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Super Hot Court Case exposes Facts About IRS! Please! :EVERYONE YOU MUST READ THIS:!!!
Robert Jones, CEO
INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE FACTS.
1.Social Security Numbers can only be issued to federal "employees" for use only in the performance of their official duties. See 20 CFR §422.104.
2.The Social Security Number is the property of the government and not you. Therefore, it can't be "yours" unless you are a public officer on official business. See 20 CFR §422.103(d).
3.The SSN is issued to the federal "public officer" and not to the man, and then only while he is an agent of the federal government.
4.Anyone who uses a Social Security Number who is NOT a federal employee acting on official commercial, government business is guilty of impersonating a federal "employee", which is a crime. See 18 U.S.C. §912.
5.You can only use it in connection with a "public purpose", and not a private purpose. It is illegal and a crime to use or abuse the SSN for a private or personal use. This is called embezzlement or conversion, and it is a criminal violation of 18 U.S.C. §641 and 18 U.S.C. §654.
6.Everything connected to the SSN becomes "public property" because the SSN can only be used in connection with a "public office" or federal employment.
7.The private man was never issued an SSN if he is not acting as a federal "employee". Therefore, he can honestly answer "NO" in response to the question of whether he was ever issued an SSN if he is not acting as a federal "employee" or agent.
taken from
USC Title 15 Chapter 1 Section 17 clearly states: "The labor of a
human being is not a commodity or article of commerce."
IRS-ACS Correspondence
PO Box 24017- Stop 76202
Fresno, CA 93776
Attn: Susan Meredith, Operations Manager, Collection
IDENTIFICATION: Bradford Smith, SSN: xxx-xx-xx, non-federally
connected worker SUBJECT: Internal Revenue Service Notice of Levy
Form 668-W(c) PURPOSE: Request for written authority to garnish
wages, including: 1) Form 668-B Levy 2) Judgment abstract from
a court of competent jurisdiction 3) Form 2159 Payroll Deduction
Agreement 4) Letter 3164 Notice 5) Form 12175
ENCLOSURES:
1. Treasury Financial Manual, Part 3, Chapter 4 of Title 1, 4075-
Levy for Unpaid Tax Liability, March 2000 edition.
2. Internal Revenue Manual 5.14.10- Administrative garnishment via
private employers, state government agencies, etc. (IRM 5.14.10.2
dated 09-30-2004),
http://www.supremelaw.org... (This section is
now conveniently missing in their revised version 5.14.10.1 dated
09-26-2008.)
3. U.S. Representative Raul M. Grijalva September 8, 2003 letter
to an IRS Taxpayer Advocate in Arizona (names & other identifying
information redacted).
Dear Susan,
BIG Corporation received a "notice" of levy; Form 668-W(c),
dated April 03, 2004 from the Fresno, CA office of the
Internal Revenue Service.
Please be advised that Bradford Smith does not consent
to an administrative levy, i.e., garnishment of salary,
wages or other remuneration due from Big Corporation. In
the event BIG surrenders sums due the private sector worker
as remuneration for services rendered, the private sector
worker reserves the right to pursue appropriate civil
and criminal remedies. Therefore, BIG must secure written
verification from the Internal Revenue Service officer or
agent responsible for issuing the notice of levy that the
Internal Revenue Service will defend BIG, pay litigation
expenses and compensate BIG for whatever damages are awarded
in the event that the private sector worker prevails.
Please note that the IRS officer responsible for the notice
of levy did not send BIG a Form 2159 Payroll Deduction
Agreement. The private sector worker has not received, nor
has BIG received, the necessary Letter 3164 notice. BIG has
not received a completed Form 12175, nor has BIG received
a properly executed Form 668 B Levy. Therefore, the naked
"notice" of levy has no lawful effect and BIG has no lawful
duty to enforce it. Please reference exhibits attached to
this notice to verify the requirement for authorization
and procedural documents listed in this paragraph.
