­ti­nu­ity between the Third Reich and the “new” Fed­eral Repub­lic, the arti­cle sup­ple­ments For The Record’s analy­sis that the EMU and the EU are the actual real­iza­tion of the Third Reich’s post­war con­tin­gency planning.

The pro­gram con­cludes by not­ing the role that key per­son­nel from major Ger­man cor­po­ra­tions played in advo­cat­ing the bailout pro­grams that the Obama admin­is­tra­tion has imple­mented. This should be under­stood in the con­text of the Bor­mann cap­i­tal network’s con­trol of cor­po­rate Ger­many. Sig­nif­i­cantly, many of AIG’s bailout pay­ments went to finan­cial insti­tu­tions con­trolled by the Under­ground Reich and the Bor­mann network.

Pro­gram High­lights Include: Sim­i­lar­ity between the tax­a­tion, wage reg­u­la­tion and indus­trial export pol­icy pur­sued by Ger­man Chan­cel­lor Brun­ing in the imme­di­ate pre-Hitler period and those insti­tuted by the Fed­eral Repub­lic in the early part of this decade; review of the links between the SS and Lud­wig Erhard (who became Eco­nom­ics Min­is­ter and then Chancellor–widely cred­ited as the author of the “Ger­man eco­nomic mir­a­cle”); AIG’s bailout pay­ments to Deutsche Bank and UBS (both key Bor­mann cap­i­tal net­work affiliates).

NOTE: A respected source attrib­utes the cri­sis to the flow of cap­i­tal from com­mer­cial banks to invest­ment banks.

1. The pro­gram begins with an arti­cle not­ing Ger­man fore­shad­ow­ing of the present global finan­cial cri­sis more than 60 years ago. Note that the Trum­pet is a Chris­t­ian mag­a­zine that [among other things] ref­er­ences bib­li­cal proph­esy. The analy­sis pre­sented here is solid, pre­scient and should not be dis­missed because of the periph­eral the­o­log­i­cal ref­er­ences, nei­ther used nor endorsed in For The Record.

“The Trum­pet keeps a keen eye on Ger­many. For nearly two decades, the Trum­pet staff has waited, watched and writ­ten about the emer­gence of a glob­ally dom­i­nant, German-led bloc of Euro­pean states. We have warned specif­i­cally that a spec­tac­u­lar global finan­cial cri­sis, cen­tered in the United States, will likely bring this event to fruition.

We are not entirely alone in this expectation.

The fol­low­ing is a snip­pet from a secret mem­o­ran­dum writ­ten by high-ranking Ger­man offi­cers and dis­trib­uted among an elite group of Ger­man lead­ers in Bonn and other parts of the world. It is an elec­tri­fy­ing pic­ture of cur­rent events.

Eco­nomic dif­fi­cul­ties will one day plunge the United States down from its present dizzy heights. Such a cat­a­stro­phe can be brought about through crafty manip­u­la­tions and through arti­fi­cially engen­dered crises. Such maneu­vers are rou­tine mea­sures which have already been employed in inter­na­tional power strug­gle and will be used again and again as long as eco­nomic rivals fight for power posi­tions and mar­kets in the world.

It is quite con­ceiv­able that Amer­ica, weak­ened by a depres­sion, will one day seek sup­port from a res­ur­rected Ger­many. Such a prospect would open tremen­dous pos­si­bil­i­ties for the future power posi­tion of a bloc intro­duc­ing a new order in the world.

That was writ­ten in 1950. It can be found in T.H. Tetens’ 1953 book, Ger­many Plots With the Krem­lin.

Its pre­science is chilling.

Sur­vey the cur­rent global finan­cial cri­sis and the changes it is pre­cip­i­tat­ing. Eco­nomic dif­fi­cul­ties [have] plunge[d] the United States down from its present dizzy heights. Check. Such a cat­a­stro­phe [was] brought about through crafty manip­u­la­tions and through arti­fi­cially engen­dered crises. Check. Amer­ica, weak­ened by a depres­sion, [is seek­ing] sup­port from a res­ur­rected Ger­many. Check. Such a prospect [is] open[ing] tremen­dous pos­si­bil­i­ties for the future power posi­tion of a bloc intro­duc­ing a new order in the world. Check.

With its eco­nomic land­scape strewn with surg­ing unem­ploy­ment lines, writhing stocks, and rot­ting corpses of banks, finan­cial insti­tu­tions and busi­nesses, it’s hard to deny “eco­nomic dif­fi­cul­ties” have brought Amer­ica down from its dizzy­ing heights. Sim­i­larly, piles of evidence-think Bernie Mad­off, Lehman Broth­ers and lib­eral bank lend­ing standards-testify to “crafty manip­u­la­tion” as a root cause of this crisis.

What about the notion that “arti­fi­cially engen­dered crises” pre­cip­i­tated by for­eign forces are also partly to blame for the col­lapse of the Amer­i­can finan­cial system?

British author and his­to­rian Sara Moore recently delved into this his­tor­i­cally sig­nif­i­cant, eerily famil­iar trend. Armed with facts and his­tor­i­cal prece­dent, Moore details in the Euro­pean Jour­nal how Ger­many, employ­ing a sim­i­lar for­mula to what it used in the 1930s, is craftily manip­u­lat­ing EU eco­nomic pol­icy in an effort to under­mine the U.S.

One fun­da­men­tal cause of the credit cri­sis in Amer­ica, Moore sug­gests, was Germany’s exploita­tion of the euro (May 2008).

This inter­est­ing argu­ment deserves close scrutiny (January/February 2009). When the euro first came online in Jan­u­ary 1999, the Euro­pean Cen­tral Bank (ecb)-headquartered in Frank­furt, pat­terned after Germany’s Bun­des­bank and heav­ily influ­enced by Germans-ensured inter­est rates remained at or around 2 per­cent. This was done, in part, to help sta­bi­lize and pro­mote the growth of the Ger­man econ­omy. By main­tain­ing low inter­est rates, Moore says, the German-led ecb caused global investors to flock to higher-yielding U.S. trea­suries, dis­tort­ing money mar­kets and facil­i­tat­ing easy credit in America.

The ecb’s pol­icy, Moore says, helped prime Amer­i­can credit mar­kets for rupture.

This became inevitable after Decem­ber 2005, when the ecb, hav­ing main­tained low inter­est rates for years, raised inter­est rates seven times in a row. By late 2007, with Europe offer­ing higher, increas­ingly attrac­tive inter­est rates, cash was flow­ing briskly into Europe, and less briskly into Amer­ica. Together with the hous­ing cri­sis, the ecb’s cal­cu­lated diver­sion of money away from Amer­ica and into Europe was at least partly respon­si­ble for the Amer­i­can credit cri­sis. Accord­ing to Moore, it was when the ecb raised its inter­est rates for the eighth con­sec­u­tive time in July 2008, that “stock mar­kets round the world collapsed.”

The idea that Ger­many pre­cip­i­tated the cur­rent global eco­nomic cri­sis is intrigu­ing. It’s an argu­ment that grows stronger if you fac­tor in the doc­u­mented proof show­ing Ger­man lead­ers planned 60 years ago that an “arti­fi­cially [German-]engendered” cri­sis would one day bring the U.S. econ­omy down, and send Amer­ica scram­bling to Ger­many for assistance.

Barely a day passes with­out a cho­rus of Amer­i­can voices-journalists, econ­o­mists, busi­ness lead­ers, politi­cians and even the Amer­i­can president-requesting Europe, par­tic­u­larly Ger­many, to do more to res­cue Europe and the rest of the world from the eco­nomic chaos. The lat­est brouhaha between Amer­ica and Europe, for exam­ple, was sparked by Pres­i­dent Barack Obama’s most recent request that Europe, and espe­cially Ger­many, lighten the bur­den of the global eco­nomic cri­sis by enact­ing larger stim­u­lus pack­ages for flail­ing Euro­pean economies. Lament­ing in the New York Times on Mon­day, promi­nent econ­o­mist Paul Krug­man said he feels Europe is not doing near enough to com­bat the global eco­nomic down­turn. It is not uncom­mon to hear world lead­ers talk­ing about the need for a new world order-one, many agree, that needs to be cen­tered in Europe.

