Rae Copitka & Loma Wharton on Imperfected Tax Liens
Robert Jones, CIO BIG Corporation
"He has erected a multitude of New Offices, and sent hither Swarms of Officers to harass our People, and eat out their Substance."
~Declaration of Independence
2.The Social Security Number is the property of the government and not you. Therefore, it can't be "yours" unless you are a public officer on official business. See 20 CFR §422.103(d).
3.The SSN is issued to the federal "public officer" and not to the man, and then only while he is an agent of the federal government.
4.Anyone who uses a Social Security Number who is NOT a federal employee acting on official commercial, government business is guilty of impersonating a federal "employee", which is a crime. See 18 U.S.C. §912.
5.You can only use it in connection with a "public purpose", and not a private purpose. It is illegal and a crime to use or abuse the SSN for a private or personal use. This is called embezzlement or conversion, and it is a criminal violation of 18 U.S.C. §641 and 18 U.S.C. §654.
6.Everything connected to the SSN becomes "public property" because the SSN can only be used in connection with a "public office" or federal employment.
7.The private man was never issued an SSN if he is not acting as a federal "employee". Therefore, he can honestly answer "NO" in response to the question of whether he was ever issued an SSN if he is not acting as a federal "employee" or agent.
taken from
PO Box 24017- Stop 76202
Fresno, CA 93776
Attn: Susan Meredith, Operations Manager, Collection
IDENTIFICATION: Bradford Smith, SSN: xxx-xx-xx, non-federally connected worker SUBJECT: Internal Revenue Service Notice of Levy Form 668-W(c) PURPOSE: Request for written authority to garnish wages, including:
ENCLOSURES:1. Treasury Financial Manual, Part 3, Chapter 4 of Title 1, 4075- Levy for Unpaid Tax Liability, March 2000 edition.
2. Internal Revenue Manual 5.14.10- Administrative garnishment via private employers, state government agencies, etc. (IRM 5.14.10.2 dated 09-30-2004), http://www.supremelaw.org
... (This section is now conveniently missing in their revised version 5.14.10.1 dated 09-26-2008.)
3. U.S. Representative Raul M. Grijalva September 8, 2003 letter to an IRS Taxpayer Advocate in Arizona (names & other identifying
information redacted).
Dear Susan,
BIG Corporation received a "notice" of levy; Form 668-W(c), dated April 03, 2004 from the Fresno, CA office of the Internal Revenue Service.
Please be advised that Bradford Smith does not consent to an administrative levy, i.e., garnishment of salary, wages or other remuneration due from Big Corporation. In the event BIG surrenders sums due the private sector worker as remuneration for services rendered, the private sector worker reserves the right to pursue appropriate civil and criminal remedies. Therefore, BIG must secure written verification from the Internal Revenue Service officer or agent responsible for issuing the notice of levy that the Internal Revenue Service will defend BIG, pay litigation expenses and compensate BIG for whatever damages are awarded in the event that the private sector worker prevails.
Please note that the IRS officer responsible for the notice of levy did not send BIG a Form 2159 Payroll Deduction Agreement. The private sector worker has not received, nor has BIG received, the necessary Letter 3164 notice. BIG has not received a completed Form 12175, nor has BIG received a properly executed Form 668 B Levy. Therefore, the naked "notice" of levy has no lawful effect and BIG has no lawful duty to enforce it. Please reference exhibits attached to this notice to verify the requirement for authorization
and procedural documents listed in this paragraph.
The naked notice of levy was fraudulently issued under the federal Administrative Offset Program, a/k/a Treasury Offset Program, and BIG Corporation simply isn't authorized to participate. Only state and federal legislative, judicial and administrative agencies may participate. See 31 U.S.C. 3711 for particulars. Per 31 U.S.C. 3711(b)(1), even government disbursement officers are required to ignore the procedure when it is fraudulent, incomplete or otherwise irregular: "(b) (1) The head of an executive, judicial, or legislative
agency may not act under subsection (a)(2) or (3) of this section on a claim that appears to be fraudulent, false, or misrepresented by a party with an interest in the claim, or that is based on conduct in violation of the antitrust laws."
