Jan. 30, 2015

PJ-96

CHAPTER 6

 

REC #2   HATONN

 

TUE., MAY 24, 1994      11:45 A.M.      YEAR 7, DAY 281

 

TUE.. MAY 24. 1994

 

CONSTITUTION-FEDERALIST PAPERS

(Chapter 3)

 

CONSTITUTION: ARTICLE 1

SECTION 2. PARAGRAPH 2

 

No person shall be a Representative who shall not have at­tained to the age of twenty-five years, and been seven years a citizen of the United States, and who shall not, when elected, be an inhabitant of that State in which he shall be chosen.

 

Federalist Papers, Excerpts:

 

No. 52, Par. 3, James Madison:

 

....The qualifications of the elected, being less carefully and properly defined by the State constitutions, and being at the same time more susceptible of uniformity, have been very properly considered and regulated by the convention. A representa­tive of the United States; must, at the time of his election, be an inhabitant of the State he is to represent; and, during the time of his service, must be in no office under the United States. Under these reasonable limitations, the door of this part of the federal government is open to merit of every description, whether na­tive or adoptive, whether young or old, and without regard to poverty or wealth, or to any particular profession or religious faith....

 

No. 60,Par. 11, Alexander Hamilton:

 

.... But upon what principle is the discrimination of the places of election to be made, in order to answer the purpose of the meditated preference? Are the wealthy and the well-born, as they are called, confined to particular spots in the several States? Have they, by some miraculous instinct or foresight, set apart in each of them a common place of residence? Are they only to be met within the towns or cities? Or are they, on the contrary, scattered over the face of the country as avarice or chance may have happened to cast their own lot or that of their predeces­sors? If the latter is the case (as every intelligent man knows it to be [Particularly in the Southern States and in this State]) is it not evident that the policy of confining the places of elections to particular districts would be as subversive of its own aim as it would be exceptionable on every other account? The truth is that there is no method of securing to the rich the preference ap­prehended but by prescribing qualifications of property either for those who may elect or be elected. But this forms no part of the power to be conferred upon the national government. Its authority would be expressly restricted to the regulation of the times, the places, and the manner of elections. The qualifica­tions of the persons who may choose or be chosen, as has been remarked upon other occasions, are defined and fixed in the Constitution, and are unalterable by the legislature....

 

CONSTITUTION: ARTICLE 1

SECTION 2 PARAGRAPH 3

 

Representatives and direct Taxes shall be apportioned among the several States which may be included within this Union, according to their respective numbers, which shall be determined by adding to the whole number of free persons, including those bound to service for a term of years, and ex­cluding Indians not taxed, three-fifths of all other Persons. The actual enumeration shall be made within three years af­ter the first meeting of the Congress of the United States, and within every subsequent term of ten years, in such manner as they shall by law direct. The number of Repre­sentatives shall not exceed one for every thirty thousand, but each State shall have at least one representative; and until such enumeration shall be made, the State of New Hampshire shall be entitled to choose three, Massachusetts eight, Rhode Island and Providence Plantations one, Connecticut five, New York six, New Jersey four, Pennsylvania eight, Delaware one, Maryland six, Virginia ten, North Carolina five, South Carolina five, and Georgia three.

 

Federalist Papers, Excerpts:

 

No. 54, Par. 1, James Madison:

 

The next view which I shall take of the House of Representa­tives relates to the apportionment of its members to the several States, which is to be determined by the same rule with that of direct taxes.

 

It is not contended that the number of people in each State ought not to be the standard for regulating the proportion of those who are to represent the people of each State. The estab­lishment of the same rule for the apportionment of taxes, will probably be as little contested; though the rule itself, in this case, is by no means founded on the same principle. In the for­mer case, the rule is understood to refer to the personal rights of the people, with which it has a natural and universal connection. In the latter, it has reference to the proportion of wealth of which it is in no case a precise measure, and in ordinary cases a very unfit one. But notwithstanding the imperfection of the rule as applied to the relative wealth and contributions of the States, it is evidently the least exceptionable among the practicable rules, and had too recently obtained the general sanction of America not to have found a ready preference with the con­vention.