America’s plea to Europe, and Ger­many in par­tic­u­lar, is des­per­ate and defin­i­tive: The world needs you to do more to res­cue it from eco­nomic calamity!

As this predica­ment inten­si­fies, it will con­tinue to cre­ate “tremen­dous pos­si­bil­i­ties” for Ger­many. Watch Ger­many intently. We don’t know if the men who wrote that secret mem­o­ran­dum in 1950 are still alive today. That is incon­se­quen­tial. The more impor­tant ques­tion is: Is their strat­egy for a Ger­man new world order still being pursued?

It is becom­ing harder to deny that it is!

There will be some who will look at the global eco­nomic melt­down and the fact that it is caus­ing both Europe and Amer­ica to rely more on Ger­many, admit that this aligns per­fectly with doc­u­mented Ger­manic designs, and con­sider it an unusual coin­ci­dence. But doesn’t Germany’s age-old pen­chant for global domin­ion, its provoca­tive role in the two largest wars in his­tory, the fact that it is doc­u­mented that after World War ii Nazis planned to do it again, the cur­rent explo­sive and uncer­tain world con­di­tions, and the night­mare sce­nario of another holo­caust, make this a sub­ject wor­thy of deep investigation?. . . ”

“Ger­many Antic­i­pated this Finan­cial Crisis–60 Years Ago” by Brad Mac­Don­ald; thetrumpet.com; 3/19/2009.

2. The Mac­Don­ald piece draws on infor­ma­tion from an arti­cle by author Sara Moore, the author of two books. Specif­i­cally, she com­pares the defla­tion­ary pol­icy fol­lowed by Ger­many under Chan­cel­lor Brun­ing in the pre-Hitler period with the defla­tion­ary pol­icy pur­sued by the [Ger­man con­trolled] Euro­pean Cen­tral Bank in the mid­dle of this decade. Moore feels that it was the sharp increases (in the mid­dle of this decade) from the rel­a­tively low inter­est rates the bank insti­tuted after the incep­tion of the Euro that helped pro­duce the cur­rent crisis.

“A reassess­ment of how Germany’s defla­tion­ary poli­cies con­tributed to the Great Depres­sion in the 1930s and to her rise to power is over­due. When in 1930 Hein­rich Brün­ing

became Chan­cel­lor of Ger­many he told his friends in the unions that his chief aim was to lib­er­ate Ger­many from pay­ing war repa­ra­tions and for­eign debt. He felt that if he diverted all Germany’s efforts into exports it would weaken the abil­ity of Amer­ica and the Allies to force

Ger­many to pay her IOUs if she chose not to. The Ger­man unions there­fore agreed to Brün­ing

reduc­ing wages, rais­ing taxes and divert­ing all indus­trial activ­ity into exports so as to bring pres­sure on the West­ern pow­ers, not real­iz­ing to what extent this would mean mis­ery,

unem­ploy­ment and a diminu­tion of power for the work­ers. Brüning’s ini­tia­tive was suc­cess­ful. Mil­lions of peo­ple abroad were fooled into believ­ing that Ger­many her­self was really poor not just her hap­less cit­i­zens, even though Ger­many was the great­est exporter in the world,

with a moun­tain of cash in the bank.

Sev­enty years after the Treaty of Ver­sailles con­sen­sus has at last been reached that the leg­end of the ‘vin­dic­tive’ Treaty was a fable. Yet his­to­ri­ans have hes­i­tated to draw new con­clu­sions about the Great Depres­sion, namely if Ger­man politi­cians escape cen­sure for their actions in the twen­ti­eth Cen­tury will they be tempted to use defla­tion for polit­i­cal pur­poses in the twenty-first

Century?. . . .”

“Germany–An Emerg­ing Super Power?–Comparisons with the 1930’s by Sara Moore; Euro­pean Jour­nal; May/2009.

3.  Moore feels that the ini­tially low inter­est rates ini­ti­ated by the ECB after the Euro’s cre­ation led to a cash flow to Amer­ica, where rel­a­tively high inter­est rates were attrac­tive to investors.

“. . . The world econ­omy is huge com­pared to the 1930s but if Ger­many imposes a defla­tion­ary pol­icy on Europe it can have an effect world­wide because the Euro­pean Union com­prises nearly 500 mil­lion peo­ple with money to save or spend.

The Euro­pean Cen­tral Bank (ECB) is located in Frank­furt and mod­eled on the Ger­man Bun­des­bank. When the euro was first intro­duced inter­est rates were kept at 2 per cent, caus­ing a slump in the value of the euro and a mass exo­dus of sur­plus funds. How­ever since 2005 Euro­pean inter­est rates have risen 8 times, caus­ing the euro to rise over 50 per cent against the dol­lar by 2007, both because of the dollar’s weak­ness and to the rise in Europe’s inter­est rates.

For­eign­ers’ faith in the euro rests pri­mar­ily with Ger­many. Other euroland coun­tries economies are not so strong. Indeed Germany’s Euro­pean neigh­bors have sud­denly dis­cov­ered that Ger­many effec­tively imposed a ‘wage freeze’ on its work­ers after the adop­tion of the euro in 1999, claw­ing back 40 per cent in labour com­pet­i­tive­ness against Italy, 30 per cent against Spain and 20 per cent against France by 2007. Britain’s bankers shed few tears over France and Italy when they com­plained of the ECB inter­est rate rises mak­ing their busi­nesses uncom­pet­i­tive, or even Spain, hit by ‘an ECB-created prop­erty bub­ble.’ Britain’s pound was strong in the spring of 2007. It had moved ‘tightly with the euro’ for the last three years but as it always paid a lit­tle more in inter­est than the euro many Euro­pean coun­tries held their bal­ances in pounds. How­ever, in July 2007 the Bank of Eng­land decided, in view of Britain’s ris­ing infla­tion, that it would raise British inter­est rates too, one month after the ECB. Unfor­tu­nately the com­bi­na­tion of the Amer­i­can sub-prime cri­sis, an over-leveraged home mar­ket and the final Euro­pean inter­est rate rise, was too much to bear — the mort­gage lender North­ern Rock cracked and Britain itself sud­denly seemed frag­ile too. . . .”

(Idem.)

4. More of Sara Moore’s analy­sis, not­ing her empha­sis on ini­tially low ECB inter­est rates:

“. . . . In a way one could say that the present credit cri­sis is the delayed result of the euro’s arrival. Ger­many was the strongest coun­try in euroland at its incep­tion but out­siders wor­ried that she was still nurs­ing a hang­over from her reuni­fi­ca­tion party in 1990. She was allowed to breach EU rules that stip­u­lated that annual gov­ern­ment deficits must not exceed 3 per cent of GDP and the ECB also promised to keep Euro­pean inter­est rates at 2 per cent to help the Ger­man econ­omy. This encour­aged the world’s spare cash to avoid the euro and seek higher returns in the US. The Asian economies accu­mu­lated vast sums from exports and piled them into dol­lars. So the bankers had the bright idea of lend­ing money to the under­priv­i­leged so they too could share in the Amer­i­can dream. . . The trou­ble was that the sub­prime mort­gages started with low inter­est rates, which soon became higher. Money began to ebb away from the US attracted by ris­ing inter­est rates in Europe. In 2008 the sub­prime mort­gage cri­sis threat­ens to be one of the largest losses of Amer­i­can wealth ever seen, wip­ing out a gen­er­a­tion of home wealth building.”

(Idem.)