The naked notice of levy was fraudulently issued under the
federal Administrative Offset Program, a/k/a Treasury Offset
Program, and BIG Corporation simply isn't authorized to
participate. Only state and federal legislative, judicial and
administrative agencies may participate. See 31 U.S.C. 3711
for particulars. Per 31 U.S.C. 3711(b)(1), even government
disbursement officers are required to ignore the procedure
when it is fraudulent, incomplete or otherwise irregular:
"(b) (1) The head of an executive, judicial, or legislative
agency may not act under subsection (a)(2) or (3) of this
section on a claim that appears to be fraudulent, false, or
misrepresented by a party with an interest in the claim, or
that is based on conduct in violation of the antitrust laws."
To verify that the Treasury Financial Management Service
rather than the Internal Revenue Service has delegated
authority over voluntary and involuntary collection of
delinquent tax debts, consult the authority section of FMS
system of records .015, Debt Collection Operation System,
published in the Federal Register on August 21, 2001,
66 F.R. 44204, et seq. Authorities listed are as follows:
Authority for maintenance of the system:
Federal Claims Collection Act of 1966 (Pub L. 89-508), as amended
by the Debt Collection Act of 1982 (Pub L. 97-365, as amended);
Deficit Reduction Act of 1984 (Pub L. 98-369, as amended); Debt
Collection Improvement Act of 1996 (Pub. L. 104-134, sec. 31001);
Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 (Pub. L. 105-34); Internal Revenue
Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998 (Pub. L. 105-206);
26 U.S.C. 6402; 26 U.S.C. 6331; 31 U.S.C. Chapter 37 (Claims),
Subchapter I (General) and Subchapter II (Claims of the
U.S. Government).
Note that the authorities include sections 6331 (levy and
distraint) and 6402 (authority to make credits and refunds)
of the Internal Revenue Code. By referencing the Parallel
Table of Authorities and Rules, there are no implementing
regulations for 26 CFR Parts 1 or 31 for 26 U.S.C. 6331
(levy and distraint), which might vest the Internal Revenue
Service with corresponding authority.
Please consult 4075.50 of Part 3, Chapter 4000 of Title
1 of the Treasury Financial Manual, which is attached as
an exhibit:
An employee may arrange with the IRS to liquidate a tax
liability through payroll deduction. IRS Form 2159: Payroll
Deduction Agreement, authorizes such payroll deductions. The
employee and a revenue officer (or other authorized IRS
agent) must sign Form 2159. Send the original to the payroll
officer. The employing agency deducts the amount agreed upon
from the employee's salary until the total tax liability
is liquidated.
Where private enterprise such as BIG Corporation
is concerned, 5.14.10 of the Internal Revenue
Manual governs (IRM 5.14.10.2 dated 09-30-2004),
http://www.supremelaw.org... (This
section is now conveniently missing in their revised
version 5.14.10.1 dated 09-26-2008.) Both the employee and
the employer must consent to administrative offset as the
means for collecting delinquent federal tax debts. See
particularly 5.14.10.2.5, beginning on page 2 of the
exhibit. The IRS agent must provide the Letter 3164 notice
and a properly executed Form 12175.
Since BIG did not receive the requisite consent form, notice,
etc., and BIG did not receive a valid levy instrument that
verifies a judgment against the private sector worker from a
court of competent jurisdiction, Big can not withhold money
from what Big owes the employee based on whatever "notice"
of levy an Internal Revenue Service agent or officer sent
to BIG. The document is an uttered instrument. The proper
form IRS uses for garnishment, seizure, etc., is the Form
668-B Levy, not the notice of levy. Additionally, in order
to be valid, a levy or any other execution instrument
must be under the seal of the Internal Revenue Service,
thereby verifying it, or the seal of a court of competent
jurisdiction. See state and federal rules of evidence and
procedure: Any legal document issuing from a government
agency is self-executing evidence only when under the
appropriate seal and the officer who has custody of the
seal verifies validity of the instrument.
Per 26 CFR 301.6332-1(b)(2), the property custodian may
refuse to honor a "levy" in the event of reasonable cause:
"The penalty described in this subparagraph is not applicable
in cases where bona fide dispute exists concerning the
amount of the property to be surrendered pursuant to a levy
or concerning the legal effectiveness of the levy "
Any statute that supposes to effect legislative judgment,
thereby eliminating judicial due process of law, is a bill
of attainder, which the U.S. Constitution prohibits both
Congress and state legislatures from enacting. However,
the Internal Revenue Code does not authorize seizures,
garnishments and the like without judicial due process.