 

All this is admitted, it will perhaps be said; but does it fol­low, from an admission of numbers for the measure of representation or of slaves combined with free citizens as a ratio of taxation, that slaves ought to be included in the numerical rule of representation? Slaves are considered as property, not as persons. They ought therefore to be comprehended in estimates of taxation which are founded on property, and to be excluded from representation which is regulated by a census of persons.

 

This is the objection, as I understand it, stated in its full force. I shall be equally candid instating the reasoning which may be of­fered on the opposite side.

 

"We subscribe to the doctrine," might one of our Southern brethren observe, "that representation relates more immedi­ately to persons, and taxation more immediately to property, and we join in the application of this distinction to the case of our slaves. But we must deny the fact that slaves are consid­ered merely as property, and in no respect whatever as per­sons. The true state of the case is that they partake of both of these qualities: being considered by our laws, in some re­spects, as persons, and in other respects as property. In being compelled to labor, not for himself, but for the mas­ter; and in being subject at all times to be restrained in his liberty and chastised in his body, by the capricious will of another--the slave may appear to be degraded from the hu­man rank, and classed with those irrational animals which fall under the legal denomination of property. The federal Constitution, therefore, decides with great propriety on the case of our slaves, when it views them in the mixed charac­ter of persons and of property. This is in fact their true character. It is the character bestowed on them by the laws under which they live; and it will not be denied that these are the proper criterion; because it is only under the pretext that the laws have transformed the negroes into subjects of property that a place is disputed them in the computation of numbers; and it is admitted that if the laws were to restore the rights which have been taken away, the Negroes COULD NO LONGER BE REFUSED AN EQUAL SHARE OF REPRESENTATION WITH THE OTHER INHABITANTS.

 

[H: I am responsible for any emphasis in these writings other than occasional italics. I cannot let this pass without interjection. This looks pretty sick and pretty bad, doesn't it? Well, that's because IT IS BAD and it IS SICK. MAN has never been noted for his compassion and desire for true equality. He doesn't even consider GOD his "equal". How do I know this? Because all MAN really wants from GOD is to give him what he wants--enslave other men (and hopefully, God, as well) and he breaks every law as given forth from GOD to suit his own whims and wishes. But, readers, it is far worse than that--far worse. As regards the Negroes, one day you are going to have to accept the fact that Negroes were first brought to your planet as SLAVES--to work the mines, etc., in Africa. You don't believe me? You will! They started out as genetically altered species for that spe­cific purpose and now look what a sad state of affairs you of humanity have wrought upon selves. YOU will never rectify the miserable treatment of these beloved brothers and sis­ters--NEVER!

 

Next, consider ALL of your plights as you re-read the above paragraph--YOU ARE ALL ALREADY ENSLAVED--and paying for it. When a man's property can be taken by force FROM him by rules and regulations--AND TAXES, YOU ARE ENSLAVED AS SURELY AS THE SUN IS GOLDEN AND THE MOON IS SILVER IN COLOR. YOU ARE ALL ENSLAVED TO THE EVIL EMPIRE OF BANKSTERS AND CRIMINAL POLITICIANS WHO ARE GOING TO RUN THE WORLD IN THIS NEW WORLD ORDER--WHICH YOU WILL WORK FOR AND PAY FOR!

 

Do you see other relativities, perchance? Look at the rela­tionship (comparison) between the slaves and slave commu­nities--with or against TODAY! You have brought the slaves of color into a worse enslavement--with far more insult to his being. You CALL him FREE and yet he is, as a race, totally enslaved worse than any other one grouping in the world. You have reduced the black to the most collectively repre­sentative of the heinous abuse of the WELFARE system. The little black girl children are baby factories and you treat them like chaff--not even chattel. Is it different from "slave days"? How? You cause them to work at menial tasks and in the lower end of all wage scales, saying they are either not bright enough or ill-trained. You place them on welfare which fully represents the slave-owner's responsibility to HIS SLAVES. The only thing is that NOW you have all races and creeds sucked into the Evil Empire's trap--YOU ARE ALL BUT SLAVES IN SATAN'S EMPIRE OF ELITE RULERS!!!]

