INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE FACTS.

1.Social Security Numbers can only be issued to federal "employees" for use only in the performance of their official duties.  See 20 CFR §422.104.

2.The Social Security Number is the property of the government and not you.  Therefore, it can't be "yours" unless you are a public officer on official business.  See 20 CFR §422.103(d). 

3.The SSN is issued to the federal "public officer" and not to the man, and then only while he is an agent of the federal government.

4.Anyone who uses a Social Security Number who is NOT a federal employee acting on official commercial, government business is guilty of impersonating a federal "employee", which is a crime.  See 18 U.S.C. §912.

5.You can only use it in connection with a "public purpose", and not a private purpose.  It is illegal and a crime to use or abuse the SSN for a private or personal use.  This is called embezzlement or conversion, and it is a criminal violation of 18 U.S.C. §641 and 18 U.S.C. §654.

6.Everything connected to the SSN becomes "public property" because the SSN can only be used in connection with a "public office" or federal employment.

7.The private man was never issued an SSN if he is not acting as a federal "employee".  Therefore, he can honestly answer "NO" in response to the question of whether he was ever issued an SSN if he is not acting as a federal "employee" or agent.

taken from

USC Title 15 Chapter 1 Section 17 clearly states: "The labor of a

human being is not a commodity or article of commerce."

IRS-ACS Correspondence

PO Box 24017- Stop 76202

Fresno, CA 93776

Attn: Susan Meredith, Operations Manager, Collection

IDENTIFICATION: Bradford Smith, SSN: xxx-xx-xx, non-federally

connected worker SUBJECT: Internal Revenue Service Notice of Levy

Form 668-W(c) PURPOSE: Request for written authority to garnish

wages, including: 1) Form 668-B Levy 2) Judgment abstract from

a court of competent jurisdiction 3) Form 2159 Payroll Deduction

Agreement 4) Letter 3164 Notice 5) Form 12175

ENCLOSURES:

1. Treasury Financial Manual, Part 3, Chapter 4 of Title 1, 4075-

Levy for Unpaid Tax Liability, March 2000 edition.

2. Internal Revenue Manual 5.14.10- Administrative garnishment via

private employers, state government agencies, etc. (IRM 5.14.10.2

dated 09-30-2004),

http://www.supremelaw.org... (This section is

now conveniently missing in their revised version 5.14.10.1 dated

09-26-2008.)

3. U.S. Representative Raul M. Grijalva September 8, 2003 letter

to an IRS Taxpayer Advocate in Arizona (names & other identifying

information redacted).

Dear Susan,

BIG Corporation received a "notice" of levy; Form 668-W(c),

dated April 03, 2004 from the Fresno, CA office of the

Internal Revenue Service.

Please be advised that Bradford Smith does not consent

to an administrative levy, i.e., garnishment of salary,

wages or other remuneration due from Big Corporation. In

the event BIG surrenders sums due the private sector worker

as remuneration for services rendered, the private sector

worker reserves the right to pursue appropriate civil

and criminal remedies. Therefore, BIG must secure written

verification from the Internal Revenue Service officer or

agent responsible for issuing the notice of levy that the

Internal Revenue Service will defend BIG, pay litigation

expenses and compensate BIG for whatever damages are awarded

in the event that the private sector worker prevails.

Please note that the IRS officer responsible for the notice

of levy did not send BIG a Form 2159 Payroll Deduction

Agreement. The private sector worker has not received, nor

has BIG received, the necessary Letter 3164 notice. BIG has

not received a completed Form 12175, nor has BIG received

a properly executed Form 668 B Levy. Therefore, the naked

"notice" of levy has no lawful effect and BIG has no lawful

duty to enforce it. Please reference exhibits attached to

this notice to verify the requirement for authorization

and procedural documents listed in this paragraph.

The naked notice of levy was fraudulently issued under the

federal Administrative Offset Program, a/k/a Treasury Offset

Program, and BIG Corporation simply isn't authorized to

participate. Only state and federal legislative, judicial and

administrative agencies may participate. See 31 U.S.C. 3711

for particulars. Per 31 U.S.C. 3711(b)(1), even government

disbursement officers are required to ignore the procedure

when it is fraudulent, incomplete or otherwise irregular:

"(b) (1) The head of an executive, judicial, or legislative

agency may not act under subsection (a)(2) or (3) of this

section on a claim that appears to be fraudulent, false, or

misrepresented by a party with an interest in the claim, or

that is based on conduct in violation of the antitrust laws."