In Duncan v. Kahanamoku, Sheriff, (1946) 327 U.S. 304;
66 S. Ct. 606; 90 L. Ed. 688, the Supreme Court of the
United States condemned legislative summary judgment and
unilateral administrative execution:
Courts and their procedural safeguards are indispensable
to our system of government. They were set up by our
founders to protect the liberties they [**615] valued.
Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 19. Their philosophy has
been the people's throughout our history. For that reason
we have maintained legislatures chosen by citizens or
their representatives and courts and juries to try those
who violate legislative enactments. We have always been
especially concerned about the potential evils of summary
criminal trials and have guarded against them by provisions
embodied in the Constitution itself. See Ex parte Milligan,
4 Wall. 2; Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227. Legislatures
and courts are not merely cherished American institutions;
they are indispensable to our Government.
The notice of levy BIG received would be illegal for the
simple reason that it is not supported by a judgment from
a court of competent jurisdiction. However, there are
numerous other flaws. In addition to other defects I will
cover in some detail, Internal Revenue Service personnel
have no authority whatever to levy salaries and wages from
privately owned companies. The authority is applicable solely
to government agencies and personnel by 26 U.S.C. 6331(a):
" Levy may be made upon the accrued salary or wages of any
officer, employee, or elected official, of the United States,
the District of Columbia, or any agency or instrumentality
of the United States or the District of Columbia, by serving
a notice of levy on the employer (as defined in section
3401(d)) of such officer, employee, or elected official "
Big has reviewed 26 CFR 301.6331-1(a)(4).
In Fuentes v. Shevin, Attorney General of Florida, et al,
(1972) 407 U.S. 67, 92 S.Ct. 1983, 32 L.Ed. 2d 556, the
U.S. Supreme Court addressed essentials of the due process
clause as it appears in the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments:
[***HR3] [***HR4] For more than a century the central
meaning of procedural due process has been clear: "Parties
whose rights are to be affected are entitled to be heard;
and in order that they may enjoy that right they must first
be notified." Baldwin v. Hale, 1 Wall. 223, 233. See Windsor
v. McVeigh, 93 U.S. 274; Hovey v. Elliott, 167 U.S. 409;
Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385. [***570] It is equally
fundamental that the right to notice and an opportunity
to be heard "must be granted at a meaningful time and in
a meaningful manner." Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552.
[***HR5] [***HR6] The constitutional right to be heard is
a basic aspect of the duty of government to follow a fair
process of decisionmaking when it acts to deprive a person of
his possessions. The purpose of this requirement is not [*81]
only to ensure abstract fair play to the individual. Its
purpose, more particularly, is to protect his use and
possession of property from arbitrary encroachment --
to minimize substantively unfair or mistaken deprivations
of property, a danger that is especially great when the
State seizes goods simply upon the application of and for
the benefit of a private party. So viewed, the prohibition
against the deprivation of property without due process of
law reflects the high value, embedded in our constitutional
and political history, that we place on a person's right to
enjoy what is his, free of governmental interference. See
Lynch v. Household Finance Corp., 405 U.S. 538, 552.
[***HR7] The requirement of notice and an opportunity to
be heard raises no impenetrable barrier to the taking of a
person's possessions. But the fair process of decision-making
that it guarantees works, by itself, to protect against
arbitrary deprivation of property. For when a person has
an opportunity to speak up in his own defense, and when the
State must listen to what he has to say, substantively unfair
and simply mistaken deprivations of property interests can
be prevented. It has long been recognized that "fairness
can rarely be obtained by secret, one-sided determination
of facts decisive of rights. ... [And n]o better instrument
has been devised for arriving at truth than to give a person
in jeopardy of serious loss notice of the case against him
and opportunity to meet it." Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee
Committee v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 170-172 (Frankfurter,
J., concurring).
