Feb 2, 2015

PJ-96

CHAPTER 8

 

REC #1   HATONN

 

THU., MAY 26, 1994     9:58 A.M.     YEAR 7, DAY 283

 

THU., MAY 26, 1994

 

CONSTITUTION-FEDERALIST PAPERS

(Chapter 5)

 

CONSTITUTION: ARTICLE 1

SECTION 3, PARAGRAPH 2

 

Immediately after they shall be assembled in consequence of the first election, they shall be divided as equally as may be into three classes. The seats of the Senators of the first class shall be vacated at the expiration of the second year, of the second class at the expiration of the fourth year, and of the third class at the expiration of the sixth year, so that one-third may be chosen every second year; and if vacancies happen by resignation, or otherwise, during the recess of the legislature of any State, the Executive thereof may make temporary appointments until the next meeting of the legis­lature, which shall then fill such vacancies.

 

Federalist Papers, Excerpts:

 

No. 59, Par. 8, Alexander Hamilton:

 

It may easily be discerned also that the national government would run a much greater risk from a power in the State legis­latures over the elections of its House of Representatives than from their power of appointing the members of its Senate. The senators are to be chosen for the period of six years; there is to be a rotation, by which the seats of a third part of them are to be vacated and replenished every two years; and no State is to be entitled to more than two senators; a quorum of the body is to consist of sixteen members. The joint result of these circumstances would be that a temporary combination of a few States to intermit the appointment of senators could neither annul the existence nor impair the activity of the body; and it is not from a general or permanent combination of the States that we can have anything to fear. The first might proceed from sinister designs in the leading members of a few of the State legislatures; the last would suppose a fixed and rooted disaffection in the great body of the people which will either never exist at all, or will, in all probability, proceed from an experience of the inaptitude of the general government to the advancement of their happiness--in which event no good citizen could desire its continuance.

 

No. 68, Par. Last 1/3rd of 10, Alexander Hamilton:

 

....But lastly, the first and second clauses of the third section of the first article not only obviate all possibility of doubt, but de­stroy the pretext of misconception. The former provides that "the Senate of the United States shall be composed of two sena­tors from each State, chosen by the legislature thereof for six years"; and the latter directs that "if vacancies in that body should happen by resignation or otherwise, during the recess of the legislature of ANY STATE, the executive THEREOF may make temporary appointments until the next meeting of the leg­islature, which shall then fill such vacancies." Here is an ex­press power given, in clear and unambiguous terms, to the State executives to fill casual vacancies in the Senate by temporary appointments; which not only invalidates the supposition that the clause before considered could have been intended to confer that power upon the President of the United States, but proves that this supposition, destitute as it is even of the merit of plausibil­ity, must have originated in an intention to deceive the people, too palpable to be obscured by sophistry, too atrocious to be palliated by hypocrisy.

 

CONSTITUTION: ARTICLE 1

SECTION 3. PARAGRAPH 3

 

No Person shall be a Senator who shall not have attained to the age of thirty years, and been nine years a citizen of the United States, and who shall not, when elected, be an inhabitant of that State for which he shall be chosen.

 

Federalist Papers, Excerpts:

 

No. 62. Par. 2, James Madison:

 

I. The qualifications proposed for senators, as distinguished from those of representatives, consist in a more advanced age and a longer period of citizenship. A senator must be thirty years of age at least; as a representative must be twenty-five. And the former must have been a citizen nine years; as seven years are required for the latter. The propriety of these distinc­tions is explained by the nature of the senatorial trust, which, requiring greater extent of information and stability of character, requires at the same time that the senator should have reached a period of life most likely to supply these advantages; and which, participating immediately in transactions with foreign nations, ought to be exercised by none who are not thoroughly weaned from the prepossessions and habits incident to foreign birth and education. The term of nine years appears to be a prudent mediocrity between a total exclusion of adopted citizens, whose merits and talents may claim a share in the public confidence, and an indiscriminate and hasty admission of them, which might create a channel for foreign influence on the national councils.