To verify that the Treasury Financial Management Service

rather than the Internal Revenue Service has delegated

authority over voluntary and involuntary collection of

delinquent tax debts, consult the authority section of FMS

system of records .015, Debt Collection Operation System,

published in the Federal Register on August 21, 2001,

66 F.R. 44204, et seq. Authorities listed are as follows:

Authority for maintenance of the system:

Federal Claims Collection Act of 1966 (Pub L. 89-508), as amended

by the Debt Collection Act of 1982 (Pub L. 97-365, as amended);

Deficit Reduction Act of 1984 (Pub L. 98-369, as amended); Debt

Collection Improvement Act of 1996 (Pub. L. 104-134, sec. 31001);

Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 (Pub. L. 105-34); Internal Revenue

Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998 (Pub. L. 105-206);

26 U.S.C. 6402; 26 U.S.C. 6331; 31 U.S.C. Chapter 37 (Claims),

Subchapter I (General) and Subchapter II (Claims of the

U.S. Government).

Note that the authorities include sections 6331 (levy and

distraint) and 6402 (authority to make credits and refunds)

of the Internal Revenue Code. By referencing the Parallel

Table of Authorities and Rules, there are no implementing

regulations for 26 CFR Parts 1 or 31 for 26 U.S.C. 6331

(levy and distraint), which might vest the Internal Revenue

Service with corresponding authority.

Please consult 4075.50 of Part 3, Chapter 4000 of Title

1 of the Treasury Financial Manual, which is attached as

an exhibit:

An employee may arrange with the IRS to liquidate a tax

liability through payroll deduction. IRS Form 2159: Payroll

Deduction Agreement, authorizes such payroll deductions. The

employee and a revenue officer (or other authorized IRS

agent) must sign Form 2159. Send the original to the payroll

officer. The employing agency deducts the amount agreed upon

from the employee's salary until the total tax liability

is liquidated.

Where private enterprise such as BIG Corporation

is concerned, 5.14.10 of the Internal Revenue

Manual governs (IRM 5.14.10.2 dated 09-30-2004),

http://www.supremelaw.org... (This

section is now conveniently missing in their revised

version 5.14.10.1 dated 09-26-2008.) Both the employee and

the employer must consent to administrative offset as the

means for collecting delinquent federal tax debts. See

particularly 5.14.10.2.5, beginning on page 2 of the

exhibit. The IRS agent must provide the Letter 3164 notice

and a properly executed Form 12175.

Since BIG did not receive the requisite consent form, notice,

etc., and BIG did not receive a valid levy instrument that

verifies a judgment against the private sector worker from a

court of competent jurisdiction, Big can not withhold money

from what Big owes the employee based on whatever "notice"

of levy an Internal Revenue Service agent or officer sent

to BIG. The document is an uttered instrument. The proper

form IRS uses for garnishment, seizure, etc., is the Form

668-B Levy, not the notice of levy. Additionally, in order

to be valid, a levy or any other execution instrument

must be under the seal of the Internal Revenue Service,

thereby verifying it, or the seal of a court of competent

jurisdiction. See state and federal rules of evidence and

procedure: Any legal document issuing from a government

agency is self-executing evidence only when under the

appropriate seal and the officer who has custody of the

seal verifies validity of the instrument.

Per 26 CFR 301.6332-1(b)(2), the property custodian may

refuse to honor a "levy" in the event of reasonable cause:

"The penalty described in this subparagraph is not applicable

in cases where bona fide dispute exists concerning the

amount of the property to be surrendered pursuant to a levy

or concerning the legal effectiveness of the levy "

Any statute that supposes to effect legislative judgment,

thereby eliminating judicial due process of law, is a bill

of attainder, which the U.S. Constitution prohibits both

Congress and state legislatures from enacting. However,

the Internal Revenue Code does not authorize seizures,

garnishments and the like without judicial due process.