 

"This question may be placed in another light. It is agreed on all sides that numbers are the best scale of wealth and taxa­tion, as they are the only proper scale of representation. Would the convention have been impartial or consistent, if they had re­jected the slaves from the list of inhabitants when the shares of representation were to be calculated, and inserted them on the lists when the tariff of contributions was to be adjusted? Could it be reasonably expected that the Southern States would concur in a system which considered their slaves in some degree as men when burdens were to be imposed, but refused to consider them in the same light when advantages were to be conferred? Might not some surprise also be expressed that those who reproach the Southern States with the barbarous policy of considering as property a part of their human brethren should themselves con­tend that the government to which all the States are to be parties ought to consider this unfortunate race more completely in the unnatural light of property than the very laws of which they complain?

 

[H: Ah, I hear you saying something about these "Christian" men who would do such a lousy thing to the blacks. Well, readers, number 1: NO MAN WHO HOLDS OR CON­DONES SLAVES IS A CHRISTIAN! I care not what they think to call themselves! Further, the slave TRADE coming from and through England--was mostly at the hands of or­ganized Khazarian traders and they were fully THE ANTI­CHRIST in full force and action...!]

 

"It may be replied, perhaps, that slaves are not included in the estimate of representatives in any of the States possessing them. They neither vote themselves nor increase the votes of their masters. Upon what principle then, ought they to be taken into the federal estimate of representation? In rejecting them altogether, the Constitution would, in this respect, have followed the very laws which have been appealed to as the proper guide.

 

"This objection is repelled by a single observation. It is a fundamental principle of the proposed Constitution that as the aggregate number of representatives allotted to the several States is to be determined by a federal rule founded on the aggregate number of inhabitants, so the right of choosing this allotted number in each State is to be exercised by such part of the in­habitants as the State itself may designate. The qualifications on which the right of suffrage depend are not, perhaps, the same in any two States. In some of the States the difference is very ma­terial. In every State, a certain proportion of inhabitants are de­prived of this right by the constitution of the State, who will be included in the census by which the federal Constitution appor­tions the representatives. [H: Right here you have the answer to "how could the federal Constitution uphold slavery? Be­cause the federal government is subservient (supposed to be) to the sovereign rule of the STATE CONSTITUTIONS! The States allowed for slavery--the federal government would have no alternative if it acted in its proper status as a gov­erning body FOR THE STATES AND THE WISHES OF THE SOVEREIGN CITIZENS OF THOSE STATES. Re­member, you had slaves and you had State regulations un­der State constitutions--AND YOU HAD TO RATIFY EVERYTHING, INCLUDING THE CONSTITUTION, WITH THOSE SEVERAL STATES. ALSO, AT THE TIME--ONLY MEN HAD RIGHT OF SUFFRAGE!] In this point of view the Southern States might retort the complaint by insisting that the principle laid down by the convention required that no regard should be had to the policy of particular States towards their own inhabitants; and consequently that the slaves, as inhabitants, should have been admitted into the census ac­cording to their full number, in like manner with other inhabi­tants, who, by the policy of other States, are not admitted to all the rights of citizens. A rigorous adherence, however, to this principle is waived by those who would be gainers by it. All that they ask is that equal moderation be shown on the other side. Let the case of the slaves be considered, as it is in truth a peculiar one. Let the compromisingly expedient of the Constitu­tion be mutually adopted which regard them as inhabitants, but as debased by servitude below the equal level of free inhabi­tants; which regards the slave as divested of two fifths of the man. [H: Indeed, indeed; sick, sick, sick. However, WHO owned slaves? Who had the power and the financial backing to OWN SLAVES? Not those nice pilgrims who landed and all but perished in establishment of the first days of a new world. The SLAVES CAME WITH THE ELITE DREGS of Elite Society! This was a business, a venture, and holdings of THE SATAN EMPIRE AS ESTABLISHED ON THE SHORES OF WHAT COULD HAVE BEEN FREELAND FOR ALL MEN--INCLUDING THE NATIVE AMERI­CANS WHO MET YOU HERE. One day you are going to go back and heed the words of your "fathers" and George Washington, etc., for they told you how it would come to pass--and it has....]