[***HR8] If the right to notice and a hearing is to serve
its full purpose, then, it is clear that it must be granted
at a time when the deprivation can still be prevented. At a
later hearing, an individual's possessions can be returned
to him if they were unfairly or mistakenly [**1995] taken
in the first place. Damages may even be [*82] awarded to
him for the wrongful deprivation. But no later hearing and
no damage award can undo the fact that the arbitrary taking
that was subject to the right of procedural due process has
already occurred. [***571] "This Court has not ... embraced
the general proposition that a wrong may be done if it can
be undone." Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U. Truth # 2. For this Arthur-Edward: Lee / arthur-edward is with this Knowledge and Conviction that the Commercial Token / Resulting Trust ARTHUR E. LEE / ARTHUR EDWARD LEE is by the Manufacturing and with the B ERTHING on the STATE OF WASHINGTON Campus on 3/30/1932 as a Commercial Token / Resulting Trust and arthur-edward / Arthur-Edward: Lee is without Knowledge of any Evidence to the Contrary and is with this Conviction that no such Evidence exists.
. 645, 647.
[***HR9] [***HR10] This is no new principle of constitutional
law. The right to a prior hearing has long been recognized
by this Court under the Fourteenth and Fifth Amendments.
Although the Court has held that due process tolerates
variances in the form of a hearing "appropriate to the
nature of the case," Mullane v. Central Hanover Tr. Co.,
339 U.S. 306, 313, and "depending upon the importance of
the interests involved and the nature of the subsequent
proceedings [if any]," Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371,
378, the Court has traditionally insisted that, whatever its
form, opportunity for that hearing must be provided before
the deprivation at issue takes effect. E. g., Bell v. Burson,
402 U.S. 535, 542; Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433,
437; Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254; Armstrong v. Manzo,
380 U.S., at 551; Mullane v. Central Hanover Tr. Co.,
supra, at 313; Opp Cotton Mills v. Administrator, 312
U.S. 126, 152-153; United States v. Illinois Central R. Co.,
291 U.S. 457, 463; Londoner v. City & County of Denver,
210 U.S. 373, 385-386. See In re Ruffalo, 390 U.S. 544,
550-551. "That the hearing required by due process is subject
to waiver, and is not fixed in form does not affect its root
requirement that an individual be given an opportunity for
a hearing before he is deprived of any significant property
interest, except for extraordinary situations where some
valid governmental interest is at stake that justifies
postponing the hearing until after the event." Boddie
v. Connecticut, supra, at 378-379 (emphasis in original).
The Supreme Court of Florida wrote one of the better
analytical summaries of U.S. Supreme Court decisions
concerning procedural due process secured by the Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendment clauses in Ray Lien Construction,
Inc. v. Jack M. Wainwrite, (1977) 346 S.2d 1029:
Garnishment is but one form of summary remedy historically
available to the creditor. It is a method whereby a person's
property, money, or credits in the possession, under the
control, or owing by another are applied to payment of the
former's debt to a third person by proper statutory process
against the debtor and garnishee. Because this remedy works
a deprivation of debtor's property, it must comply with
the requirements of procedural due process.
For more than a century the central meaning of procedural
due process has been clear: "Parties whose rights are to be
affected are entitled to be heard, and in order that they
may enjoy that right, they must first be notified." Baldwin
v. Hale, 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 223, 233, 17 L. Ed. 531. Fuentes
v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, [**4] 80, 92 S. Ct. 1983, 32