 

No. 64. Par. 4, John Jay:

 

As the select assemblies for choosing the President, as well as the State legislatures who appoint the senators, will in general be composed of the most enlightened and respectable citizens, there is reason to presume that their attention and their votes will be directed to those men only who have become the most distinguished by their abilities and virtue, and in whom the peo­ple perceive just grounds for confidence. The Constitution manifests very particular attention to this object. By excluding men under thirty-five from the first office, and those under thirty from the second, it confines the electors to men of whom the people have had time to form a judgment, and with re­spect to whom they will not be liable to be deceived by those brilliant appearances of genius and patriotism which, like transient meteors, sometimes mislead as well as dazzle. If the observation be well founded that wise kings will always be served by able ministers it is fair to argue that as an assembly of select electors possess, in a greater degree than kings, the means of extensive and accurate information relative to men and char­acters, so will their appointments bear at least equal marks of discretion and discernment. The inference which naturally re­sults from these considerations is this, that the President and senators so chosen will always be of the number of those who best understand our national interests, whether considered in relation to the several States or to foreign nations, who are best able to promote those interests, and whose reputation for in­tegrity inspires and merits confidence. With such men the power of making treaties may be safely lodged.[H: Please note that you have come full tilt--back to treaties (which rank highest in command for honoring) now being made by "advisors", "cabinet members", members of the U.N.--al­most EVERYTHING except who SHOULD make them. Af­ter treaties and new laws are made they are NOW "ratified" by some two or three persons in the middle of some dark night in closets. People--you had better get your lessons in good repair according to TRUTH or you haven't a chance! How many classes such as this are ALLOWED in your schools and colleges? I thought not.]

 

CONSTITUTION: ARTICLE 1

SECTION 3. PARAGRAPH 4

 

The Vice President of the United States shall be President of the Senate, but shall have no vote, unless they be equally dividd.

 

CONSTITUTION: ARTICLE 1

SECTION 3. PARAGRAPH 5

 

The Senate shall choose their other officers, and also a President pro tempore, in the absence of the Vice President, or when he shall exercise the office of President of the United States.

 

[H: How many of you even know VVII0 that might be TODAY?]

 

CONSTITUTION: ARTICLE 1

SECTION 3. PARAGRAPH 6

 

The Senate shall have the sole power to try all impeachments. When sitting for that purpose, they shall be on oath or affirmative. When the President of the United States is tried, the Chief Justice shall preside; and no persons shall be convicted without the concurrence of two-thirds of the members present.

 

Federalist Papers, Excerpts:

 

No. 39, Par. 5, (near end), James Madison:

 

....The President of the United States is impeachable at any time during his continuance in office. The tenure by which the judges are to hold their places is, as it unquestionably ought to be, that of good behavior. The tenure of the ministerial offices generally will be a subject of legal regulation, conformably to the reason of the case and the example of the State constitutions.

 

No. 65, Par. 1, Alexander Hamilton:

 

The remaining powers which the plan of the convention allots to the Senate, in a distinct capacity, are comprised in their par­ticipation with the executive in the appointment to offices, and in their judicial character as a court for the trial of impeachments. As in the business of appointments the executive will be the principal agent, the provisions relating to it will most properly be discussed in the examination of that department. We will, therefore, conclude this head with a view of the judicial charac­ter of the Senate.

 

A well-constituted court for the trial of impeachments is an object not more to be desired than difficult to be obtained in a government wholly elective. The subjects of its jurisdiction are those offenses which proceed from the misconduct of public men, or, in other words, from the abuse or violation of some public trust. They are of a nature which may with peculiar pro­priety be denominated POLITICAL, as they relate chiefly to injuries done immediately to the society itself. The prosecution of them, for this reason, will seldom fail to agitate the passions of the whole community, and to divide it into parties more or less friendly or inimical to the accused. In many cases it will connect itself with the pre-existing factions, and will enlist all their animosities, partialities, influence, and interest on one side or on the other; and in such cases there will always be the great­est danger that the decision will be regulated more by the com­parative strength of parties than by the real demonstrations of innocence or guilt.