 

"After all, may not another ground be taken on which this article of the Constitution will admit of a still more ready de­fense? We have hitherto proceeded on the idea that representa­tion related to persons only, and not at all to property. But is it a just idea? Government is instituted no less for protection of the property than of the persons of individuals. The one as well as the other, therefore, may be considered as represented by those who are charged with the government. Upon this princi­ple it is that in several of the States, and particularly in the State of New York, one branch of the government is intended more especially to be the guardian of property and is accordingly elected by that part of the society which is most interested in this object of government. In the federal Constitution, this policy does not prevail. The rights of property are committed into the same hands with the personal rights. Some attention ought, therefore, to be paid to property in the choice of those hands.

 

"For another reason, the votes allowed in the federal legisla­ture to the people of each State ought to bear some proportion to the comparative wealth of the States. States have not, like indi­viduals, an influence over each other, arising from superior ad­vantages of fortune. If the law allows an opulent citizen but a single vote in the choice of his representative, the respect and consequence which he derives from his fortunate situation very frequently guide the votes of others to the objects of his choice; and through this imperceptible channel the rights of property are conveyed into the public representation. A State possesses no such influence over other States. It is not probable that the rich­est State in the Confederacy will ever influence the choice of a single representative in any other State. Nor will the represen­tatives of the larger and richest States possess any other advan­tage in the federal legislature over the representatives of other States than what may result from their superior number alone. As far, therefore, as their superior wealth and weight may justly entitle them to any advantage, it ought to be secured to them by a superior share of representation. The new Constitution is, in this respect, materially different from the existing Confedera­tion, as well as from that of the United Netherlands, and other similar confederacies. In each of the latter, the efficacy of the federal resolutions depends on the subsequent and voluntary res­olutions of the States composing the union. Hence the States, though possessing an equal vote in the public councils, have an unequal influence, corresponding with the unequal importance of these subsequent and voluntary resolutions. Under the pro­posed Constitution, the federal acts will take effect without the necessary intervention of the individual States. They will de­pend merely on the majority of votes in the federal legislature, and consequently each vote, whether proceeding from a larger or a smaller State, or a State more or less wealthy or powerful, will have an equal weight and efficacy: in the same manner as the votes individually given in a State legislature, by the rep­resentatives of unequal counties or other districts, have each a precise equality of value and effect; or if there be any difference in the case, it proceeds from the difference in the personal char­acter of the individual representative, rather than from any re­gard to the extent of the district from which he comes."

 

Such is the reasoning which an advocate for the Southern in­terests might employ on this subject; and although it may appear to be a little strained in some points, yet on the whole, I must confess that it fully reconciles me to the scale of representation which the convention have established.

 

In one respect, the establishment of a common measure for representation and taxation will have a very salutary effect. As the accuracy of the census to be obtained by the Congress will necessarily depend, in a considerable degree, on the disposition, if not on the co-operation of the States, it is of great importance that the States should feel as little bias as possible to swell or to reduce the amount of their numbers. Were their share of repre­sentation alone to be governed by this rule, they would have an interest in exaggerating their inhabitants. Were the rule to de­cide their share of taxation alone, a contrary temptation would prevail. By extending the rule to both objects, the States will have opposite interests which will control and balance each other and produce the requisite impartiality. PUBLIUS

 

No. 58, Par. 1, James Madison:

 

The remaining charge against the House of Representatives, which I am to examine, is grounded on a supposition that the number of members will not be augmented from time to time, as the progress of population may demand.

 

It has been admitted that this objection, if well supported, would have great weight. The following observations will show that, like most other objections against the Constitution, it can only proceed from a partial view of the subject, or from a jeal­ousy which discolors and disfigures every object which is be­held....