To verify that the Treasury Financial Management Service rather than the Internal Revenue Service has delegated authority over voluntary and involuntary collection of delinquent tax debts, consult the authority section of FMS system of records .015, Debt Collection Operation System, published in the Federal Register on August 21, 2001, 66 F.R. 44204, et seq. Authorities listed are as follows: Authority for maintenance of the system: Federal Claims Collection Act of 1966 (Pub L. 89-508), as amended by the Debt Collection Act of 1982 (Pub L. 97-365, as amended); Deficit Reduction Act of 1984 (Pub L. 98-369, as amended); Debt Collection Improvement Act of 1996 (Pub. L. 104-134, sec. 31001); Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 (Pub. L. 105-34); Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998 (Pub. L. 105-206); 26 U.S.C. 6402; 26 U.S.C. 6331; 31 U.S.C. Chapter 37 (Claims), Subchapter I (General) and Subchapter II (Claims of the U.S. Government).
Note that the authorities include sections 6331 (levy and distraint) and 6402 (authority to make credits and refunds) of the Internal Revenue Code. By referencing the Parallel Table of Authorities and Rules, there are no implementing regulations for 26 CFR Parts 1 or 31 for 26 U.S.C. 6331 (levy and distraint), which might vest the Internal Revenue Service with corresponding authority.
Please consult 4075.50 of Part 3, Chapter 4000 of Title 1 of the Treasury Financial Manual, which is attached as an exhibit:An employee may arrange with the IRS to liquidate a tax liability through payroll deduction. IRS Form 2159: Payroll Deduction Agreement, authorizes such payroll deductions. The employee and a revenue officer (or other authorized IRS agent) must sign Form 2159. Send the original to the payroll officer. The employing agency deducts the amount agreed upon from the employee's salary until the total tax liability is liquidated.
Where private enterprise such as BIG Corporation is concerned, 5.14.10 of the Internal Revenue Manual governs (IRM 5.14.10.2 dated 09-30-2004), http://www.supremelaw.org
... (This section is now conveniently missing in their revised version 5.14.10.1 dated 09-26-2008.) Both the employee and the employer must consent to administrative offset as the means for collecting delinquent federal tax debts. See particularly 5.14.10.2.5, beginning on page 2 of the exhibit. The IRS agent must provide the Letter 3164 notice and a properly executed Form 12175.
Since BIG did not receive the requisite consent form, notice, etc., and BIG did not receive a valid levy instrument that verifies a judgment against the private sector worker from a court of competent jurisdiction, Big can not withhold money from what Big owes the employee based on whatever "notice" of levy an Internal Revenue Service agent or officer sent to BIG. The document is an uttered instrument. The proper form IRS uses for garnishment, seizure, etc., is the Form 668-B Levy, not the notice of levy. Additionally, in order to be valid, a levy or any other execution instrument must be under the seal of the Internal Revenue Service,
thereby verifying it, or the seal of a court of competent jurisdiction. See state and federal rules of evidence and procedure: Any legal document issuing from a government agency is self-executing evidence only when under the appropriate seal and the officer who has custody of the seal verifies validity of the instrument.
Per 26 CFR 301.6332-1(b)(2), the property custodian may refuse to honor a "levy" in the event of reasonable cause:
"The penalty described in this subparagraph is not applicable in cases where bona fide dispute exists concerning the amount of the property to be surrendered pursuant to a levy or concerning the legal effectiveness of the levy "
Any statute that supposes to effect legislative judgment, thereby eliminating judicial due process of law, is a bill of attainder, which the U.S. Constitution prohibits both Congress and state legislatures from enacting. However, the Internal Revenue Code does not authorize seizures, garnishments and the like without judicial due process.
In Duncan v. Kahanamoku, Sheriff, (1946) 327 U.S. 304; 66 S. Ct. 606; 90 L. Ed. 688, the Supreme Court of the United States condemned legislative summary judgment and unilateral administrative execution: Courts and their procedural safeguards are indispensable to our system of government. They were set up by our founders to protect the liberties they [**615] valued.
Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 19. Their philosophy has been the people's throughout our history. For that reason we have maintained legislatures chosen by citizens or their representatives and courts and juries to try those who violate legislative enactments. We have always been especially concerned about the potential evils of summary criminal trials and have guarded against them by provisions
embodied in the Constitution itself. See Ex parte Milligan, 4 Wall. 2; Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227. Legislatures and courts are not merely cherished American institutions; they are indispensable to our Government.