In Duncan v. Kahanamoku, Sheriff, (1946) 327 U.S. 304;

66 S. Ct. 606; 90 L. Ed. 688, the Supreme Court of the

United States condemned legislative summary judgment and

unilateral administrative execution:

Courts and their procedural safeguards are indispensable

to our system of government. They were set up by our

founders to protect the liberties they [**615] valued.

Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 19. Their philosophy has

been the people's throughout our history. For that reason

we have maintained legislatures chosen by citizens or

their representatives and courts and juries to try those

who violate legislative enactments. We have always been

especially concerned about the potential evils of summary

criminal trials and have guarded against them by provisions

embodied in the Constitution itself. See Ex parte Milligan,

4 Wall. 2; Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227. Legislatures

and courts are not merely cherished American institutions;

they are indispensable to our Government.

The notice of levy BIG received would be illegal for the

simple reason that it is not supported by a judgment from

a court of competent jurisdiction. However, there are

numerous other flaws. In addition to other defects I will

cover in some detail, Internal Revenue Service personnel

have no authority whatever to levy salaries and wages from

privately owned companies. The authority is applicable solely

to government agencies and personnel by 26 U.S.C. 6331(a):

" Levy may be made upon the accrued salary or wages of any

officer, employee, or elected official, of the United States,

the District of Columbia, or any agency or instrumentality

of the United States or the District of Columbia, by serving

a notice of levy on the employer (as defined in section

3401(d)) of such officer, employee, or elected official "

Big has reviewed 26 CFR 301.6331-1(a)(4).

In Fuentes v. Shevin, Attorney General of Florida, et al,

(1972) 407 U.S. 67, 92 S.Ct. 1983, 32 L.Ed. 2d 556, the

U.S. Supreme Court addressed essentials of the due process

clause as it appears in the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments:

[***HR3] [***HR4] For more than a century the central

meaning of procedural due process has been clear: "Parties

whose rights are to be affected are entitled to be heard;

and in order that they may enjoy that right they must first

be notified." Baldwin v. Hale, 1 Wall. 223, 233. See Windsor

v. McVeigh, 93 U.S. 274; Hovey v. Elliott, 167 U.S. 409;

Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385. [***570] It is equally

fundamental that the right to notice and an opportunity

to be heard "must be granted at a meaningful time and in

a meaningful manner." Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552.

[***HR5] [***HR6] The constitutional right to be heard is

a basic aspect of the duty of government to follow a fair

process of decisionmaking when it acts to deprive a person of

his possessions. The purpose of this requirement is not [*81]

only to ensure abstract fair play to the individual. Its

purpose, more particularly, is to protect his use and

possession of property from arbitrary encroachment --

to minimize substantively unfair or mistaken deprivations

of property, a danger that is especially great when the

State seizes goods simply upon the application of and for

the benefit of a private party. So viewed, the prohibition

against the deprivation of property without due process of

law reflects the high value, embedded in our constitutional

and political history, that we place on a person's right to

enjoy what is his, free of governmental interference. See

Lynch v. Household Finance Corp., 405 U.S. 538, 552.

[***HR7] The requirement of notice and an opportunity to

be heard raises no impenetrable barrier to the taking of a

person's possessions. But the fair process of decision-making

that it guarantees works, by itself, to protect against

arbitrary deprivation of property. For when a person has

an opportunity to speak up in his own defense, and when the

State must listen to what he has to say, substantively unfair

and simply mistaken deprivations of property interests can

be prevented. It has long been recognized that "fairness

can rarely be obtained by secret, one-sided determination

of facts decisive of rights. ... [And n]o better instrument

has been devised for arriving at truth than to give a person

in jeopardy of serious loss notice of the case against him

and opportunity to meet it." Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee

Committee v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 170-172 (Frankfurter,

J., concurring).