 

No. 55, Par. 1, James Madison:

 

The number of which the House of Representatives is to con­sist forms another and a very interesting point of view under which this branch of the federal legislature may be contem­plated. Scarce any article, indeed, in the whole Constitution seems to be rendered more worthy of attention by the weight of character and the apparent force of argument with which it has been assailed. The charges exhibited against it are, first, that so small a number of representatives will be an unsafe depository of the public interests; second, that they will not possess a proper knowledge of the local circumstances of their numerous constituents; third, that they will be taken from that class of citi­zens which will sympathize least with the feelings of the mass of the people and be most likely to aim at a permanent elevation of the few on the depression of the many; fourth, that defective as the number will be in the first instance, it will be more and more disproportionate, by the increase of the people and the obstacles which will prevent a correspondent increase of the representatives.

 

In general it may be remarked on this subject that no political problem is less susceptible of a precise solution than that which relates to the number most convenient for a representative leg­islature; nor is there any point on which the policy of the several States is more at variance, whether we compare their legislative assemblies directly with each other, or consider the proportions which they respectively bear to the number of their constituents. Passing over the difference between the smallest and largest States, as Delaware, whose most numerous branch consists of twenty-one representatives, and Massachusetts, where it amounts to between three and four hundred, a very considerable difference is observable among States nearly equal in popula­tion. The number of representatives in Pennsylvania is not more than one fifth of that in the State last mentioned. New York, whose population is to that of South Carolina as six to five, has little more than one third of the number of representatives. As great a disparity prevails between the States of Georgia and Delaware or Rhode Island. In Pennsylvania, the representatives do not bear a greater proportion to their constituents than of one for every four or five thousand. In Rhode Island, they bear a proportion of at least one for every thousand. And according to the constitution of Georgia, the proportion may be carried to one to every ten electors; and must unavoidably far exceed the pro­portion in any of the other States.

 

Another general remark to be made is that the ratio between the representatives and the people ought not to be the same where the latter are very numerous as when they are very few. Were the representatives in Virginia to be regulated by the stan­dard in Rhode island, they would, at this time, amount to be­tween four and five hundred; and twenty or thirty years hence, to a thousand. On the other hand, the ratio of Pennsylvania, if applied to the State of Delaware, would reduce the representa­tive assembly of the latter to seven or eight members. Nothing can be more fallacious than to found our political calculations on arithmetical principles. Sixty or seventy men may be more properly trusted with a given degree of power than six or seven. But it does not follow that six or seven hundred would be proportion ably a better depository. And if we carry on the suppo­sition to six or seven thousand, the whole reasoning ought to be reversed. The truth is that in all cases a certain number at least seems to be necessary to secure the benefits of free consultation and discussion, and to guard against too easy a combination for improper purposes; as, on the other hand, the number ought at most to be kept within a certain limit, in order to avoid the con­fusion and intemperance of a multitude. In all very numerous assemblies, of whatever characters composed, passion never fails to wrest the scepter from reason. Had every Athenian citi­zen been a Socrates, every Athenian assembly would still have been a mob.

 

It is necessary also to recollect here the observations which were applied to the case of biennial elections. For the same rea­son that the limited powers of the Congress, and the control of the State legislatures, justify less frequent election than the pub­lic safety might otherwise require, the members of the Congress need be less numerous than if they possessed the whole power of legislation, and were under no other than the ordinary restraints of other legislative bodies.

 

With these general ideas in our minds, let us weigh the ob­jections which have been stated against the number of members proposed for the House of Representatives. It is said, in the first place, that so small a number cannot be safely trusted with so much power.

 

The number of which this branch of the legislature is to con­sist, at the outset of the government, will be sixty-five. Within three years a census is to be taken, when the number may be augmented to one for every thirty thousand inhabitants; and within every successive period of ten years the census is to be renewed, and augmentations may continue to be made under the above limitation. It will not be thought an extravagant conjec­ture that the first census will, at the rate of one for every thirty thousand, raise the number of representatives to at least one hundred. Estimating the Negroes in the proportion of three fifths, it can scarcely be doubted that the population of the United States will, by that time, if it does not already, amount to three millions. At the expiration of twenty-five years, according to the computed rate of increase, the number of representatives will amount to two hundred; and of fifty years, to four hundred. This is a number which, I presume, will put an end to all fears arising from the smallness of the body. I take for granted here what I shall, in answering the fourth objection, hereafter show that the number of representatives will be augmented from time to time in the manner provided by the Constitution. On a con­trary supposition, I should admit the objection to have very great weight indeed.