 

The delicacy and magnitude of a trust which so deeply con­cerns the political reputation and existence of every man en­gaged in the administration of public affairs speak for them­selves. The difficulty of placing it rightly in a government resting entirely on the basis of periodical elections will as read­ily be perceived, when it is considered that the most conspicuous characters in it will, from that circumstance, be too often the leaders or the tools of the most cunning or the most numerous faction, and on this account can hardly be expected to possess the requisite neutrality towards those whose conduct may be the subject of scrutiny.

 

The convention, it appears, thought the Senate the most fit depository of this important trust. Those who can best discern the intrinsic difficulty of the thing will be the least hasty in con­demning that opinion, and will be most inclined to allow due weight to the arguments which may be supposed to have pro­duced it.

 

What, it may be asked, is the true spirit of the institution it­self? Is it not designed as a method of NATIONAL INQUEST into the conduct of public men? If this be the design of it, who can so properly be the inquisitors for the nation as the represen­tatives of the nation themselves? It is not disputed that the power of originating the inquiry, or, in other words, of prefer­ring the impeachment, ought to be lodged in the hands of one branch of the legislative body. Will not the reasons which indi­cate the propriety of this arrangement strongly plead for an ad­mission of the other branch of that body to a share of the in­quiry? The model from which the idea of this institution has been borrowed pointed out that course to the convention. In Great Britain it is the province of the House of Commons to pre­fer the impeachment, and of the House of Lords to decide upon it. Several of the State constitutions have followed the example. As well the latter as the former seem to have regarded the prac­tice of impeachments as a bridle in the hands of the legislative body upon the executive servants of the government. Is not this the true light in which it ought to be regarded?

 

Where else than in the Senate could have been found a tri­bunal sufficiently dignified, or sufficiently independent? What other body would be likely to feel confidence enough in its own situation to preserve, unawed and uninfluenced, the necessary impartiality between an individual accused and the representa­tives of the people, his accusers? [H: How FAR HAVE YOU DETERIORATED here?]

 

Could the Supreme Court have been relied upon as answering this description? It is much to be doubted whether the members of that tribunal would at all times be endowed with so eminent a portion of fortitude as would be called for in the execution of so difficult a task; and it is still more to be doubted whether they would possess the degree of credit and authority which might, on certain occasions, be indispensable towards reconciling the people to a decision that should happen to clash with an accusa­tion brought by their immediate representatives. A deficiency in the first would be fatal to the accused; in the last, dangerous to the public tranquility. The hazard, in both these respects, could only be avoided, if at all, by rendering that tribunal more nu­merous than would consist with a reasonable attention to econ­omy. The necessity of a numerous court for the trial of im­peachments is equally dictated by the nature of the proceeding. This can never be tied down by such strict rules, either in the delineation of the offense by the prosecutors or in the construc­tion of it by the judges, as in common cases serve to limit the discretion of courts in favor of personal security. There will be no jury to stand between the judges who are to pronounce the sentence of the law and the party who is to receive or suffer it. The awful discretion which a court of impeachments must nec­essarily have to doom to honor or to infamy the most confiden­tial and most distinguished characters of the community forbids the commitment of the trust to a small number of persons.