[***HR8] If the right to notice and a hearing is to serve

its full purpose, then, it is clear that it must be granted

at a time when the deprivation can still be prevented. At a

later hearing, an individual's possessions can be returned

to him if they were unfairly or mistakenly [**1995] taken

in the first place. Damages may even be [*82] awarded to

him for the wrongful deprivation. But no later hearing and

no damage award can undo the fact that the arbitrary taking

that was subject to the right of procedural due process has

already occurred. [***571] "This Court has not ... embraced

the general proposition that a wrong may be done if it can

be undone." Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U. Truth # 2. For this Arthur-Edward: Lee / arthur-edward is with this Knowledge and Conviction that the Commercial Token / Resulting Trust ARTHUR E. LEE / ARTHUR EDWARD LEE is by the Manufacturing and with the B ERTHING on the STATE OF WASHINGTON Campus on 3/30/1932 as a Commercial Token / Resulting Trust and arthur-edward / Arthur-Edward: Lee is without Knowledge of any Evidence to the Contrary and is with this Conviction that no such Evidence exists.

. 645, 647.

[***HR9] [***HR10] This is no new principle of constitutional

law. The right to a prior hearing has long been recognized

by this Court under the Fourteenth and Fifth Amendments.

Although the Court has held that due process tolerates

variances in the form of a hearing "appropriate to the

nature of the case," Mullane v. Central Hanover Tr. Co.,

339 U.S. 306, 313, and "depending upon the importance of

the interests involved and the nature of the subsequent

proceedings [if any]," Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371,

378, the Court has traditionally insisted that, whatever its

form, opportunity for that hearing must be provided before

the deprivation at issue takes effect. E. g., Bell v. Burson,

402 U.S. 535, 542; Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433,

437; Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254; Armstrong v. Manzo,

380 U.S., at 551; Mullane v. Central Hanover Tr. Co.,

supra, at 313; Opp Cotton Mills v. Administrator, 312

U.S. 126, 152-153; United States v. Illinois Central R. Co.,

291 U.S. 457, 463; Londoner v. City & County of Denver,

210 U.S. 373, 385-386. See In re Ruffalo, 390 U.S. 544,

550-551. "That the hearing required by due process is subject

to waiver, and is not fixed in form does not affect its root

requirement that an individual be given an opportunity for

a hearing before he is deprived of any significant property

interest, except for extraordinary situations where some

valid governmental interest is at stake that justifies

postponing the hearing until after the event." Boddie

v. Connecticut, supra, at 378-379 (emphasis in original).

The Supreme Court of Florida wrote one of the better

analytical summaries of U.S. Supreme Court decisions

concerning procedural due process secured by the Fifth

and Fourteenth Amendment clauses in Ray Lien Construction,

Inc. v. Jack M. Wainwrite, (1977) 346 S.2d 1029:

Garnishment is but one form of summary remedy historically

available to the creditor. It is a method whereby a person's

property, money, or credits in the possession, under the

control, or owing by another are applied to payment of the

former's debt to a third person by proper statutory process

against the debtor and garnishee. Because this remedy works

a deprivation of debtor's property, it must comply with

the requirements of procedural due process.

For more than a century the central meaning of procedural

due process has been clear: "Parties whose rights are to be

affected are entitled to be heard, and in order that they

may enjoy that right, they must first be notified." Baldwin

v. Hale, 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 223, 233, 17 L. Ed. 531. Fuentes

v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, [**4] 80, 92 S. Ct. 1983, 32

L. Ed. 2d 556 (1972).

The United States District Court for the Middle District

of Florida recently reviewed the statutes in question and

held the procedure, as outlined in Chapter 77, Florida

Statutes, unconstitutional. See Bunton v. First National

Bank of Tampa, 394 F. Supp. 793 (M.D.Fla.1975). In arriving

at its decision, the District Court relied upon the Supreme

Court's decision in North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem,

Inc., 419 U.S. 601, 95 S. Ct. 719, 42 L. Ed. 2d 751 (1975),

wherein a similar Georgia prejudgment garnishment statute

was declared unconstitutional. In North Georgia Finishing,

the Court referred to its earlier decision in Fuentes

v. Shevin, supra, wherein the Florida and Pennsylvania

replevin statutes were held invalid. Those statutes permitted

a secured installment seller to repossess goods sold without

prior notice and without opportunity for a hearing or other

safeguard against mistaken repossession. A writ was issuable

by a clerk of the court upon ex [*1032] parte application

and posting of bond. It was not necessary to show that the

goods were wrongfully detained. Nor was provision made

for prompt post-seizure [**5] hearing. Thus, the debtor

was deprived of his property until final outcome of the

repossession suit. The Georgia statute was condemned on

similar grounds. A writ of garnishment was issuable at the

behest of the seller, without notice or opportunity for early

hearing and without participation by a judicial officer. As

in Fuentes, debtor's only remedy was to post a security bond.