The notice of levy BIG received would be illegal for the simple reason that it is not supported by a judgment from a court of competent jurisdiction. However, there are numerous other flaws. In addition to other defects I will cover in some detail, Internal Revenue Service personnel have no authority whatever to levy salaries and wages from privately owned companies. The authority is applicable solely to government agencies and personnel by 26 U.S.C. 6331(a):
In Fuentes v. Shevin, Attorney General of Florida, et al, (1972) 407 U.S. 67, 92 S.Ct. 1983, 32 L.Ed. 2d 556, the U.S. Supreme Court addressed essentials of the due process clause as it appears in the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments: [***HR3] [***HR4] For more than a century the central meaning of procedural due process has been clear: "Parties whose rights are to be affected are entitled to be heard; and in order that they may enjoy that right they must first be notified." Baldwin v. Hale, 1 Wall. 223, 233. See Windsor
v. McVeigh, 93 U.S. 274; Hovey v. Elliott, 167 U.S. 409; Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385. [***570] It is equally fundamental that the right to notice and an opportunity to be heard "must be granted at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner." Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552.
[***HR5] [***HR6] The constitutional right to be heard is a basic aspect of the duty of government to follow a fair process of decisionmaking when it acts to deprive a person of his possessions. The purpose of this requirement is not [*81] only to ensure abstract fair play to the individual. Its purpose, more particularly, is to protect his use and possession of property from arbitrary encroachment -- to minimize substantively unfair or mistaken deprivations of property, a danger that is especially great when the
State seizes goods simply upon the application of and for the benefit of a private party. So viewed, the prohibition against the deprivation of property without due process of law reflects the high value, embedded in our constitutional and political history, that we place on a person's right to enjoy what is his, free of governmental interference. See Lynch v. Household Finance Corp., 405 U.S. 538, 552.
[***HR7] The requirement of notice and an opportunity to be heard raises no impenetrable barrier to the taking of a person's possessions. But the fair process of decision-making that it guarantees works, by itself, to protect against arbitrary deprivation of property. For when a person has an opportunity to speak up in his own defense, and when the State must listen to what he has to say, substantively unfair and simply mistaken deprivations of property interests can be prevented. It has long been recognized that "fairness
can rarely be obtained by secret, one-sided determination of facts decisive of rights. ... [And n]o better instrument has been devised for arriving at truth than to give a person in jeopardy of serious loss notice of the case against him and opportunity to meet it." Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 170-172 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
[***HR8] If the right to notice and a hearing is to serve its full purpose, then, it is clear that it must be granted at a time when the deprivation can still be prevented. At a later hearing, an individual's possessions can be returned to him if they were unfairly or mistakenly [**1995] taken in the first place. Damages may even be [*82] awarded to him for the wrongful deprivation. But no later hearing and no damage award can undo the fact that the arbitrary taking that was subject to the right of procedural due process has
already occurred. [***571] "This Court has not ... embraced the general proposition that a wrong may be done if it can be undone." Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U. Truth # 2. For this Arthur-Edward: Lee / arthur-edward is with this Knowledge and Conviction that the Commercial Token / Resulting Trust ARTHUR E. LEE / ARTHUR EDWARD LEE is by the Manufacturing and with the B ERTHING on the STATE OF WASHINGTON Campus on 3/30/1932 as a Commercial Token / Resulting Trust and arthur-edward / Arthur-Edward: Lee is without Knowledge of any Evidence to the Contrary and is with this Conviction that no such Evidence exists.
[***HR9] [***HR10] This is no new principle of constitutional law. The right to a prior hearing has long been recognized by this Court under the Fourteenth and Fifth Amendments. Although the Court has held that due process tolerates variances in the form of a hearing "appropriate to the nature of the case," Mullane v. Central Hanover Tr. Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313, and "depending upon the importance of the interests involved and the nature of the subsequent proceedings [if any]," Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371,
378, the Court has traditionally insisted that, whatever its form, opportunity for that hearing must be provided before the deprivation at issue takes effect. E. g., Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 542; Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 437; Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254; Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S., at 551; Mullane v. Central Hanover Tr. Co., supra, at 313; Opp Cotton Mills v. Administrator, 312 U.S. 126, 152-153; United States v. Illinois Central R. Co., 291 U.S. 457, 463; Londoner v. City & County of Denver, 210 U.S. 373, 385-386. See In re Ruffalo, 390 U.S. 544, 550-551. "That the hearing required by due process is subject
to waiver, and is not fixed in form does not affect its root requirement that an individual be given an opportunity for a hearing before he is deprived of any significant property interest, except for extraordinary situations where some valid governmental interest is at stake that justifies postponing the hearing until after the event." Boddie v. Connecticut, supra, at 378-379 (emphasis in original).