5. Con­tin­u­ing her com­par­i­son of 1930’s Ger­many under Brun­ing with the Fed­eral Repub­lic today, Moore notes that analy­sis of that coun­try as eco­nom­i­cally weak [in the late ’90’s] was pre­ma­ture, as was the 1930 assess­ment of Ger­many as eco­nom­i­cally weak.

“Despite Germany’s impres­sive export per­for­mance in 1930/31 most peo­ple believed her protes­ta­tions of poverty in the Great Depres­sion because of the mis­ery and unem­ploy­ment of the Ger­man peo­ple. When the euro was intro­duced in 1999 the Ger­man economy’s health was also in ques­tion. Yet in 2003 Katinka Barysch of the Cen­tre for Euro­pean Reform wrote an arti­cle called ‘Ger­many — the sick man of Europe?’ which asserted that Ger­many with its flour­ish­ing high­tech sec­tor was not as infirm as many made out. Once more the world’s largest exporter she was also the prin­ci­pal trad­ing part­ner for most East­ern Euro­pean coun­tries join­ing the EU.

Katinka Barysch declared that what dis­tin­guished Ger­many — ‘from most of its peers’ — was the weak­ness of domes­tic demand. Indeed after the arrival of the euro Ger­man work­ers suf­fered years of stag­nant or declin­ing wages. Then the Ger­man gov­ern­ment, in an admit­tedly pale com­par­i­son with 1930, decided to cut cor­po­ra­tion tax and give other advan­tages to indus­try, and to raise VAT, bring­ing pain to the work­ers, in order to pay for it. Nat­u­rally, in Jan­u­ary 2007, the Ger­man unions asked for more money to com­pen­sate them for the increase in taxes. Yet after wage increases of 4.1 per cent were agreed with Germany’s most pow­er­ful union I G Met­all, the head of the Ger­man Bun­des­bank Axel Weber declared that wage infla­tion was get­ting out of con­trol, there was a growth in the money sup­ply, and the ECB needed to raise inter­est rates to curb it. On 18 May 2007, France’s bank chief, Chris­t­ian Noyer, flatly con­tra­dicted Weber’s com­ments on infla­tion. Yet euroland inter­est rates were still raised to 4 per cent — with the expec­ta­tion of more — caus­ing money to pour out of the dol­lar into the euro and an esca­la­tion of the Amer­i­can sub-prime cri­sis. The ECB has since flooded mar­kets with short-term money but despite the rules being bent when the euro was first intro­duced to aid the Ger­man econ­omy, Bun­des­bank chief Axel Weber and ECB chief econ­o­mist Jur­gen Stark have remained deaf to pleas, which would really help the world in 2008, to bend the rules and allow ECB inter­est rates to fall.”

(Idem.)

6. After dis­cus­sion of the effect of ECB rate increases on the U.S. sub­prime hold­ers, Moore com­pares trans-Atlantic cap­i­tal flows with those in the 1929–1930 period.

“If one is look­ing at pre-war par­al­lels one could chart the ebb and flow of money across the Atlantic Ocean. In the late 1920s because of her stri­dent pro­pa­ganda Ger­many was viewed as poor and less guilty of the war in 1914, but mod­ern his­to­ri­ans and econ­o­mists now believe her to have been pri­mar­ily respon­si­ble for the Great War and by 1928 more pow­er­ful than in 1914. Euro­pean money, includ­ing an unspec­i­fied amount of Ger­man cash, flowed into Wall Street in 1928/29. At the end of April 1929, with a new deal beck­on­ing over the pay­ment of war repa­ra­tions, Ger­many put her inter­est rates up by a full 1 per cent to 7 per cent, prompt­ing inter­est rate rises in Aus­tria, Poland and Hun­gary. From June 1929 Ger­many was reported pur­chas­ing sub­stan­tial quan­ti­ties of gold, an alarmed France fol­low­ing one month later. Ger­many and France’s gold pur­chases were so large that they even­tu­ally prompted expec­ta­tions of a rise in the British bank rate as all the major coun­tries were on the Gold Stan­dard. Money

became tight and in that envi­ron­ment finan­cial scan­dals hap­pen. Clarence Hatry’s fraud­u­lent empire col­lapsed. Soon after­ward Wall Street crashed. In essence the Wall Street crash was a polit­i­cal event, caused by wor­ries whether Ger­man war repa­ra­tions and debt would ever get repaid, but tight money mar­ket con­di­tions also helped. In 2007 money in Britain and the US also sud­denly became scarce. One hopes that the final par­al­lel with the Great Depres­sion — a stock mar­ket crash — is averted. . . Germany’s defla­tion so far is only a faint shadow of her defla­tion in the 1930s but we can sur­mise that she has aspirations.”

(Idem.)

7. Moore con­cludes her argu­ment with a look at the his­tory of impe­r­ial Pan-Germanism. Obvi­ously, she sees the EU and the Euro­pean Mon­e­tary Union as a poten­tial ful­fill­ment of Pan-Germanic aspirations.

“In 1994 Pres­i­dent Clin­ton proph­e­sied that Ger­many would be Europe’s future leader. In the Mid­dle Ages she had been leader of the Holy Roman Empire, which encom­passed much of Europe. Later, before the First World War, the Pan Ger­man League aimed at cre­at­ing an empire of all the Ger­manic peo­ples under Pruss­ian lead­er­ship, which would include all the nations in the Austro-Hungarian Empire, also Switzer­land, Hol­land and Bel­gium and Roma­nia because of her strate­gic posi­tion at the mouth of the Danube. The empire would be bound together first by a cus­toms union, which would pre­pare the way for the cre­ation of community-wide legal and polit­i­cal insti­tu­tions. Even­tu­ally a Nation­al­staat would come into being ‘impelled by the logic

of eth­nic sol­i­dar­ity, eco­nomic pres­sure, and should it prove nec­es­sary, mil­i­tary force’.

In the First and Sec­ond World Wars Ger­many became Europe’s mas­ter by dri­ving tanks into Europe’s cities. How­ever after the Sec­ond World War she turned into a very dif­fer­ent coun­try, a bas­tion of democ­racy. Later the Euro­pean Union evolved but it was not viewed as Germany’s empire, either within Ger­many or in the rest of Europe. Although France and Ger­many were orig­i­nal mem­bers, the EU is for­mally run by the Coun­cil of Min­is­ters, the Euro­pean Par­lia­ment and by bureau­crats in Brus­sels, rather than by a sin­gle state. Democ­racy is enshrined in the EU and the voice of each tiny coun­try car­ries weight. Yet it is becom­ing increas­ingly clear that it has a dom­i­nant Franco-German axis and that Ger­many is the prin­ci­pal pay­mas­ter. So the old adage — he who pays the piper calls the tune — may even­tu­ally be appro­pri­ate even in the Euro­pean Union.

Angela Merkel, declared that the time of reflec­tion about anew form of gov­ern­ment was over. By March 2007 the Berlin Dec­la­ra­tion was adopted which declared the inten­tion of all mem­ber states to have rat­i­fied a new Treaty for the gov­ern­ment of the enlarged Euro­pean Union by the 2009 elec­tions. Beyond the Treaty, Ger­many, who stayed firmly in the dri­ving seat dur­ing the dis­cus­sions lead­ing up to the Lis­bon Treaty, is now alleged to have ambi­tions to cre­ate a

super­power in Europe, with mil­i­tary power and con­trol over tax­a­tion. One wor­ries that if things do not go her way she could revert to her old idea of a Ger­manic empire, which would divide Europe and frag­ment nations.