L. Ed. 2d 556 (1972).
The United States District Court for the Middle District
of Florida recently reviewed the statutes in question and
held the procedure, as outlined in Chapter 77, Florida
Statutes, unconstitutional. See Bunton v. First National
Bank of Tampa, 394 F. Supp. 793 (M.D.Fla.1975). In arriving
at its decision, the District Court relied upon the Supreme
Court's decision in North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem,
Inc., 419 U.S. 601, 95 S. Ct. 719, 42 L. Ed. 2d 751 (1975),
wherein a similar Georgia prejudgment garnishment statute
was declared unconstitutional. In North Georgia Finishing,
the Court referred to its earlier decision in Fuentes
v. Shevin, supra, wherein the Florida and Pennsylvania
replevin statutes were held invalid. Those statutes permitted
a secured installment seller to repossess goods sold without
prior notice and without opportunity for a hearing or other
safeguard against mistaken repossession. A writ was issuable
by a clerk of the court upon ex [*1032] parte application
and posting of bond. It was not necessary to show that the
goods were wrongfully detained. Nor was provision made
for prompt post-seizure [**5] hearing. Thus, the debtor
was deprived of his property until final outcome of the
repossession suit. The Georgia statute was condemned on
similar grounds. A writ of garnishment was issuable at the
behest of the seller, without notice or opportunity for early
hearing and without participation by a judicial officer. As
in Fuentes, debtor's only remedy was to post a security bond.
We read North Georgia Finishing, supra, and Mitchell, supra,
to require a hearing either before the alleged taking or
promptly thereafter. In Unique Caterers v. Rudy's Farm Co.,
supra, we found Chapter 76 constitutionally deficient because
it did not require an immediate post-seizure hearing. Rather,
it simply kept the court open at any time to hear motions
for dissolution
We also stated: It is constitutionally imperative that a writ
issue only after an impartial factual determination is made
concerning the existence of the essential elements necessary
for issuance of [**8] the writ. Consequently, a writ must
be issued by a judicial officer based upon a prima facie
showing rather than pro forma by the clerk of court, unless
the initial pleading is made under oath to a clerk who makes
an independent factual determination that the requirements
of the statute have been complied with. Only then can the
individual have his use and enjoyment of [*1033] property
protected from arbitrary encroachment. (footnote omitted)
The meaning of the Fifth Amendment due process clause
shouldn't need explanation. Unless Big has evidence of
a court order authorizing pre-judgment or post-judgment
garnishment, as required by the Federal Debt Collection
Procedures Act, BIG has no authority whatever to garnish
wages, bank accounts or any other property that belong to
its employees.
According to the United States Attorney's Manual, the
purpose of a "levy" is to not to "seize" assets, but to
"freeze" assets until a civil action for collection of a
delinquent tax debt is commenced:
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
TAX DIVISION JUDGMENT COLLECTION MANUAL - 1997 Ed.
E. Liquidating Assets
1. The IRS's Ability to Collect Administratively
A suit to reduce an assessment to judgment must be brought, or
a counterclaim filed, prior to the expiration of the ten-year
period provided under 6502, I.R.C., or the extension of that
period (by agreement or by operation of law) (47). During this
period the IRS has the power to seize property by levy (*48)
and distraint. I.R.C. 6331-6344. If a collection suit is
timely filed, the IRS power to levy is extended for as long as
the suit is pending and for as long as any judgment resulting
from the suit remains enforceable.
*48. While a levy must be served within the period prescribed in
I.R.C. 6502, it "freezes" the corpus levied upon until a levy
enforcement action is commenced. Such an action may be brought at
any later date. See, e.g., United States v. Eiland, 223 F.2d 118,
121-22 (4th Cir. 1955); United States v. Weintraub, 613 F.2d 612
(6th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 905
(1980). [Bold & underscore emphasis added]
Thus, the purpose of the notice, assuming intent to initiate
civil litigation, is to require the 21-day hold; it is not
a seizure order. If litigation is not initiated by the
government before the 21 days expires, no action can be
required or expected of Big. Technically, a lis pendens
must be filed before a notice of levy is issued. Big
finds prejudgment remedies classified in the Federal Debt
Collection Procedure Act at 28 U.S.C. 3101-3105. Big
also finds that state law forbids garnishment, seizure and
encumbrance of property without a judgment from a court of
competent jurisdiction. In sum, garnishment other than via
a voluntary administrative offset agreement is a lawful
remedy only as a pre-judgment remedy, which corresponds
with 28 U.S.C. 3101-3105, or as a post-judgment remedy,
which under federal law must comply with provisions of 28
U.S.C. 3205.