 

These considerations seem alone sufficient to authorize a conclusion, that the Supreme Court would have been an im­proper substitute for the Senate, as a court of impeachments. There remains a further consideration, which will not a little strengthen this conclusion. It is this: the punishment which may be the consequence of conviction upon impeachment is not to terminate the chastisement of the offender. [H: PAY ATTEN­TION!] After having been sentenced to a perpetual os­tracism from the esteem and confidence and honors and emoluments of his country, he will still be liable to prosecu­tion and punishment in the ordinary course of law. Would it be proper that the persons who had disposed of his fame, and his most valuable rights as a citizen, in one trial, should, in another trial, for the same offense, be also the disposers of his life and his fortune? Would there not be the greatest reason to appre­hend that error, in the first sentence, would be the parent of er­ror in the second sentence? That the strong bias of one decision would be apt to overrule the influence of any new lights which might be brought to vary the complexion of another decision? Those who know anything of human nature will not hesitate to answer these questions in the affirmative; and will be at no loss to perceive that by making the same persons judges in both cases, those who might happen to be the objects of prosecution would, in a great measure, be deprived of the double security intended them by a double trial. The loss of life and estate would often be virtually included in a sentence which, in its terms, imported nothing more than dismission from a present and disqualification for a future office. It may be said that the intervention of a jury, in the second instance, would obviate the danger. But juries are frequently influenced by the opinions of judges. They are sometimes induced to find special ver­dicts, which refer the main question to the decision of the court. Who would be willing to stake his life and his estate upon the verdict of a jury acting under the auspices of judges who had predetermined his guilt? [H: Well, you have it EVERY DAY! This IS THE WAY IT WORKS IN THIS DAY!]

 

Would it have been an improvement of the plan to have united the Supreme Court with the Senate in the formation of the court of impeachments? This union would certainly have been attended with several advantages; but would they not have been overbalanced by the signal disadvantage, already stated, arising from the agency of the same judges in the double prosecution to which the offender would be liable? To a certain extent, the benefits of that union will be obtained from making the chief justice of the Supreme Court the president of the court of im­peachments, as is proposed to be done in the plan of the con­vention; while the inconveniences of an entire incorporation of the former into the latter will be substantially avoided. This was perhaps the prudent mean. I forbear to remark upon the addi­tional pretext for clamor against the judiciary, which so consid­erable an augmentation of its authority would have afforded.

 

Would it have been desirable to have composed the court for the trial of impeachments of persons wholly distinct from the other departments of the government? There are weighty argu­ments, as well against as in favor of such a plan. To some minds it will not appear a trivial objection that it would tend to increase the complexity of the political machine, and to add a new spring to the government, the utility of which would at best be questionable. But an objection which will not be thought by any unworthy of attention is this: a court formed upon such a plan would either be attended with heavy expense, or might in practice be subject to a variety of casualties and inconveniences. It must either consist of permanent officers, stationary at the seat of government, and of course entitled to fixed and regular stipends, or of certain officers of the State governments, to be called upon whenever an impeachment was actually depending. It will not be easy to imagine any third mode materially different which could rationally be proposed. As the court, for reasons already given, ought to be numerous, the first scheme will be reprobated by every man who can compare the extent of the public wants with the means of supplying them. The second will be espoused with caution by those who will seriously con­sider the difficulty of collecting men dispersed over the whole Union; the injury to the innocent, from the procrastinated de­termination of the charges which might be brought against them; the advantage to the guilty, from the opportunities which delay would afford to intrigue and corruption; and in some cases the detriment to the State, from the prolonged inaction of men whose firm and faithful execution of their duty might have ex­posed them to the persecution of an intemperate or designing majority in the House of Representatives. Though this latter supposition may seem harsh and might not be likely often to be verified, yet it ought not to be forgotten that the demon of fac­tion will, at certain seasons, extend his scepter over all numer­ous bodies of men.