One also frets about the future eco­nomic out­look of the Euro­pean Union. . . With the help of the

Euro­pean Union and its most pow­er­ful provider of funds, Ger­many, the coun­tries of the for­mer Soviet Union in East­ern Europe are becom­ing richer, demo­c­ra­tic and self-confident. Ger­many has a right to have an impor­tant say in the ECB to ensure that her money is well spent. Yet we

live in a global econ­omy. Power must be used with care. We must not under­es­ti­mate Germany’s strength because of her cit­i­zens’ poverty or unem­ploy­ment. Her defla­tion, and push for the ECB to adopt a high inter­est rate pol­icy, besides affect­ing Britain and Amer­ica, will slow growth for the whole of the Euro­pean Union and cre­ate prob­lems for the weak­est states,  whilst strength­en­ing her rel­a­tive posi­tion. How Ger­many will use this posi­tion is of fun­da­men­tal inter­est and the par­al­lels up to the present time with the 1930s expe­ri­ence raises cause for concern.”

(Idem.)

8. Review­ing the tem­plate for the Euro­pean Mon­e­tary Union, the pro­gram reca­pit­u­lates the plans for­mu­lated by Friedrich List for Ger­man world dom­i­na­tion. Writ­ing in 1943, Win­kler fore­saw that the Prusso-Teutonics would real­ize their goals through the cre­ation of a German-dominated cen­tral Euro­pean eco­nomic union (bear­ing a strik­ing resem­blance to today’s Euro­pean Mon­e­tary Union.) One of the prin­ci­pal influ­ences on List’s think­ing was the “con­ti­nen­tal” con­cept of Napoleon, who attempted to eco­nom­i­cally unite Europe under French influence.

“Charles Andler, a French author, summed up cer­tain ideas of List in his work, The Ori­gins of Pan-Germanism, (pub­lished in 1915.) ‘It is nec­es­sary to orga­nize con­ti­nen­tal Europe against Eng­land. Napoleon I, a great strate­gist, also knew the meth­ods of eco­nomic hege­mony. His con­ti­nen­tal sys­tem, which met with oppo­si­tion even from coun­tries which might have prof­ited from such an arrange­ment should be revived, but, this time, not as an instru­ment of Napoleonic dom­i­na­tion. The idea of united Europe in a closed trade bloc is no longer shock­ing if Ger­many assumes dom­i­na­tion over such a bloc-and not France. [Ital­ics are Mr. Emory’s.] Bel­gium, Hol­land, Switzer­land, will­ingly or by force, will enter this ‘Cus­toms Fed­er­a­tion.’ Aus­tria is assumed to be won over at the out­set. Even France, if she gets rid of her notions of mil­i­tary con­quest, will not be excluded. The first steps the Con­fed­er­a­tion would take to assure unity of thought and action would be to estab­lish a joint rep­re­sen­ta­tive body, as well as to orga­nize a com­mon fleet. But of course, both the head­quar­ters of the Fed­er­a­tion and its par­lia­men­tary seat would be in Ger­many. [Ital­ics mine–D.E.]”

The Thousand-Year Con­spir­acy; by Paul Win­kler; Charles Scribner’s Sons [HC]; 1943; pp. 15–16.

4. Dorothy Thomp­son noted that the Third Reich’s plans for German-dominated Europe entailed a real­iza­tion of the List blue­print. A stun­ning mea­sure of the suc­cess of the Under­ground Reich and Ger­man Ost­poli­tik can be obtained by read­ing Dorothy Thompson’s analy­sis of Germany’s plans for world dom­i­na­tion by a cen­tral­ized Euro­pean eco­nomic union. (In this, we can see the plans of pan-German the­o­reti­cian Friedrich List, as real­ized by the Euro­pean Mon­e­tary Union.) Ms. Thomp­son was writ­ing in The New York Her­ald Tri­bune on May 31, 1940! Her com­ments are repro­duced by Tetens on page 92. Check out the cur­rent Euro­pean Mon­e­tary Union and the “bor­der­less” EU against the back­ground of what Ms. Thomp­son fore­cast in 1940 and Mr. Tetens repro­duced in 1953.

“The Ger­mans have a clear plan of what they intend to do in case of vic­tory. I believe that I know the essen­tial details of that plan. I have heard it from a suf­fi­cient num­ber of impor­tant Ger­mans to credit its authen­tic­ity . . . Germany’s plan is to make a cus­toms union of Europe, with com­plete finan­cial and eco­nomic con­trol cen­tered in Berlin. This will cre­ate at once the largest free trade area and the largest planned econ­omy in the world. In West­ern Europe alone . . . there will be an eco­nomic unity of 400 mil­lion per­sons . . . To these will be added the resources of the British, French, Dutch and Bel­gian empires. These will be pooled in the name of Europa Germanica . . .”

“The Ger­mans count upon polit­i­cal power fol­low­ing eco­nomic power, and not vice versa. Ter­ri­to­r­ial changes do not con­cern them, because there will be no ‘France’ or ‘Eng­land,’ except as lan­guage groups. Lit­tle imme­di­ate con­cern is felt regard­ing polit­i­cal orga­ni­za­tions . . . . No nation will have the con­trol of its own finan­cial or eco­nomic sys­tem or of its cus­toms. The Naz­i­fi­ca­tion of all coun­tries will be accom­plished by eco­nomic pres­sure. In all coun­tries, con­tacts have been estab­lished long ago with sym­pa­thetic busi­ness­men and indus­tri­al­ists . . . . As far as the United States is con­cerned, the plan­ners of the World Ger­man­ica laugh off the idea of any armed inva­sion. They say that it will be com­pletely unnec­es­sary to take mil­i­tary action against the United States to force it to play ball with this sys­tem. . . . Here, as in every other coun­try, they have estab­lished rela­tions with numer­ous indus­tries and com­mer­cial orga­ni­za­tions, to whom they will offer advan­tages in co-operation with Germany. . . .”

Ger­many Plots with the Krem­lin; T.H. Tetens; Henry Schu­man [HC]; 1953; p. 92.

5. In order to enhance under­stand­ing of the con­ti­nu­ity between the Third Reich and the “eco­nomic mir­a­cle” of the “New” Ger­many, the pro­gram reviews the gen­e­sis of the Bor­mann flight cap­i­tal net­work. On August 10, 1944, SS gen­eral Dr. Scheid chaired a secret meet­ing of key indus­tri­al­ists and financiers at which he laid out the blue­print for the Nazi flight cap­i­tal pro­gram that matured into the Bor­mann cap­i­tal net­work. The pur­pose of the Bor­mann flight cap­i­tal pro­gram was set forth by Paul Man­ning, the heroic author who wrote the story of the Bor­mann organization.

“Mar­tin Bor­mann, forty-one at the fall of Berlin, and strong as a bull, was at all times at Hitler’s side, impas­sive and cool. His be-all and end-all was to guide Hitler, and now to make the deci­sions that would lead to the even­tual rebirth of his coun­try. Hitler; his intu­itions at peak level despite his crum­bling phys­i­cal and men­tal health in the last year of the Third Reich, real­ized this and approved of it. ‘Bury your trea­sure,’ he advised Bor­mann, ‘for you will need it to begin a Fourth Reich.’ [Empha­sis added.] That is pre­cisely what Bor­mann was about when he set in motion the ‘flight cap­i­tal’ scheme August 10, 1944, in Stras­bourg. The trea­sure, the golden ring, he envi­sioned for the new Ger­many was the sophis­ti­cated dis­tri­b­u­tion of national and cor­po­rate assets to safe havens through­out the neu­tral nations of the rest of the world.”

(Mar­tin Bor­mann: Nazi in Exile; Paul Man­ning; Copy­right 1981 [HC]; Lyle Stu­art Inc.; ISBN 0–8184-0309–8; pp. 29–30.)