We read North Georgia Finishing, supra, and Mitchell, supra,

to require a hearing either before the alleged taking or

promptly thereafter. In Unique Caterers v. Rudy's Farm Co.,

supra, we found Chapter 76 constitutionally deficient because

it did not require an immediate post-seizure hearing. Rather,

it simply kept the court open at any time to hear motions

for dissolution

We also stated: It is constitutionally imperative that a writ

issue only after an impartial factual determination is made

concerning the existence of the essential elements necessary

for issuance of [**8] the writ. Consequently, a writ must

be issued by a judicial officer based upon a prima facie

showing rather than pro forma by the clerk of court, unless

the initial pleading is made under oath to a clerk who makes

an independent factual determination that the requirements

of the statute have been complied with. Only then can the

individual have his use and enjoyment of [*1033] property

protected from arbitrary encroachment. (footnote omitted)

The meaning of the Fifth Amendment due process clause

shouldn't need explanation. Unless Big has evidence of

a court order authorizing pre-judgment or post-judgment

garnishment, as required by the Federal Debt Collection

Procedures Act, BIG has no authority whatever to garnish

wages, bank accounts or any other property that belong to

its employees.

According to the United States Attorney's Manual, the

purpose of a "levy" is to not to "seize" assets, but to

"freeze" assets until a civil action for collection of a

delinquent tax debt is commenced:

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

TAX DIVISION JUDGMENT COLLECTION MANUAL - 1997 Ed.

E. Liquidating Assets

1. The IRS's Ability to Collect Administratively

A suit to reduce an assessment to judgment must be brought, or

a counterclaim filed, prior to the expiration of the ten-year

period provided under 6502, I.R.C., or the extension of that

period (by agreement or by operation of law) (47). During this

period the IRS has the power to seize property by levy (*48)

and distraint. I.R.C. 6331-6344. If a collection suit is

timely filed, the IRS power to levy is extended for as long as

the suit is pending and for as long as any judgment resulting

from the suit remains enforceable.

*48. While a levy must be served within the period prescribed in

I.R.C. 6502, it "freezes" the corpus levied upon until a levy

enforcement action is commenced. Such an action may be brought at

any later date. See, e.g., United States v. Eiland, 223 F.2d 118,

121-22 (4th Cir. 1955); United States v. Weintraub, 613 F.2d 612

(6th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 905

(1980). [Bold & underscore emphasis added]

Thus, the purpose of the notice, assuming intent to initiate

civil litigation, is to require the 21-day hold; it is not

a seizure order. If litigation is not initiated by the

government before the 21 days expires, no action can be

required or expected of Big. Technically, a lis pendens

must be filed before a notice of levy is issued. Big

finds prejudgment remedies classified in the Federal Debt

Collection Procedure Act at 28 U.S.C. 3101-3105. Big

also finds that state law forbids garnishment, seizure and

encumbrance of property without a judgment from a court of

competent jurisdiction. In sum, garnishment other than via

a voluntary administrative offset agreement is a lawful

remedy only as a pre-judgment remedy, which corresponds

with 28 U.S.C. 3101-3105, or as a post-judgment remedy,

which under federal law must comply with provisions of 28

U.S.C. 3205.

According to the following court case, the levy is Form 668

B, which replaced the Form 69, Warrant for Distraint. The

Secretary's authority to issue a warrant for distraint

is found at Title 31 Section 3541, which authorizes the

Secretary to obtain a warrant for distraint against public

officials who are holding the government's money. Warrants

for distraint are served by United States Marshals, not by

IRS agents, and not through the mail.