According to the following court case, the levy is Form 668
B, which replaced the Form 69, Warrant for Distraint. The
Secretary's authority to issue a warrant for distraint
is found at Title 31 Section 3541, which authorizes the
Secretary to obtain a warrant for distraint against public
officials who are holding the government's money. Warrants
for distraint are served by United States Marshals, not by
IRS agents, and not through the mail.
"Under the 1939 Code, effective with respect to distraint and
seizure and sale actions prior to January 1, 1955, levy or
distraint on personal or real property in the possession of
a taxpayer was authorized by a signed Warrant for Distraint,
Form 69, which commanded the collection officer to take the
necessary distraint action. Under the 1954 Code, effective
with respect to all collection actions after December 31,
1954, the levy and distraint action will be authorized
by a new form, Levy, Form 668-B, January 1955. This form,
properly executed, directs the collection officer to levy
upon, and to sell so much of the property and rights to
property, either real or personal, of the taxpayer liable,
as may be necessary to satisfy the taxes enumerated in the
levy." Henderson v. Internal Revenue Service, KTC 1994-486
(S.D. Ind. 1994) [Bold & underscore emphasis added]
The notice also says "this levy requires ." A notice is
never the thing of which it notifies. If the levy requires
some action, evidence of the action must be included with
or identified on the execution instrument. For example,
notices of federal tax lien IRS personnel routinely send
to county recorders have space on the back for judgment
abstracts but that portion is rarely if ever completed. See
28 U.S.C. 3201 concerning judgment liens and definitions
at 28 U.S.C. 3002(3) to verify that "tax debts" are in
fact among obligations to Government of the United States
subject to the Federal Debt Collection Procedures Act. As
is the case for federal tax liens, if there is no judicial
writ attached to or referenced on a notice of levy, and
the notice is accompanied by an actual Form 668-B Levy,
there is no levy.
Attorney General's Opinions, AGO 53-55 No. 97 and AGO 65-66
No. 127 explain in some detail how a levy proceeds from an
action in a court of law. Further, Internal Revenue Service
Letter Ruling, # 200123062, dated 5/2/2001, explains several
important due process steps in serving notices of levy.
First, such notices must include a Form 668 B, which is
the actual levy. Second, only those large businesses and
governmental units, that have designated officers and
written agreements, are authorized to receive notices of
levy by mail. Third, to complete the levy, another form,
Form 668 C, must be served, but cannot be served by mail;
it must be served in person. That completes service of
"notice of levy". Absent Form 668 B there is no evidence
that there is a levy. In the event the IRS fails to serve
either or both the levy a nd Form 668 C, service of process
is incomplete, and IRS defaults.
Again, state law governs property and rights to property,
and substantive due process rights secured by the state
Bill of Rights correspond with those secured by the Fourth,
Fifth, Sixth and Seventh Amendments to the Constitution of
the United States. The Fifth Amendment due process clause has
universal application within States of the Union: No person
shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due
process of law. Further, for reasons not addressed in this
letter, federal judgments are foreign to States of the
Union and must be executed via state courts of competent
jurisdiction.
Even registering a foreign judgment does not give the foreign
creditor the right to execute on it. The creditor must obtain
the equivalent in a state court before proceeding. In brief,
there can be no seizure before a judgment in a state court
is rendered. Further, the AGO states clearly that there
are two forms of judicial process referred to above, writs
of attachment and writs of garnishment. Since a notice
of levy is neither, it should be obvious that it is not
"service of process" in any legal sense whatsoever. Federal
law says that a levy is served with a writ of attachment;
writs of attachment have a different purpose than writs
of garnishment.
The Treasury Financial Services publishes a procedural manual
(the Treasury Financial Manual, or TFM) that explains in
plain English that the IRS can only "serve" notices of levy
on government officers who are appointed by heads of agencies
to receive such notices. The following excerpts from Chapter
3, Part 4000, of Volume 1, part of which are included as an
exhibit, were downloaded from the Treasury Financial Services
web site, at .
Section 4075 Levy for Unpaid Tax Liability: IRC provisions
permit district directors to collect delinquent Federal
taxes by levy on the accrued salary or wages of any officer,
employee or elected official of the United States or the
District of Columbia. Since this levy is served against the
take-home pay of the employee, once the levy is served,
agencies should not permit an employee to increase any
voluntary allotment until the tax liability is liquidated
or other arrangements satisfactory to the IRS are made.