 

The true question to be decided, then, is whether the small­ness of the number, as a temporary regulation, be dangerous to the public liberty? Whether sixty-five members for a few years, and a hundred or two hundred for a few more, be a safe depos­itory for a limited and well-guarded power of legislating for the United States? I must own that I could not give a negative an­swer to this question without first obliterating every impression which I have received with regard to the present genius of the people of America, the spirit which actuates the State legisla­tures, and the principles which are incorporated with the politi­cal character of every class of citizens. I am unable to conceive that the people of America, in their present temper, or under any circumstances which can speedily happen, will choose, and every second year repeat the choice of, sixty-five or a hundred men who would be disposed to form and pursue a scheme of tyranny or treachery. I am unable to conceive that the State legislatures, which must feel so many motives to watch and which possess so many means of counteracting the federal leg­islature, would fail either to detect or to defeat a conspiracy of the latter against the liberties of their common constituents.[H: Everybody still awake? If he can't conceive of these things then how could YOU be expected to find yourselves in this position TODAY?] I am equally unable to conceive that there are at this time, or can be in any short time, in the United States, any sixty-five or a hundred men capable of recommending themselves to the choice of the people at large, who would either desire or dare, within the short space of two years, to be­tray the solemn trust committed to them. What change of circumstances time, and a fuller population of our country may produce requires a prophetic spirit to declare, which makes no part of my pretensions. But judging from the circumstances now before us, and from the probable state of them within a moderate period of time, I must pronounce that the liberties of America cannot be unsafe in the number of hands proposed by the federal Constitution.

 

From what quarter can the danger proceed? Are we afraid of foreign gold? If foreign gold could so easily corrupt our federal rulers and enable them to ensnare and betray their constituents, how has it happened that we are at this time a free and indepen­dent nation? The Congress which conducted us through the Revolution was a less numerous body than their successors will be; they were not chosen by, nor responsible to, their fellow-citizens at large; though appointed from year to year, and re­callable at pleasure, they were generally continued for three years, and prior to the ratification of the federal articles, for a still longer term. They held their consultations always under the veil of secrecy; they had the sole transaction of our affairs with foreign nations; through the whole course of the war they had the fate of their country more in their hands than it is to be hoped will ever be the case with our future representatives; and from the greatness of the prize at stake, and the eagerness of the party which lost it, it may well be supposed that the use of other means than force would not have been scrupled. Yet we know by happy experience that the public trust was not betrayed; nor has the purity of our public councils in this particular ever suffered, even from the whispers of calumny.

 

Is the danger apprehended from the other branches of the federal government? But where are the means to be found by the President, or the Senate, or both? Their emoluments of of­fice, it is to be presumed, will not, and without a previous cor­ruption of the House of Representatives cannot, more than suf­fice for very different purposes; their private fortunes, as they must all be American citizens, cannot possibly be sources of danger. The only means, then, which they can possess, will be in the dispensation of appointments. Is it here that suspicion rests her charge? Sometimes we are told that this fund of cor­ruption is to be exhausted by the President in subduing the virtue of the Senate. Now, the fidelity of the other House is to be the victim. The improbability of such a mercenary and perfidious combination of the several members of government, standing on as different foundations as republican principles will well admit, and at the same time accountable to the society over which they are placed, ought alone to quiet this apprehension. But, fortu­nately, the Constitution has provided a still further safeguard. The members of the Congress are rendered ineligible to any civil offices that may be created, or of which the emoluments may be increased, during the term of their election. No offices therefore can be dealt out to the existing members but such as may become vacant by ordinary casualties: and to suppose that these would be sufficient to purchase the guardians of the peo­ple, selected by the people themselves, is to renounce every rule by which events ought to be calculated, and to substitute an in­discriminate and unbounded jealousy, with which all reasoning must be vain. The sincere friends of liberty who give them­selves up to the extravagancies of this passion-are not aware of the injury they do their own cause. As there is a degree of de­pravity in mankind which requires a certain degree of circum­spection and distrust, so there are other qualities in human na­ture which justify a certain portion of esteem and confidence. Republican government presupposes the existence of these qual­ities in a higher degree than any other form. Were the pictures which have been drawn by the political jealousy of some among us faithful likenesses of the human character, the inference would be that there is not sufficient virtue among men for self-government; and that nothing less than the chains of despotism can restrain them from destroying and devouring one another. PUBLIUS

 

No. 56, Par. 1, James Madison:

 

The second charge against the House of Representatives is that it will be too small to possess a due knowledge of the inter­ests of its constituents.