6. Held in Stras­bourg, France, the meet­ing is described in detail:

“The Staff car had left Col­mar at first light for Stras­bourg, car­ry­ing SS Ober­grup­pen­fue­herer Scheid, who held the rank of lieu­tenant gen­eral in the Waf­fen SS, as well as the title of Dr. Scheid, direc­tor of the indus­trial firm of Her­madorff & Schen­burg Com­pany. While the beauty of the rolling coun­try­side was not lost on Dr. Scheid, his thoughts were on the meet­ing of impor­tant Ger­man busi­ness­men to take place on his arrival at the Hotel Mai­son Rouge in Stras­bourg. Reich­sleiter Mar­tin Bor­mann him­self had ordered the con­fer­ence, and although he would not phys­i­cally be present he had con­fided to Dr. Scheid, who was to pre­side, ‘The steps to be taken as a result of this meet­ing will deter­mine the post­war future of Ger­many.’ The Reish­sleiter had added, ‘Ger­man indus­try must real­ize that the war can­not now be won, and must take steps to pre­pare for a post­war com­mer­cial cam­paign which will in time insure the eco­nomic resur­gence of Ger­many.’ It was August 10, 1944. The Mercedes-Benz bear­ing SS Ober­grup­pen­fuer­her Scheid moved slowly now through the nar­row streets of Stras­bourg. Dr. Scheid noticed that this was a most agree­able city, one to return to after the war.”

(Ibid.; pp. 23–24.)

6. Scheid briefed the lead­ers of Ger­man indus­try on Bormann’s plan, and gave them contacts-many of them in New York.

“Dr. Scheid, papers from his brief­case arranged neatly on the table before him, stated that all indus­trial materiel in France was to be evac­u­ated to Ger­many imme­di­ately. ‘The bat­tle of France is lost to Ger­many,’ he admit­ted, quot­ing Reich­sleiter Bor­mann as his author­ity, ‘and now the defense of the Siegfried Line (and Ger­many itself) is the main prob­lem. . . . From now on, Ger­many indus­try must take steps in prepa­ra­tion for a post­war com­mer­cial cam­paign, with each indus­trial firm mak­ing new con­tacts and alliances with for­eign firms. This must be done indi­vid­u­ally and with­out attract­ing any sus­pi­cion. How­ever, the party and the Third Reich will stand behind every firm with per­mis­sive and finan­cial sup­port.’ He assured those present that the fright­en­ing law of 1933 known as Trea­son Against the Nation, which man­dated the death penalty for vio­la­tion of for­eign exchange reg­u­la­tions or con­ceal­ing of for­eign cur­rency, was now null and void, on direct order of Reich­sleiter Bormann.”

(Ibid.; p. 25.)

7. The pro­gram notes that the Bush fam­ily were among the col­lab­o­ra­tionist indus­tri­al­ists referred to by Ms. Thomp­son in the Her­ald Tri­bune arti­cle men­tioned in para­graph 4. Hamburg-Amerika Line’s oper­a­tions in the U.S. were con­trolled by the grand­fa­ther and great grand­fa­ther of George W. Bush.

“Dr. Scheid also affirmed, ‘The ground must now be laid on the finan­cial level for bor­row­ing con­sid­er­able sums from for­eign coun­tries after the war.’ As an exam­ple of the kind of sup­port that had been most use­ful to Ger­many in the past, Dr. Scheid cited the fact that ‘patents for stain­less steel belonged to the Chem­i­cal Foun­da­tion, Inc. New York, and the Krupp Com­pany of Ger­many, jointly, and that of the United States Steel Cor­po­ra­tion, Carnegie, Illi­nois, Amer­i­can Steel & Wire, National Tube, etc., were thereby under an oblig­a­tion to work with the Krupp con­cern.’ He also cited the Zeiss Com­pany, the Leica Com­pany, and the Hamburg-Amerika line as typ­i­cal firms that had been espe­cially effec­tive in pro­tect­ing Ger­man inter­ests abroad. He gave New York addresses to the twelve men.”

(Idem.)

8. An arti­cle not included in the orig­i­nal broad­cast sup­ple­ments Manning’s writ­ing and also rein­forces the the­sis that, in many ways, the EU and the Euro­pean Mon­e­tary Union rep­re­sent the par­tial ful­fill­ment of the Nazi plans for dom­i­na­tion of post­war Europe.

“The paper is aged and frag­ile, the type­writ­ten let­ters slowly fad­ing. But US Mil­i­tary Intel­li­gence report EW-Pa 128 is as chill­ing now as the day it was writ­ten in Novem­ber 1944.

The doc­u­ment, also known as the Red House Report, is a detailed account of a secret meet­ing at the Mai­son Rouge Hotel in Stras­bourg on August 10, 1944. There, Nazi offi­cials ordered an elite group of Ger­man indus­tri­al­ists to plan for Germany’s post-war recov­ery, pre­pare for the Nazis’ return to power and work for a ‘strong Ger­man empire’. In other words: the Fourth Reich.

The three-page, closely typed report, marked ‘Secret’, copied to British offi­cials and sent by air pouch to Cordell Hull, the US Sec­re­tary of State, detailed how the indus­tri­al­ists were to work with the Nazi Party to rebuild Germany’s econ­omy by send­ing money through Switzerland.

They would set up a net­work of secret front com­pa­nies abroad. They would wait until con­di­tions were right. And then they would take over Ger­many again.

The indus­tri­al­ists included rep­re­sen­ta­tives of Volk­swa­gen, Krupp and Messer­schmitt. Offi­cials from the Navy and Min­istry of Arma­ments were also at the meet­ing and, with incred­i­ble fore­sight, they decided together that the Fourth Ger­man Reich, unlike its pre­de­ces­sor, would be an eco­nomic rather than a mil­i­tary empire — but not just German.

The Red House Report, which was unearthed from US intel­li­gence files, was the inspi­ra­tion for my thriller The Budapest Protocol.

The book opens in 1944 as the Red Army advances on the besieged city, then jumps to the present day, dur­ing the elec­tion cam­paign for the first pres­i­dent of Europe. The Euro­pean Union super­state is revealed as a front for a sin­is­ter con­spir­acy, one rooted in the last days of the Sec­ond World War.

But as I researched and wrote the novel, I realised that some of the Red House Report had become fact.

Nazi Ger­many did export mas­sive amounts of cap­i­tal through neu­tral coun­tries. Ger­man busi­nesses did set up a net­work of front com­pa­nies abroad. The Ger­man econ­omy did soon recover after 1945.

The Third Reich was defeated mil­i­tar­ily, but pow­er­ful Nazi-era bankers, indus­tri­al­ists and civil ser­vants, reborn as democ­rats, soon pros­pered in the new West Ger­many. There they worked for a new cause: Euro­pean eco­nomic and polit­i­cal integration.

Is it pos­si­ble that the Fourth Reich those Nazi indus­tri­al­ists fore­saw has, in some part at least, come to pass?

The Red House Report was writ­ten by a French spy who was at the meet­ing in Stras­bourg in 1944 — and it paints an extra­or­di­nary picture.

The indus­tri­al­ists gath­ered at the Mai­son Rouge Hotel waited expec­tantly as SS Ober­grup­pen­fuhrer Dr Scheid began the meet­ing. Scheid held one of the high­est ranks in the SS, equiv­a­lent to Lieu­tenant Gen­eral. He cut an impos­ing fig­ure in his tai­lored grey-green uni­form and high, peaked cap with sil­ver braid­ing. Guards were posted out­side and the room had been searched for microphones.

There was a sharp intake of breath as he began to speak. Ger­man indus­try must realise that the war can­not be won, he declared. ‘It must take steps in prepa­ra­tion for a post-war com­mer­cial cam­paign.’ Such defeatist talk was trea­so­nous — enough to earn a visit to the Gestapo’s cel­lars, fol­lowed by a one-way trip to a con­cen­tra­tion camp.

But Scheid had been given spe­cial licence to speak the truth — the future of the Reich was at stake. He ordered the indus­tri­al­ists to ‘make con­tacts and alliances with for­eign firms, but this must be done indi­vid­u­ally and with­out attract­ing any suspicion’.

The indus­tri­al­ists were to bor­row sub­stan­tial sums from for­eign coun­tries after the war.