The Supreme Court of Florida wrote one of the better analytical summaries of U.S. Supreme Court decisions concerning procedural due process secured by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment clauses in Ray Lien Construction, Inc. v. Jack M. Wainwrite, (1977) 346 S.2d 1029: Garnishment is but one form of summary remedy historically available to the creditor. It is a method whereby a person's property, money, or credits in the possession, under the control, or owing by another are applied to payment of the former's debt to a third person by proper statutory process against the debtor and garnishee. Because this remedy works a deprivation of debtor's property, it must comply with the requirements of procedural due process.
For more than a century the central meaning of procedural due process has been clear: "Parties whose rights are to be affected are entitled to be heard, and in order that they may enjoy that right, they must first be notified." Baldwin v. Hale, 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 223, 233, 17 L. Ed. 531. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, [**4] 80, 92 S. Ct. 1983, 32 L. Ed. 2d 556 (1972).
The United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida recently reviewed the statutes in question and held the procedure, as outlined in Chapter 77, Florida Statutes, unconstitutional. See Bunton v. First National Bank of Tampa, 394 F. Supp. 793 (M.D.Fla.1975). In arriving at its decision, the District Court relied upon the Supreme Court's decision in North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 601, 95 S. Ct. 719, 42 L. Ed. 2d 751 (1975), wherein a similar Georgia prejudgment garnishment statute
was declared unconstitutional. In North Georgia Finishing, the Court referred to its earlier decision in Fuentes v. Shevin, supra, wherein the Florida and Pennsylvania replevin statutes were held invalid. Those statutes permitted a secured installment seller to repossess goods sold without prior notice and without opportunity for a hearing or other safeguard against mistaken repossession. A writ was issuable by a clerk of the court upon ex [*1032] parte application and posting of bond. It was not necessary to show that the
goods were wrongfully detained. Nor was provision made for prompt post-seizure [**5] hearing. Thus, the debtor was deprived of his property until final outcome of the repossession suit. The Georgia statute was condemned on similar grounds. A writ of garnishment was issuable at the behest of the seller, without notice or opportunity for early hearing and without participation by a judicial officer. As in Fuentes, debtor's only remedy was to post a security bond.
We read North Georgia Finishing, supra, and Mitchell, supra, to require a hearing either before the alleged taking or promptly thereafter. In Unique Caterers v. Rudy's Farm Co., supra, we found Chapter 76 constitutionally deficient because it did not require an immediate post-seizure hearing. Rather, it simply kept the court open at any time to hear motions for dissolution
We also stated: It is constitutionally imperative that a writ issue only after an impartial factual determination is made concerning the existence of the essential elements necessary for issuance of [**8] the writ. Consequently, a writ must be issued by a judicial officer based upon a prima facie showing rather than pro forma by the clerk of court, unless the initial pleading is made under oath to a clerk who makes an independent factual determination that the requirements of the statute have been complied with. Only then can the
individual have his use and enjoyment of [*1033] property protected from arbitrary encroachment. (footnote omitted)
The meaning of the Fifth Amendment due process clause shouldn't need explanation. Unless Big has evidence of a court order authorizing pre-judgment or post-judgment garnishment, as required by the Federal Debt Collection Procedures Act, BIG has no authority whatever to garnish wages, bank accounts or any other property that belong to its employees.
According to the United States Attorney's Manual, the purpose of a "levy" is to not to "seize" assets, but to "freeze" assets until a civil action for collection of a delinquent tax debt is commenced:
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE TAX DIVISION JUDGMENT COLLECTION MANUAL - 1997 Ed.
E. Liquidating Assets
1. The IRS's Ability to Collect Administratively
A suit to reduce an assessment to judgment must be brought, or a counterclaim filed, prior to the expiration of the ten-year period provided under 6502, I.R.C., or the extension of that period (by agreement or by operation of law) (47). During this period the IRS has the power to seize property by levy (*48) and distraint. I.R.C. 6331-6344. If a collection suit is timely filed, the IRS power to levy is extended for as long as the suit is pending and for as long as any judgment resulting from the suit remains enforceab le. *48. While a levy must be served within the period prescribed in I.R.C. 6502, it "freezes" the corpus levied upon until a levy enforcement action is commenced. Such an action may be brought at any later date. See, e.g., United States v. Eiland, 223 F.2d 118, 121-22 (4th Cir. 1955); United States v. Weintraub, 613 F.2d 612 (6th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 905 (1980). [Bold & underscore emphasis added]
Thus, the purpose of the notice, assuming intent to initiate civil litigation, is to require the 21-day hold; it is not a seizure order. If litigation is not initiated by the government before the 21 days expires, no action can be required or expected of Big. Technically, a lis pendens must be filed before a notice of levy is issued. Big finds prejudgment remedies classified in the Federal Debt Collection Procedure Act at 28 U.S.C. 3101-3105. Big also finds that state law forbids garnishment, seizure and encumbrance of property without a judgment from a court of competent jurisdiction. In sum, garnishment other than via a voluntary administrative offset agreement is a lawful remedy only as a pre-judgment remedy, which corresponds with 28 U.S.C. 3101-3105, or as a post-judgment remedy, which under federal law must comply with provisions of 28 U.S.C. 3205.