 

But, though one or the other of the substitutes which have been examined or some other that might be devised should be thought preferable to the plan, in this respect reported by the convention, it will not follow that the Constitution ought for this reason to be rejected. If mankind were to resolve to agree in no institution of government, until every part of it had been ad­justed to the most exact standard of perfection, society would soon become a general scene of anarchy, and the world a desert. Where is the standard of perfection to be found? Who will un­dertake to unite the discordant opinion of a whole community in the same judgement of it; and to prevail upon one conceited projector to renounce his infallible criterion for the fallible crite­rion of his more conceited neighbor? To answer the purpose of the adversaries of the Constitution, they ought to prove, not merely that particular provisions in it are not the best which might have been imagined, but that the plan upon the whole is bad and pernicious. PUBLIUS

 

***

 

Please, readers, do not just browse through this material and toss it aside as a bother. IT IS THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN FREEDOM, SUPERB GOVERNMENT, CITIZEN SOV­EREIGNTY, STATE SOVEREIGNTY--AND HOW TO GET THE CRIMINALS OUT--AND OF ANY OPPORTUNITY TO EVER HAVE THIS OPPORTUNITY AGAIN! WHETHER OR NOT YOU LIKE TO REALIZE IT--GOD IS GIVING YOU THIS LAST OPPORTUNITY TO SEE, TO HEAR AND TO ACT TO RECLAIM THAT WHICH YOU HAVE THROWN AWAY, IGNORED AND ALLOWED TO BE DESTROYED BY THE CRIMINALS YOU ALSO "ALLOWED" TO TAKE CONTROL. So be it.

 

***

 

No. 66, Par. 1, Alexander Hamilton:

 

(March 8, 1788)

 

A review of the principal objections that have appeared against the proposed court for the trial of impeachments will not improbably eradicate the remains of any unfavorable impres­sions, which may still exist, in regard to this matter.

 

The first of these objections is that the provision in question confounds legislative and judiciary authorities in the same body; in violation of that important and well established maxim which requires a separation between the different departments of power. The true meaning of this maxim has been discussed and ascertained in another place and has been shown to be entirely compatible with a partial intermixture of those departments for special purposes, preserving them, in the main, distinct and un­connected. This partial intermixture is even in some cases not only proper, but necessary to the mutual defense of the several members of the government, against each other. An absolute or qualified negative in the executive, upon the acts of the legisla­tive body is admitted, by the ablest adepts in political science, to be an indefensible barrier against the encroachments of the latter upon the former. And it may perhaps with not less reason be contended that the powers relating to impeachments are as be­fore intimated, an essential check in the hands of that body upon the encroachments of the executive. The division of them be­tween the two branches of the legislature, assigning to one the right of accusing, to the other the right of judging, avoids the inconvenience of making the same persons both accusers and judges; and guards against the danger of persecution from the prevalency of a factious spirit in either of these branches. As the concurrence of two-thirds of the Senate will be requisite to a condemnation, the security to innocence, from this additional circumstance, will be as complete as itself can desire.

 

It is curious to observe with what vehemence this part of the plan is assailed, on the principle here taken notice of, by men who profess to admire without exception the constitution of the State; while that constitution makes the Senate, together with the chancellor and judges of the supreme court, not only a court of impeachments, but the highest judiciary in the State in all causes, civil and criminal.[H: So, it really DOES pay the President to appoint whomever he KNOWS WILL PRO­TECT HIS ASSETS IN ALL INSTANCES! You-the-people are talking right now about the possibility of impeachment of your President, Clinton--be very sure of HOW you go about such a thing should it come to be for upon history and true constitutional fundamentals should that act be accom­plished. If you continue with the false and deceitful prac­tices as now perpetuated by the ones in power--you will only have taken backward steps and the Elite will eat you alive!] The proportion, in point of numbers, of the chancellor and judges to the senators, is so inconsiderable, that the judiciary authority of New York in the last resort may, with truth, be said to reside in its senate. If the plan of the convention be in this respect chargeable with a departure from the celebrated maxim which has been so often mentioned, and seems to be so little un­derstood, how much more culpable must be the constitution of New York? [H: Keep in mind that these papers were being run in the New York Times and were, in this instance, ad­dressed to the People of the State of New York. We are talking about year 1788. But where better to get your information about intent of, and actual writing of, the CONSTITUTION than from the ones who WROTE IT?]