4075.10 Service of Levy An IRS employee (agent) serves notice
of levy on wages, salary and other income of individuals
designated under section 4075.20. The IRS can serve this
notice in person or by mail. Service by mail is limited to
the United States, its territories and possessions, and
ships at sea. A notice of levy includes an original and
four copies. All copies should be signed and dated, with
the time of receipt noted on the forms. The agency should
return the original to the IRS employee. The employing
agency keeps one copy. IRS or the employing agency sends
another copy to the employee. The person designated in
section 4075.20 must honor all applicable notices of levy,
whether served in person or received by mail. The General
Accounting Office makes no disallowance nor does it raise
charges against any disbursing officer or designated person
for complying with notices of levy.
4075.20 Designating Individuals to Receive Service of Notice
of Levy: Each Government agency should designate one or more
persons on whom notice of levy for delinquent taxes of its
employees may be served. These designees receive written
statements from such employees regarding exemptions for
dependents as provided for in the IRC.
Nothing in the TFM indicates that IRS has authority to
perform any similar act regarding private citizens or
businesses. BIG is not one of the designated agents outlined
above. BIG is not a person lawfully authorized to respond
to an IRS notice of levy. A private or state employer must
agree to participate in administrative offset as the means
for collecting delinquent federal taxes, as specified by
5.14.10 of the Internal Revenue Manual, also included as
an exhibit.
Previously cited sections of the Treasury Financial Manual
are somewhat misleading, as government employees subject
to administrative garnishment must voluntarily agree
to garnishment. See 4075.50, cited in the first part
of this letter. If a federal employee doesn't concede a
liability for delinquent taxes and voluntarily authorize
administrative offset garnishment, the Treasury Financial
Management Service must verify the claim then recommend
civil action for collection. The Attorney General must
initiate an action in compliance with 26 U.S.C. 7402. See
5 U.S.C. 5512 concerning garnishment litigation against
government personnel.
A levy is not a garnishment. It would take a court action
to compel BIG to surrender the employee's property to
another without the employees consent and over the employees
objection; ordinary people must get writs of garnishment,
and so must governments.
In sum, a notice of levy is not a levy or a
garnishment. Unless the tax involved is administered by
BATF, or the victim is a government employee, there is no
justification for a levy.
Unless BIG Corporation is a government agency with a written
agreement to receive such notices, BIG is not authorized
to receive them by mail, let alone act upon them. Even
where such agreements are in place, the only way money can
be garnished administratively without a judicial writ of
garnishment or some other appropriate execution instrument
is when whoever is subjected to the administrative action
has signed the consent form prescribed by the Financial
Management Service. Where private and state employers are
concerned, the employer, too, must consent and IRS personnel
responsible for administrative offset must provide the notice
and additional forms required by 5.14.10 (2004)of the
Internal Revenue Manual. The employee has not and does not
intend to sign such consent and to date Big has not executed
written consent to garnishment via administrative offset.
The Code of Federal Regulations speaks to liability of those
who erroneously surrender property to the Internal Revenue
Service and other Department of the Treasury bureaus such
as the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms.
At 26 CFR 301.6332-1(b)(2), BIG finds the requirement to
make a good faith effort to determine whether or not there
is a valid levy in place: "The penalty described in this
subparagraph is not applicable in cases where bona fide
dispute exists concerning the amount of the property to
be surrendered pursuant to a levy or concerning the legal
effectiveness of the levy " A corresponding statement
in BATF regulations more closely duplicates verbiage in
the 1966 Congressional Report on amended lien and levy
legislation. The cite is found at 27 CFR 70.163(c):
"Any person who mistakenly surrenders to the United States
property or rights to property not properly subject to levy
is not relieved from liability to a third party who owns
the property " Therefore, until BIG receives the requested
authority from the IRS to garnish employee's wages, BIG is
not lawfully authorized to respond to an IRS notice of levy.
Sincerely,
Robert Jones, CEO
BIG Corporation
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