According to the following court case, the levy is Form 668 B, which replaced the Form 69, Warrant for Distraint. The Secretary's authority to issue a warrant for distraint is found at Title 31 Section 3541, which authorizes the Secretary to obtain a warrant for distraint against public officials who are holding the government's money. Warrants for distraint are served by United States Marshals, not by IRS agents, and not through the mail.
"Under the 1939 Code, effective with respect to distraint and seizure and sale actions prior to January 1, 1955, levy or distraint on personal or real property in the possession of a taxpayer was authorized by a signed Warrant for Distraint, Form 69, which commanded the collection officer to take the necessary distraint action. Under the 1954 Code, effective with respect to all collection actions after December 31, 1954, the levy and distraint action will be authorized by a new form, Levy, Form 668-B, January 1955. This form, properly executed, directs the collection officer to levy upon, and to sell so much of the property and rights to property, either real or personal, of the taxpayer liable, as may be necessary to satisfy the taxes enumerated in the levy." Henderson v. Internal Revenue Service, KTC 1994-486 (S.D. Ind. 1994) [Bold & underscore emphasis added]
The notice also says "this levy requires ." A notice is never the thing of which it notifies. If the levy requires some action, evidence of the action must be included with or identified on the execution instrument. For example, notices of federal tax lien IRS personnel routinely send to county recorders have space on the back for judgment abstracts but that portion is rarely if ever completed. See
28 U.S.C. 3201 concerning judgment liens and definitions at 28 U.S.C. 3002(3) to verify that "tax debts" are in fact among obligations to Government of the United States subject to the Federal Debt Collection Procedures Act. As is the case for federal tax liens, if there is no judicial writ attached to or referenced on a notice of levy, and the notice is accompanied by an actual Form 668-B Levy,
there is no levy.
Attorney General's Opinions, AGO 53-55 No. 97 and AGO 65-66 No. 127 explain in some detail how a levy proceeds from an
action in a court of law. Further, Internal Revenue Service Letter Ruling, # 200123062, dated 5/2/2001, explains several important due process steps in serving notices of levy.
First, such notices must include a Form 668 B, which is the actual levy. Second, only those large businesses and governmental units, that have designated officers and written agreements, are authorized to receive notices of levy by mail. Third, to complete the levy, another form, Form 668 C, must be served, but cannot be served by mail; it must be served in person. That completes service of
"notice of levy". Absent Form 668 B there is no evidence that there is a levy. In the event the IRS fails to serve either or both the levy a nd Form 668 C, service of process is incomplete, and IRS defaults.
Again, state law governs property and rights to property, and substantive due process rights secured by the state Bill of Rights correspond with those secured by the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth and Seventh Amendments to the Constitution of the United States. The Fifth Amendment due process clause has universal application within States of the Union: No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law. Further, for reasons not addressed in this letter, federal judgments are foreign to States of the
Union and must be executed via state courts of competent jurisdiction.
Even registering a foreign judgment does not give the foreign creditor the right to execute on it. The creditor must obtain the equivalent in a state court before proceeding. In brief, there can be no seizure before a judgment in a state court is rendered. Further, the AGO states clearly that there are two forms of judicial process referred to above, writs of attachment and writs of garnishment. Since a notice of levy is neither, it should be obvious that it is not "service of process" in any legal sense whatsoever. Federal law says that a levy is served with a writ of attachment; writs of attachment have a different purpose than writs of garnishment.
The Treasury Financial Services publishes a procedural manual (the Treasury Financial Manual, or TFM) that explains in plain English that the IRS can only "serve" notices of levy on government officers who are appointed by heads of agencies to receive such notices. The following excerpts from Chapter 3, Part 4000, of Volume 1, part of which are included as an exhibit, were downloaded from the Treasury Financial Services web site, at .