They were espe­cially to exploit the finances of those Ger­man firms that had already been used as fronts for eco­nomic pen­e­tra­tion abroad, said Scheid, cit­ing the Amer­i­can part­ners of the steel giant Krupp as well as Zeiss, Leica and the Hamburg-America Line ship­ping company.

But as most of the indus­tri­al­ists left the meet­ing, a hand­ful were beck­oned into another smaller gath­er­ing, presided over by Dr Bosse of the Arma­ments Min­istry. There were secrets to be shared with the elite of the elite.

Bosse explained how, even though the Nazi Party had informed the indus­tri­al­ists that the war was lost, resis­tance against the Allies would con­tinue until a guar­an­tee of Ger­man unity could be obtained. He then laid out the secret three-stage strat­egy for the Fourth Reich.

In stage one, the indus­tri­al­ists were to ‘pre­pare them­selves to finance the Nazi Party, which would be forced to go under­ground as a Maquis’, using the term for the French resistance.

Stage two would see the gov­ern­ment allo­cat­ing large sums to Ger­man indus­tri­al­ists to estab­lish a ‘secure post-war foun­da­tion in for­eign coun­tries’, while ‘exist­ing finan­cial reserves must be placed at the dis­posal of the party so that a strong Ger­man empire can be cre­ated after the defeat’.

In stage three, Ger­man busi­nesses would set up a ‘sleeper’ net­work of agents abroad through front com­pa­nies, which were to be cov­ers for mil­i­tary research and intel­li­gence, until the Nazis returned to power.

‘The exis­tence of these is to be known only by very few peo­ple in each indus­try and by chiefs of the Nazi Party,’ Bosse announced.

‘Each office will have a liai­son agent with the party. As soon as the party becomes strong enough to re-establish its con­trol over Ger­many, the indus­tri­al­ists will be paid for their effort and co-operation by con­ces­sions and orders.’

The exported funds were to be chan­nelled through two banks in Zurich, or via agen­cies in Switzer­land which bought prop­erty in Switzer­land for Ger­man con­cerns, for a five per cent commission.

The Nazis had been covertly send­ing funds through neu­tral coun­tries for years.

Swiss banks, in par­tic­u­lar the Swiss National Bank, accepted gold looted from the trea­suries of Nazi-occupied coun­tries. They accepted assets and prop­erty titles taken from Jew­ish busi­ness­men in Ger­many and occu­pied coun­tries, and sup­plied the for­eign cur­rency that the Nazis needed to buy vital war materials.

Swiss eco­nomic col­lab­o­ra­tion with the Nazis had been closely mon­i­tored by Allied intelligence.

The Red House Report’s author notes: ‘Pre­vi­ously, exports of cap­i­tal by Ger­man indus­tri­al­ists to neu­tral coun­tries had to be accom­plished rather sur­rep­ti­tiously and by means of spe­cial influence.

‘Now the Nazi Party stands behind the indus­tri­al­ists and urges them to save them­selves by get­ting funds out­side Ger­many and at the same time advance the party’s plans for its post-war operations.’

The order to export for­eign cap­i­tal was tech­ni­cally ille­gal in Nazi Ger­many, but by the sum­mer of 1944 the law did not matter.

More than two months after D-Day, the Nazis were being squeezed by the Allies from the west and the Sovi­ets from the east. Hitler had been badly wounded in an assas­si­na­tion attempt. The Nazi lead­er­ship was ner­vous, frac­tious and quarrelling.

Dur­ing the war years the SS had built up a gigan­tic eco­nomic empire, based on plun­der and mur­der, and they planned to keep it.

A meet­ing such as that at the Mai­son Rouge would need the pro­tec­tion of the SS, accord­ing to Dr Adam Tooze of Cam­bridge Uni­ver­sity, author of Wages of Destruc­tion: The Mak­ing And Break­ing Of The Nazi Economy.

He says: ‘By 1944 any dis­cus­sion of post-war plan­ning was banned. It was extremely dan­ger­ous to do that in pub­lic. But the SS was think­ing in the long-term. If you are try­ing to estab­lish a work­able coali­tion after the war, the only safe place to do it is under the aus­pices of the appa­ra­tus of terror.’

Shrewd SS lead­ers such as Otto Ohlen­dorf were already think­ing ahead.

As com­man­der of Ein­satz­gruppe D, which oper­ated on the East­ern Front between 1941 and 1942, Ohlen­dorf was respon­si­ble for the mur­der of 90,000 men, women and children.

A highly edu­cated, intel­li­gent lawyer and econ­o­mist, Ohlen­dorf showed great con­cern for the psy­cho­log­i­cal wel­fare of his exter­mi­na­tion squad’s gun­men: he ordered that sev­eral of them should fire simul­ta­ne­ously at their vic­tims, so as to avoid any feel­ings of per­sonal responsibility.

By the win­ter of 1943 he was trans­ferred to the Min­istry of Eco­nom­ics. Ohlendorf’s osten­si­ble job was focus­ing on export trade, but his real pri­or­ity was pre­serv­ing the SS’s mas­sive pan-European eco­nomic empire after Germany’s defeat.

Ohlen­dorf, who was later hanged at Nurem­berg, took par­tic­u­lar inter­est in the work of a Ger­man econ­o­mist called Lud­wig Erhard. Erhard had writ­ten a lengthy man­u­script on the tran­si­tion to a post-war econ­omy after Germany’s defeat. This was dan­ger­ous, espe­cially as his name had been men­tioned in con­nec­tion with resis­tance groups.

But Ohlen­dorf, who was also chief of the SD, the Nazi domes­tic secu­rity ser­vice, pro­tected Erhard as he agreed with his views on sta­bil­is­ing the post-war Ger­man econ­omy. Ohlen­dorf him­self was pro­tected by Hein­rich Himm­ler, the chief of the SS.

Ohlen­dorf and Erhard feared a bout of hyper-inflation, such as the one that had destroyed the Ger­man econ­omy in the Twen­ties. Such a cat­a­stro­phe would ren­der the SS’s eco­nomic empire almost worthless.

The two men agreed that the post-war pri­or­ity was rapid mon­e­tary sta­bil­i­sa­tion through a sta­ble cur­rency unit, but they realised this would have to be enforced by a friendly occu­py­ing power, as no post-war Ger­man state would have enough legit­i­macy to intro­duce a cur­rency that would have any value.

That unit would become the Deutschmark, which was intro­duced in 1948. It was an aston­ish­ing suc­cess and it kick-started the Ger­man econ­omy. With a sta­ble cur­rency, Ger­many was once again an attrac­tive trad­ing partner.

The Ger­man indus­trial con­glom­er­ates could rapidly rebuild their eco­nomic empires across Europe.

War had been extra­or­di­nar­ily prof­itable for the Ger­man econ­omy. By 1948 — despite six years of con­flict, Allied bomb­ing and post-war repa­ra­tions pay­ments — the cap­i­tal stock of assets such as equip­ment and build­ings was larger than in 1936, thanks mainly to the arma­ments boom.

Erhard pon­dered how Ger­man indus­try could expand its reach across the shat­tered Euro­pean con­ti­nent. The answer was through supra­na­tion­al­ism — the vol­un­tary sur­ren­der of national sov­er­eignty to an inter­na­tional body.

Ger­many and France were the dri­vers behind the Euro­pean Coal and Steel Com­mu­nity (ECSC), the pre­cur­sor to the Euro­pean Union. The ECSC was the first supra­na­tional organ­i­sa­tion, estab­lished in April 1951 by six Euro­pean states. It cre­ated a com­mon mar­ket for coal and steel which it reg­u­lated. This set a vital prece­dent for the steady ero­sion of national sov­er­eignty, a process that con­tin­ues today.

But before the com­mon mar­ket could be set up, the Nazi indus­tri­al­ists had to be par­doned, and Nazi bankers and offi­cials rein­te­grated. In 1957, John J. McCloy, the Amer­i­can High Com­mis­sioner for Ger­many, issued an amnesty for indus­tri­al­ists con­victed of war crimes.