 

A second objection to the Senate, as a court of impeach­ments, is, that it contributes to an undue accumulation of power in that body, tending to give to the government a countenance too aristocratic. The Senate, it is observed, is to have concurrent authority with the executive in the formation of treaties, and in the appointment to offices: If, say the objectors, to these pre­rogatives is added that of deciding in all cases of impeachment, it will give a decided predominancy to senatorial influence. To an objection so little precise in itself, it is not easy to find a very precise answer. Where is the measure or criterion to which we can appeal, for determining what will give the Senate too much, too little, or barely the proper degree of influence? Will it not be more safe, as well as more simple, to dismiss such vague and uncertain calculations, to examine each power by itself, and to decide on general principles where it may be deposited with most advantage and least inconvenience?

 

If we take this course it will lead to a more intelligible, if not to a more certain result. The disposition of the power of making treaties, which has obtained in the plan of the convention, will then, if I mistake not, appear to be fully justified by the consid­erations stated in a former number, and by others which will oc­cur under the next head of our enquiries. The expediency of the junction of the Senate with the executive will, I trust, be placed in a light not less satisfactory, in the disquisitions under the same head. And I flatter myself the observations in my last pa­per must have gone no inconsiderable way towards proving that it was not easy, if practicable, to find a more fit receptacle for the power of determining impeachments, than that which has been chosen. If this be truly the case, the hypothetical danger of the too great weight of the Senate ought to be discarded from our reasonings.

 

But this hypothesis, such as it is, has already been refuted in the remarks applied to the duration in office prescribed for the senators. It was by them shown, as well on the credit of histori­cal examples, as from the reason of the thing, that the most pop­ular branch of every government, partaking of the republican genius, by being generally the favorite of the people, will be as generally a full match, if not an overmatch, for every other member of the government.

 

But independent of this most active and operative principle; to secure the equilibrium of the national house of representatives, the plan of the convention has provided in its favor, sev­eral important counterpoises to the additional authorities to be conferred upon the Senate. The exclusive privilege of originat­ing money bills will belong to the house of representatives. The same house will possess the sole right of instituting impeach­ments: Is not this a complete counterbalance to that of deter­mining them? The same house will be the umpire in all elec­tions of the President, which do not unite the suffrages of a ma­jority of the whole number of electors; a case which it cannot be doubted will sometimes, if not frequently, happen. The constant possibility of the thing must be a fruitful source of influence to that body. The more it is contemplated, the more important will appear this ultimate, though contingent, power of deciding the competitions of the most illustrious citizens of the union for the first office in it. It would not perhaps be rash to predict that as the mean influence it will be found to outweigh all the peculiar attributes of the Senate.

 

A third objection to the Senate as a court of impeachments is drawn from the agency they are to have in the appointments to office. It is imagined that they would be too indulgent judges of the conduct of men in whose official creation they had partici­pated. The principle of this objection would condemn a prac­tice, which is to be seen in all the State governments, if not in all the governments, with which we are acquainted: I mean that of rendering those, who hold office during pleasure, dependent on the pleasure of those, who appoint them. With equal plausi­bility might it be alleged in this case that the favoritism of the latter would always be an asylum for the misbehavior of the former. But that practice, in contradiction to this principle, pro­ceeds upon the presumption that the responsibility of those who appoint, for the fitness and competency of the persons on whom they bestow their choice, and the interest they will have in the respectable and prosperous administration of affairs will inspire a sufficient disposition to dismiss from a share in it, all such, who, by their conduct, shall have proved themselves unworthy of the confidence reposed in them. Though facts may not al­ways correspond with this presumption, yet if it be, in the main, just, it must destroy the supposition that the Senate, who will merely sanction the choice of the executive, should feel a bias toward the objects of that choice strong enough to blind them to the evidences of guilt so extraordinary as to have induced the representatives of the nation to become its accusers.