Section 4075 Levy for Unpaid Tax Liability: IRC provisions permit district directors to collect delinquent Federal taxes by levy on the accrued salary or wages of any officer, employee or elected official of the United States or the District of Columbia. Since this levy is served against the take-home pay of the employee, once the levy is served, agencies should not permit an employee to increase any
voluntary allotment until the tax liability is liquidated or other arrangements satisfactory to the IRS are made.
4075.10 Service of Levy An IRS employee (agent) serves notice of levy on wages, salary and other income of individuals designated under section 4075.20. The IRS can serve this notice in person or by mail. Service by mail is limited to the United States, its territories and possessions, and ships at sea. A notice of levy includes an original and four copies. All copies should be signed and dated, with
the time of receipt noted on the forms. The agency should return the original to the IRS employee. The employing agency keeps one copy. IRS or the employing agency sends another copy to the employee. The person designated in section 4075.20 must honor all applicable notices of levy, whether served in person or received by mail. The General Accounting Office makes no disallowance nor does it raise charges against any disbursing officer or designated person for complying with notices of levy.
4075.20 Designating Individuals to Receive Service of Notice of Levy: Each Government agency should designate one or more
persons on whom notice of levy for delinquent taxes of its employees may be served. These designees receive written statements from such employees regarding exemptions for dependents as provided for in the IRC.
Nothing in the TFM indicates that IRS has authority to perform any similar act regarding private citizens or businesses. BIG is not one of the designated agents outlined above. BIG is not a person lawfully authorized to respond to an IRS notice of levy. A private or state employer must agree to participate in administrative offset as the means for collecting delinquent federal taxes, as specified by
5.14.10 of the Internal Revenue Manual, also included as an exhibit.
Previously cited sections of the Treasury Financial Manual are somewhat misleading, as government employees subject to administrative garnishment must voluntarily agree to garnishment. See 4075.50, cited in the first part of this letter. If a federal employee doesn't concede a liability for delinquent taxes and voluntarily authorize administrative offset garnishment, the Treasury Financial Management Service must verify the claim then recommend civil action for collection. The Attorney General must initiate an action in compliance with 26 U.S.C. 7402. See 5 U.S.C. 5512 concerning garnishment litigation against government personnel.
A levy is not a garnishment. It would take a court action to compel BIG to surrender the employee's property to another without the employees consent and over the employees objection; ordinary people must get writs of garnishment, and so must governments.
In sum, a notice of levy is not a levy or a garnishment. Unless the tax involved is administered by BATF, or the victim is a government employee, there is no justification for a levy.
Unless BIG Corporation is a government agency with a written agreement to receive such notices, BIG is not authorized to receive them by mail, let alone act upon them. Even where such agreements are in place, the only way money can be garnished administratively without a judicial writ of garnishment or some other appropriate execution instrument is when whoever is subjected to the administrative action has signed the consent form prescribed by the Financial Management Service. Where private and state employers are concerned, the employer, too, must consent and IRS personnel responsible for administrative offset must provide the notice and additional forms required by 5.14.10 (2004)of the Internal Revenue Manual. The employee has not and does not
intend to sign such consent and to date Big has not executed written consent to garnishment via administrative offset.
The Code of Federal Regulations speaks to liability of those who erroneously surrender property to the Internal Revenue Service and other Department of the Treasury bureaus such as the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms.
At 26 CFR 301.6332-1(b)(2), BIG finds the requirement to make a good faith effort to determine whether or not there is a valid levy in place: "The penalty described in this subparagraph is not applicable in cases where bona fide dispute exists concerning the amount of the property to be surrendered pursuant to a levy or concerning the legal effectiveness of the levy " A corresponding statement
in BATF regulations more closely duplicates verbiage in the 1966 Congressional Report on amended lien and levy legislation. The cite is found at 27 CFR 70.163(c): "Any person who mistakenly surrenders to the United States property or rights to property not properly subject to levy is not relieved from liability to a third party who owns the property " Therefore, until BIG receives the requested
authority from the IRS to garnish employee's wages, BIG is not lawfully authorized to respond to an IRS notice of levy.
Sincerely,
Robert Jones, CEO
BIG Corporation
No law compels a work eligible man or woman to submit a form W-4 or W-9(or their equivalent) nor disclose an SSN as a condition of being hired or keeping one's job. With the exception of an order from a court of competent jurisdiction issued by a duly qualified judge, no amounts can be lawfully taken from one's pay (for taxes, fees or other charges) without the worker's explicit, knowing, voluntary, written consent. http://www.preferredservi...