The two most pow­er­ful Nazi indus­tri­al­ists, Alfried Krupp of Krupp Indus­tries and Friedrich Flick, whose Flick Group even­tu­ally owned a 40 per cent stake in Daimler-Benz, were released from prison after serv­ing barely three years.

Krupp and Flick had been cen­tral fig­ures in the Nazi econ­omy. Their com­pa­nies used slave labour­ers like cat­tle, to be worked to death.

The Krupp com­pany soon became one of Europe’s lead­ing indus­trial combines.

The Flick Group also quickly built up a new pan-European busi­ness empire. Friedrich Flick remained unre­pen­tant about his wartime record and refused to pay a sin­gle Deutschmark in com­pen­sa­tion until his death in July 1972 at the age of 90, when he left a for­tune of more than $1billion, the equiv­a­lent of £400million at the time.

‘For many lead­ing indus­trial fig­ures close to the Nazi regime, Europe became a cover for pur­su­ing Ger­man national inter­ests after the defeat of Hitler,’ says his­to­rian Dr Michael Pinto-Duschinsky, an adviser to Jew­ish for­mer slave labourers.

‘The con­ti­nu­ity of the econ­omy of Ger­many and the economies of post-war Europe is strik­ing. Some of the lead­ing fig­ures in the Nazi econ­omy became lead­ing builders of the Euro­pean Union.’

Numer­ous house­hold names had exploited slave and forced labour­ers includ­ing BMW, Siemens and Volk­swa­gen, which pro­duced muni­tions and the V1 rocket.

Slave labour was an inte­gral part of the Nazi war machine. Many con­cen­tra­tion camps were attached to ded­i­cated fac­to­ries where com­pany offi­cials worked hand-in-hand with the SS offi­cers over­see­ing the camps.

Like Krupp and Flick, Her­mann Abs, post-war Germany’s most pow­er­ful banker, had pros­pered in the Third Reich. Dap­per, ele­gant and diplo­matic, Abs joined the board of Deutsche Bank, Germany’s biggest bank, in 1937. As the Nazi empire expanded, Deutsche Bank enthu­si­as­ti­cally ‘Aryanised’ Aus­trian and Czechoslo­vak banks that were owned by Jews.

By 1942, Abs held 40 direc­tor­ships, a quar­ter of which were in coun­tries occu­pied by the Nazis. Many of these Aryanised com­pa­nies used slave labour and by 1943 Deutsche Bank’s wealth had quadrupled.

Abs also sat on the super­vi­sory board of I.G. Far­ben, as Deutsche Bank’s rep­re­sen­ta­tive. I.G. Far­ben was one of Nazi Germany’s most pow­er­ful com­pa­nies, formed out of a union of BASF, Bayer, Hoechst and sub­sidiaries in the Twenties.

It was so deeply entwined with the SS and the Nazis that it ran its own slave labour camp at Auschwitz, known as Auschwitz III, where tens of thou­sands of Jews and other pris­on­ers died pro­duc­ing arti­fi­cial rubber.

When they could work no longer, or were ver­braucht (used up) in the Nazis’ chill­ing term, they were moved to Birke­nau. There they were gassed using Zyk­lon B, the patent for which was owned by I.G. Farben.

But like all good busi­ness­men, I.G. Farben’s bosses hedged their bets.

Dur­ing the war the com­pany had financed Lud­wig Erhard’s research. After the war, 24 I.G. Far­ben exec­u­tives were indicted for war crimes over Auschwitz III — but only twelve of the 24 were found guilty and sen­tenced to prison terms rang­ing from one-and-a-half to eight years. I.G. Far­ben got away with mass murder.

Abs was one of the most impor­tant fig­ures in Germany’s post-war recon­struc­tion. It was largely thanks to him that, just as the Red House Report exhorted, a ‘strong Ger­man empire’ was indeed rebuilt, one which formed the basis of today’s Euro­pean Union.

Abs was put in charge of allo­cat­ing Mar­shall Aid — recon­struc­tion funds — to Ger­man indus­try. By 1948 he was effec­tively man­ag­ing Germany’s eco­nomic recovery.

Cru­cially, Abs was also a mem­ber of the Euro­pean League for Eco­nomic Co-operation, an elite intel­lec­tual pres­sure group set up in 1946. The league was ded­i­cated to the estab­lish­ment of a com­mon mar­ket, the pre­cur­sor of the Euro­pean Union.

Its mem­bers included indus­tri­al­ists and financiers and it devel­oped poli­cies that are strik­ingly famil­iar today — on mon­e­tary inte­gra­tion and com­mon trans­port, energy and wel­fare systems.

When Kon­rad Ade­nauer, the first Chan­cel­lor of West Ger­many, took power in 1949, Abs was his most impor­tant finan­cial adviser.

Behind the scenes Abs was work­ing hard for Deutsche Bank to be allowed to recon­sti­tute itself after decen­tral­i­sa­tion. In 1957 he suc­ceeded and he returned to his for­mer employer.

That same year the six mem­bers of the ECSC signed the Treaty of Rome, which set up the Euro­pean Eco­nomic Com­mu­nity. The treaty fur­ther lib­er­alised trade and estab­lished increas­ingly pow­er­ful supra­na­tional insti­tu­tions includ­ing the Euro­pean Par­lia­ment and Euro­pean Commission.

Like Abs, Lud­wig Erhard flour­ished in post-war Ger­many. Ade­nauer made Erhard Germany’s first post-war eco­nom­ics min­is­ter. In 1963 Erhard suc­ceeded Ade­nauer as Chan­cel­lor for three years.

But the Ger­man eco­nomic mir­a­cle — so vital to the idea of a new Europe — was built on mass mur­der. The num­ber of slave and forced labour­ers who died while employed by Ger­man com­pa­nies in the Nazi era was 2,700,000.

Some spo­radic com­pen­sa­tion pay­ments were made but Ger­man indus­try agreed a con­clu­sive, global set­tle­ment only in 2000, with a £3billion com­pen­sa­tion fund. There was no admis­sion of legal lia­bil­ity and the indi­vid­ual com­pen­sa­tion was paltry.

A slave labourer would receive 15,000 Deutschmarks (about £5,000), a forced labourer 5,000 (about £1,600). Any claimant accept­ing the deal had to under­take not to launch any fur­ther legal action.

To put this sum of money into per­spec­tive, in 2001 Volk­swa­gen alone made prof­its of £1.8billion.

Next month, 27 Euro­pean Union mem­ber states vote in the biggest transna­tional elec­tion in his­tory. Europe now enjoys peace and sta­bil­ity. Ger­many is a democ­racy, once again home to a sub­stan­tial Jew­ish com­mu­nity. The Holo­caust is seared into national memory.

But the Red House Report is a bridge from a sunny present to a dark past. Joseph Goebbels, Hitler’s pro­pa­ganda chief, once said: ‘In 50 years’ time nobody will think of nation states.’

For now, the nation state endures. But these three type­writ­ten pages are a reminder that today’s drive towards a Euro­pean fed­eral state is inex­orably tan­gled up with the plans of the SS and Ger­man indus­tri­al­ists for a Fourth Reich — an eco­nomic rather than mil­i­tary imperium.”

“Revealed:The Secret Report That Shows How the Nazis Planned a Fourth Reich . . . in the EU” by Adam Lebor; Mail Online; 5/9/2009.

9. Deutsche Bank’s chief econ­o­mist fore­shad­owed and per­haps helped pre­cip­i­tate the administration’s plan to buy up banks’ bad debt. Note that Deutsche Bank is a key ele­ment of the Bor­mann network.

