Nuclear Suppliers Drop Opposition to US-India Deal
J. Sri Raman
The latest protestations of loyalty to the leader from within the group have emanated from two NSG members earlier seen as uncompromising upholders of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Deserving of special note is the decision of these countries - Germany and Australia - not to desert the flock despite the deal's violation of the treaty that says "no" to nuclear commerce with non-signatory nations.
For those with an eye for ironies, the currently 45-member NSG was formed a year after India's first nuclear test of 1974. The test was supposed to have demonstrated that non-weapons-specific technology could be turned to weapons development. The NSG undertook to help the cause of nonproliferation by controlling the export and re-transfer of materials applicable to nuclear weapons development and by improving safeguards and protection on existing materials.
For NSG members with an eye to the main chance, however, the undertaking was not unalterably permanent. These members revealed a readiness to abandon the undertaking the moment they saw the business opportunities for them all from the bilateral agreement.
The opportunities arose from the civilian and military nuclear programs of India, both of which were to get a major boost from the 123 Agreement (the pact named after the provision of the US law under which it is to be concluded). As for civilian energy, India's Department of Atomic Energy expects the pact to help it raise its nuclear power capacity from 3,300 megawatts to 20,000 megawatts by 2020 and rapidly higher from then on. Hundreds of large, shiny-new reactors are part of the nuclear heaven being promised for the meek and poor of India.
Simultaneously, the import of uranium following the agreement will free up more of India's domestic uranium for its military program, to be carried forward in the eight nuclear facilities specified under the "separation plan." The former head of India's official National Security Advisory Board, K. Subrahmaniyam, is on record as arguing: "Given India's uranium ore crunch, it is to India's advantage to categorize as many power reactors as possible as civilian ones to be refueled by imported uranium and conserve our native uranium fuel for weapons-grade plutonium production."
Even months before the finalization of the text of the 123 Agreement on July 20, four major nuclear players - Russia, Canada, Britain and France - had more than indicated an eagerness to play major roles in future nuclear projects in India. Particularly notable are the considerably increased prospects of Russian cooperation in this regard. Three years ago, Moscow had ruled out providing enriched uranium to India for the Tarapur nuclear power plant, citing NSG rules. It had also refused India's request for an additional 2,000 megawatts for the Koodankulam nuclear power project in the south of India. But with the U.S.-India nuclear deal round the corner, and after Russian President Vladimir Putin's visit to India in January 2007, Moscow has been quick to clear the way for India in both these cases and to pledge help to this country in acquiring the latest nuclear energy-generation technology.
Still noteworthy is a new confidence in Washington about taking the NSG on board on the deal. The Bush administration has let India know of its plans to call special meetings of the group in order to sell the deal. This is to be done after the International Atomic Energy Agency and New Delhi enter into an "India-specific" scheme of safeguards. The process is expected to be over by the first week of September or so. Statements from Germany and Australia help to explain the spurt in Washington's confidence.
Soon after the 123 accord was finalized, Germany (expected to take a different stand within the NSG as a non-nuclear-weapon state) did a somersault of sorts. Germany's ambassador in India, Bernd Muetzelberg, said Germany would try to "forge a consensus" within the group on the deal and in favor of it. He added: "It's not an easy task (to forge a consensus) given India's consistent refusal to join the NPT regime. But we also understand India's security situation in which it has to operate."
In March, I had met an official of Germany's Foreign Affairs Ministry to discuss the NSG's role on the deal. He did tell me about the German corporates' interest in its consummation, pointing to the prospects it offered of increased German exports of not only nuclear material and equipment but even such machinery as turbines. But he did not tell me of the political case Bonn was building up for the policy change.
The ambassador, however, went on to voice antiterror solidarity with New Delhi, and said: "We are united with India in condemning all forms of terrorism." He hastened to single out "Islamic fundamentalism" as "the most dangerous" of these forms. He underlined that India had a "special responsibility" in combating this brand of terrorism as it was "home to the second-largest Muslim population in the world." New Delhi, which has been proudly proclaiming India's freedom from internal terrorism of this kind, has thus far refrained from reacting to the ambassador's undiplomatic statement.
Meanwhile, Australia has offered New Delhi post-deal cooperation of crucial importance to India's military nuclear program. Before the ink had dried on the agreed text of the 123 accord, Australia's foreign affairs minister, Alexander Downer, said that his government would discuss "the potential sale of Australian uranium to India fairly soon."
Jim Green of Australia's Energy Science Coalition, in a detailed critique of Australia's offer, points to the total about-face in Canberra's position. On March 7, 2006 Downer had identified the NPT as the key issue in relation to uranium sales to India: "We don't have any current intentions of changing our policy, and the reason is this: for 30 years we've been contributing very substantially in all sorts of ways to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and to the non-proliferation regime." Now, according to the same Downer, "inspections is the issue."
Green notes: "Proponents of nuclear trade with India argue that it will bring 65 percent (14/22) of India's reactors under safeguards. But it does not curtail India's nuclear weapons program by 65 percent. Nuclear trade will probably do more to facilitate India's nuclear weapons program than to curtail it."
He adds: "Indeed, it is by no means clear that the US has any interest in curtailing India's nuclear weapons program. Arthur Tellis from the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (and previously the US National Security Council) expresses a view which appears to have considerable support in Washington."
Tellis argues that integrating India into the nonproliferation order at the cost of capping the size of its nuclear arsenal "threatens to place New Delhi at a severe disadvantage vis-à-vis Beijing, a situation that could not only undermine Indian security, but also US interests in Asia in the face of the prospective rise of Chinese power over the long term."
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A freelance journalist and a peace activist in India, J. Sri Raman is the author of "Flashpoint" (Common Courage Press, USA). He is a regular contributor to Truthout.
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