"Under the 1939 Code, effective with respect to distraint and

seizure and sale actions prior to January 1, 1955, levy or

distraint on personal or real property in the possession of

a taxpayer was authorized by a signed Warrant for Distraint,

Form 69, which commanded the collection officer to take the

necessary distraint action. Under the 1954 Code, effective

with respect to all collection actions after December 31,

1954, the levy and distraint action will be authorized

by a new form, Levy, Form 668-B, January 1955. This form,

properly executed, directs the collection officer to levy

upon, and to sell so much of the property and rights to

property, either real or personal, of the taxpayer liable,

as may be necessary to satisfy the taxes enumerated in the

levy." Henderson v. Internal Revenue Service, KTC 1994-486

(S.D. Ind. 1994) [Bold & underscore emphasis added]

The notice also says "this levy requires ." A notice is

never the thing of which it notifies. If the levy requires

some action, evidence of the action must be included with

or identified on the execution instrument. For example,

notices of federal tax lien IRS personnel routinely send

to county recorders have space on the back for judgment

abstracts but that portion is rarely if ever completed. See

28 U.S.C. 3201 concerning judgment liens and definitions

at 28 U.S.C. 3002(3) to verify that "tax debts" are in

fact among obligations to Government of the United States

subject to the Federal Debt Collection Procedures Act. As

is the case for federal tax liens, if there is no judicial

writ attached to or referenced on a notice of levy, and

the notice is accompanied by an actual Form 668-B Levy,

there is no levy.

Attorney General's Opinions, AGO 53-55 No. 97 and AGO 65-66

No. 127 explain in some detail how a levy proceeds from an

action in a court of law. Further, Internal Revenue Service

Letter Ruling, # 200123062, dated 5/2/2001, explains several

important due process steps in serving notices of levy.

First, such notices must include a Form 668 B, which is

the actual levy. Second, only those large businesses and

governmental units, that have designated officers and

written agreements, are authorized to receive notices of

levy by mail. Third, to complete the levy, another form,

Form 668 C, must be served, but cannot be served by mail;

it must be served in person. That completes service of

"notice of levy". Absent Form 668 B there is no evidence

that there is a levy. In the event the IRS fails to serve

either or both the levy a nd Form 668 C, service of process

is incomplete, and IRS defaults.

Again, state law governs property and rights to property,

and substantive due process rights secured by the state

Bill of Rights correspond with those secured by the Fourth,

Fifth, Sixth and Seventh Amendments to the Constitution of

the United States. The Fifth Amendment due process clause has

universal application within States of the Union: No person

shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due

process of law. Further, for reasons not addressed in this

letter, federal judgments are foreign to States of the

Union and must be executed via state courts of competent

jurisdiction.

Even registering a foreign judgment does not give the foreign

creditor the right to execute on it. The creditor must obtain

the equivalent in a state court before proceeding. In brief,

there can be no seizure before a judgment in a state court

is rendered. Further, the AGO states clearly that there

are two forms of judicial process referred to above, writs

of attachment and writs of garnishment. Since a notice

of levy is neither, it should be obvious that it is not

"service of process" in any legal sense whatsoever. Federal

law says that a levy is served with a writ of attachment;

writs of attachment have a different purpose than writs

of garnishment.

The Treasury Financial Services publishes a procedural manual

(the Treasury Financial Manual, or TFM) that explains in

plain English that the IRS can only "serve" notices of levy

on government officers who are appointed by heads of agencies

to receive such notices. The following excerpts from Chapter

3, Part 4000, of Volume 1, part of which are included as an

exhibit, were downloaded from the Treasury Financial Services

web site, at .

Section 4075 Levy for Unpaid Tax Liability: IRC provisions

permit district directors to collect delinquent Federal

taxes by levy on the accrued salary or wages of any officer,

employee or elected official of the United States or the

District of Columbia. Since this levy is served against the

take-home pay of the employee, once the levy is served,

agencies should not permit an employee to increase any

voluntary allotment until the tax liability is liquidated

or other arrangements satisfactory to the IRS are made.