“Joe LaVorgna, Chief US Econ­o­mist at Deutsche Bank Secu­ri­ties has writ­ten a research note as part of the U.S. Daily Eco­nomic Notes titled “Falling Short : The gov­ern­ment needs to buy toxic assets”. It says that ulti­mately the tax­payer will pay, one way or another, either through greatly dimin­ished job prospects and / or sig­nif­i­cantly higher taxes down the line. We think the gov­ern­ment should do the fol­low­ing — Esti­mate the high­est price it can pay for the var­i­ous toxic assets resid­ing on finan­cial insti­tu­tion bal­ance sheets, which would still return the prin­ci­ple to the tax­pay­ers. So, it’s basi­cally say­ing — either you’ll have 20% unem­ploy­ment, unless you buy toxic assets, not for what they are worth, not for what their mar­ket value is, but as much as you can pay.

Joe LaVorgna, who wrote the note talked to Simon John­son and Adam David­son, reporters from NPR and said that the bot­tom­line is that some­one has to pay for the mess cre­ated and there’s no escap­ing that the tax­payer is on the hook.

The gov­ern­ment and the banks have been say­ing that there’s some mag­i­cal recipe where the gov­ern­ment bails out the banks , the banks do bet­ter and the tax­pay­ers end up mak­ing money. Every­one wins.

Simon John­son posted the note on his blog and one the read­ers on his blog para­phrased the note say­ing, “that sure is a nice global econ­omy you’ve got there. Be a shame if any­thing were to hap­pen to it.”

Joe LaVorgna has called it a real­ity check and said that the approach has not been aggres­sive enough. That there’s no point in delay­ing the pain. He says, “let’s just get to it.”

Why though can’t the tax­payer be made share­hold­ers in the banks? Why weren’t the tax­pay­ers made stake­hold­ers in TARP1 and TARP2? This is the nation­al­iza­tion option. Under this option, the gov­ern­ment has to tell the banks to rec­og­nize their losses and then the gov­ern­ment cov­ers the losses and lia­bil­i­ties of the banks. But the gov­ern­ment now owns the bank. As much as this option seems like social­ism, in this option, the tax­payer has an own­er­ship stake in the banks (instead of an own­er­ship stake in toxic assets) and once the gov­ern­ment cleans up the bank and sells it off down the road, the tax­pay­ers will get some of their money back. Besides, this is the tra­di­tional way that gov­ern­ments usu­ally fix banks.

Simon John­son, for­merly Chief Econ­o­mist at the Inter­na­tional Mon­e­tary Fund and he warns that there are many prac­ti­cal chal­lenges related to nation­al­i­sa­tion of banks and that’s why the gov­ern­ment doesn’t want to talk about this.When Adam David­son inter­viewed the Sec­re­tary of the Trea­sury, Tim­o­thy Gei­th­ner, Gei­th­ner refused to use the word “nation­al­iza­tion”. In TARP1 and TARP2, the gov­ern­ment is not forc­ing the banks to sell their assets or mark-it-to-market and it has gone out of its way to give banks bailout money with­out tak­ing con­trol. They’ve given banks over $240 bil­lion (includ­ing $45 bil­lion to Citibank alone) and struc­tured the deal in a spe­cial way, specif­i­cally designed so it was not a nation­al­iza­tion and when Citibank’s trou­bles got worse, the gov­ern­ment had to go through these amaz­ing con­tor­tions to help the bank with­out becom­ing the owner.

How­ever, Nouriel Roubini, Pro­fes­sor of Eco­nom­ics at NYU tells CNBC that AIG is already nation­al­ized and it is not a ques­tion of whether banks should be nation­al­ized but if the banks should be par­tially or wholly nation­al­ized. It remains to be seen how the polit­i­cal the­ater sur­round­ing the eco­nomic issues plays out. But the fact that the major banks, includ­ing Bank of Amer­ica and Citibank, are insol­vent, is utterly obvious.”

“Nation­al­iza­tion of U.S. Banks is Immi­nent”; www.nowpublic.com; 3/3/2009.

10. Among the appar­ent prime movers for Obama’s bailout plan for the major banks was Bill Gross, man­ag­ing direc­tor of PIMCO, a sub­sidiary of Allianz and, as one of the Ger­man core cor­po­ra­tions, part of the Bor­mann cap­i­tal net­work (Like Deutsche Bank.)

“In today’s flurry of pos­i­tive press about the stock market’s 7% uptick in response to Trea­sury Sec­re­tary Tim Geithner’s bank res­cue plan, one name stands out: Bill Gross, chair­man of the vast PIMCO bond fund.

Bloomberg, Time mag­a­zine, the Finan­cial Times, and other out­lets all picked up Gross’ punchy dec­la­ra­tion that the Gei­th­ner plan is “win-win-win.” Reuters even touted as an “exclu­sive” its report that Pimco would be par­tic­i­pat­ing in Geithner’s public-private ini­tia­tive to buy up toxic mortgage-backed assets.

There’s only one prob­lem with this: Gross is prac­ti­cally duty-bound to love the plan, since it was partly his idea. As the WaPo reported on Sun­day: (empha­sis mine)

Last fall, bil­lion­aire investor War­ren E. Buf­fett, Gold­man Sachs chief exec­u­tive Lloyd Blank­fein and William H. Gross, the man­ag­ing direc­tor of PIMCO, the largest bond fund in the world, approached Trea­sury offi­cials about an idea to cre­ate invest­ment funds, using pub­lic and pri­vate money, to buy toxic assets from banks, accord­ing to for­mer senior Trea­sury offi­cials. Buf­fett is a direc­tor of The Wash­ing­ton Post Co.The Obama admin­is­tra­tion fur­ther devel­oped that pro­posal to address the two main prob­lems banks are fac­ing: trou­bled debt such as mort­gages that insti­tu­tions are hold­ing until the loans are paid off, plus the com­plex secu­ri­ties and deriv­a­tives that were invented to finance those loans.

Why is Gross allowed to be quoted wax­ing rhap­sodic about the Gei­th­ner public-private part­ner­ship, with­out any added con­text to illu­mi­nate his role in the plan’s devel­op­ment? One pos­si­ble answer: it’s no longer con­sid­ered newsy that the Trea­sury is openly crav­ing Wall Street’s approval of its moves. Josh posted on this tru­ism last night.

Late Update: Some com­menters sug­gest that I’m unfairly malign­ing Gross, who offered to man­age the government’s bailout for free and deliv­ered cogent early warn­ings last year on the grow­ing risk of mortgage-backed securities.

Let me be clear: Gross’ praise for the plan he helped develop is all well and good. It would just be nice if main­stream out­lets pro­vided con­text to help under­stand the cen­tral role that Gross, Gold­man CEO Lloyd Blank­fein, and other invest­ment chiefs are play­ing in Geithner’s plan. . . .”

Shocker: Media Let Wall Street Chief­tain Praise His Own Idea” by Elana Schor; Talk­ing Points Memo; 3/24/2009

11. Large Euro­pean banks–many of them also part of the Bor­mann cap­i­tal network–received bil­lions of dol­lars in pay­outs as part of the res­cue of A.I.G. In the Man­ning text, the Bor­mann net­work links to UBS and Deutsche Bank are set forth at length. Man­ning also dis­cusses the con­tin­ued post­war con­trol of the French econ­omy by the Ger­man eco­nomic power struc­ture and the Bor­mann net­work. It is in that con­text that the U.S. bailout (through A.I.G.) of Soci­ete Gen­erale should be understood.

“. . . Big for­eign banks also received large sums from the res­cue, includ­ing Société Générale of France and Deutsche Bank of Ger­many, which each received nearly $12 bil­lion; Bar­clays of Britain ($8.5 bil­lion); and UBS of Switzer­land ($5 billion). . . .”

A.I.G. Lists Banks It Paid with U.S. Bailout Funds” by Mary Williams Walsh; New York Times; 3/15/2009.

spitfirelist.com/for-the-record/ftr-671-update-on-the-meltdown-part-4-germany-the-underground-reich-and-the-global-financial-crisis/

August 12, 2010