 

If any further argument were necessary to evince the improb­ability of such a bias, it might be found in the nature of the agency of the Senate, in the business of appointments. It will be the office of the president to nominate, and with the advice and consent of the Senate to appoint. There will of course be no ex­ertion of choice--they can only ratify, or reject, the choice of the president. They might even entertain a preference to some other person at the very moment they were assenting to the one pro­posed; because there might be no positive ground of opposition to him; and they could not be sure, if they withheld their assent, that the subsequent nomination would fall upon their own fa­vorite, or upon any other person in their estimation more meri­torious than the one rejected. Thus it could hardly happen that the majority of the Senate would feel any other complacency towards the object of an appointment, than such as the appear­ances of merit might inspire, and the proofs of the want of it, destroy.

 

A fourth objection to the Senate, in the capacity of a court of impeachments, is derived from their union with the executive in the power of making treaties. This, it has been said, would con­stitute the senators their own judges, in every case of a corrupt or perfidious execution of that trust. After having combined with the executive in betraying the interests of the nation in a ruinous treaty, what prospect, it is asked, would there be of their being made to suffer the punishment, they would deserve, when they were themselves to decide upon the accusation brought against them for the treachery of which they had been guilty? [H: I would guess that if you followed through with GUILTY parties to this kind of treachery--you would convict and hang all the surviving PRESIDENTS and leaders--along with a written denouncement of the last many presidents as well, having become deceased. Your nation has been totally destroyed through the use of these heinous TREATIES, even unto that with the United Nations!]

 

This objection has been circulated with more earnestness and with greater show of reason than any other which has appeared against this part of the plan; and yet I am deceived if it does not rest upon an erroneous foundation.

 

The security essentially intended by the Constitution against corruption and treachery in the formation of treaties, is to be sought for in the numbers and characters of those who are to make them. The JOINT AGENCY of the chief magistrate of the union, and of two-thirds of the members of a body selected by the collective wisdom of the legislatures of the several States, is designed to be the pledge for the fidelity of the national coun­cils in this particular. The convention might with propriety have mediated the punishment of the executive for a deviation from the instructions of the Senate, or a want of integrity in the con­duct of the negotiations committed to him: They might also have had in view the punishment of a few leading individuals in the Senate, who should have prostituted their influence in that body, as the mercenary instruments of foreign corruption: But they could not with more or with equal propriety have contemplated the impeachment and punishment of two-thirds of the Senate, consenting to an improper treaty, than of a majority of that or of the other branch of the national legislature, consenting to a per­nicious or unconstitutional law; a principle which I believe has never been admitted into any government. How in fact could a majority of the house of representatives impeach themselves? Not better, it is evident, than two-thirds of the Senate, sacrific­ing the same interests in an injurious treaty with a foreign power? The truth is, that in all such cases it is essential to the freedom and to the necessary independence of the deliberations of the body, that the members of it should be exempt from pun­ishment for acts done in a collective capacity; and the security to the society must depend on the care which is taken to confide the trust to proper hands, to make it their interest to execute it with fidelity, and to make it as difficult as possible for them to combine in any interest opposite to that of the public good.

 

So far as might concern the misbehavior of the executive in perverting the instructions, or contravening the views of the Senate, we need not be apprehensive of the want of a disposition in that body to punish the abuse of their confidence, or to vindi­cate their own authority. We may thus far count, upon their pride, if not upon their virtue. And so far even as might con­cern the corruption of leading members by whose arts and influ­ence the majority may have been inveigled into measures odious to the community, if the proofs of that corruption should be sat­isfactory, the usual propensity of human nature will warrant us in concluding that there would be commonly no defect of incli­nation in the body to divert the public resentment from them­selves by a ready sacrifice of the authors of their mismanage­ment and disgrace. PUBLIUS

 

END OF CHAPTER FIVE

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