4075.10 Service of Levy An IRS employee (agent) serves notice

of levy on wages, salary and other income of individuals

designated under section 4075.20. The IRS can serve this

notice in person or by mail. Service by mail is limited to

the United States, its territories and possessions, and

ships at sea. A notice of levy includes an original and

four copies. All copies should be signed and dated, with

the time of receipt noted on the forms. The agency should

return the original to the IRS employee. The employing

agency keeps one copy. IRS or the employing agency sends

another copy to the employee. The person designated in

section 4075.20 must honor all applicable notices of levy,

whether served in person or received by mail. The General

Accounting Office makes no disallowance nor does it raise

charges against any disbursing officer or designated person

for complying with notices of levy.

4075.20 Designating Individuals to Receive Service of Notice

of Levy: Each Government agency should designate one or more

persons on whom notice of levy for delinquent taxes of its

employees may be served. These designees receive written

statements from such employees regarding exemptions for

dependents as provided for in the IRC.

Nothing in the TFM indicates that IRS has authority to

perform any similar act regarding private citizens or

businesses. BIG is not one of the designated agents outlined

above. BIG is not a person lawfully authorized to respond

to an IRS notice of levy. A private or state employer must

agree to participate in administrative offset as the means

for collecting delinquent federal taxes, as specified by

5.14.10 of the Internal Revenue Manual, also included as

an exhibit.

Previously cited sections of the Treasury Financial Manual

are somewhat misleading, as government employees subject

to administrative garnishment must voluntarily agree

to garnishment. See 4075.50, cited in the first part

of this letter. If a federal employee doesn't concede a

liability for delinquent taxes and voluntarily authorize

administrative offset garnishment, the Treasury Financial

Management Service must verify the claim then recommend

civil action for collection. The Attorney General must

initiate an action in compliance with 26 U.S.C. 7402. See

5 U.S.C. 5512 concerning garnishment litigation against

government personnel.

A levy is not a garnishment. It would take a court action

to compel BIG to surrender the employee's property to

another without the employees consent and over the employees

objection; ordinary people must get writs of garnishment,

and so must governments.

In sum, a notice of levy is not a levy or a

garnishment. Unless the tax involved is administered by

BATF, or the victim is a government employee, there is no

justification for a levy.

Unless BIG Corporation is a government agency with a written

agreement to receive such notices, BIG is not authorized

to receive them by mail, let alone act upon them. Even

where such agreements are in place, the only way money can

be garnished administratively without a judicial writ of

garnishment or some other appropriate execution instrument

is when whoever is subjected to the administrative action

has signed the consent form prescribed by the Financial

Management Service. Where private and state employers are

concerned, the employer, too, must consent and IRS personnel

responsible for administrative offset must provide the notice

and additional forms required by 5.14.10 (2004)of the

Internal Revenue Manual. The employee has not and does not

intend to sign such consent and to date Big has not executed

written consent to garnishment via administrative offset.

The Code of Federal Regulations speaks to liability of those

who erroneously surrender property to the Internal Revenue

Service and other Department of the Treasury bureaus such

as the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms.

At 26 CFR 301.6332-1(b)(2), BIG finds the requirement to

make a good faith effort to determine whether or not there

is a valid levy in place: "The penalty described in this

subparagraph is not applicable in cases where bona fide

dispute exists concerning the amount of the property to

be surrendered pursuant to a levy or concerning the legal

effectiveness of the levy " A corresponding statement

in BATF regulations more closely duplicates verbiage in

the 1966 Congressional Report on amended lien and levy

legislation. The cite is found at 27 CFR 70.163(c):

"Any person who mistakenly surrenders to the United States

property or rights to property not properly subject to levy

is not relieved from liability to a third party who owns

the property " Therefore, until BIG receives the requested

authority from the IRS to garnish employee's wages, BIG is

not lawfully authorized to respond to an IRS notice of levy.

Sincerely,

Robert Jones, CEO

BIG Corporation

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No law compels a work eligible man or woman to submit a form W-4 or W-9(or their equivalent) nor disclose an SSN as a condition of being hired or keeping one's job. With the exception of an order from a court of competent jurisdiction issued by a duly qualified judge, no amounts can be lawfully taken from one's pay (for taxes, fees or other charges) without the worker's explicit, knowing, voluntary, written consent. http://www.preferredservi...

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