 

As this objection evidently proceeds from a comparison of the proposed number of representatives with the great extent of the United States, the number of their inhabitants, and the diver­sity of their interests, without taking into view at the same time the circumstances which will distinguish the Congress from other legislative bodies, the best answer that can be given to it will be a brief explanation of these peculiarities.

 

It is a sound and important principle that the representative ought to be acquainted with the interests and circumstances of his constituents. But this principle can extend no further than to those circumstances and interests to which the authority and care of the representatives relate. An ignorance of a variety of minute and particular objects which do not lie within the com­pass of legislation is consistent with every attribute necessary to a due performance of the legislative trust. In determining the extent of information required in the exercise of a particular au­thority, recourse then must be had to the objects within the purview of that authority.

 

What are of most importance, and which seem most to re­quire local knowledge, are commerce, taxation, and the militia.

 

A proper regulation of commerce requires much information, as has been elsewhere remarked; but as far as this information relates to the laws and local situation of each individual State, a very few representatives would be very sufficient vehicles of it to the federal councils.

 

Taxation will consist, in a great measure, of duties which will be involved in the regulation of commerce. So far the preceding remark is applicable to this object. As far as it may consist of internal collections, a more diffusive knowledge of the circum­stances of the State may be necessary. But will not this also be possessed in sufficient degree by a very few intelligent men, dif­fusively elected within the State? Divide the largest State into ten or twelve districts and it will be found that there will be no peculiar local interests in either which will not be within the knowledge of the representative of the district. Besides this source of information, the laws of the State, framed by representatives from every part of it, will be almost of themselves a sufficient guide. In every State there have been made, and must continue to be made, regulations on this subject which will, in many cases, leave little more to be done by the federal legisla­ture than to review the different laws and reduce them in one general act. A skilful individual in his closet, with all the local codes before him, might compile a law on some subjects of tax­ation for the whole Union, without any aid from oral informa­tion, and it may be expected that whenever internal taxes may be necessary, and particularly in cases requiring uniformity throughout the State the more simple objects will be preferred. To be fully sensible of the facility which will be given to this branch of federal legislation by the assistance of the State codes, we need only suppose for a moment that this or any other State were divided into a number of parts, each having and exercising within itself a power of local, legislation. Is it not evident that a degree of local information and preparatory labor would be found in the several volumes of their proceedings, which would very much shorten the labors of the general legislature, and ren­der a much smaller number of members sufficient for it? The federal councils will derive great advantage from another cir­cumstance. The representatives of each State will not only bring with them a considerable knowledge of its laws, and local knowledge of their respective districts, but will probably in all cases have been members, and may even at the very time be members, of the State legislature, where all the local informa­tion and interests of the State are assembled, and from whence they may easily be conveyed by a very few hands into the legis­lature of the United States.

 

With regard to the regulation of the militia, there are scarcely any circumstances in reference to which local knowledge can be said to be necessary. The general face of the country, whether mountainous or level, most fit for the operations of infantry or cavalry, is almost the only consideration of this nature that can occur. The art of war teaches general principles of organiza­tion, movement, and discipline, which apply universally.

 

The attentive reader will discern that the reasoning here used to prove the sufficiency of a moderate number of representatives does not in any respect contradict what was urged on another occasion with regard to the extensive information which the rep­resentatives ought to possess, and the time that might be neces­sary for acquiring it. This information, so far as it may relate to local objects, is rendered necessary and difficult, not by a dif­ference of laws and local circumstances within a single State, but of those among different States. Taking each State by itself, its laws are the same, and its interests but little diversified. A few men, therefore, will possess all the knowledge requisite for a proper representation of them. Were the interests and affairs of each individual State perfectly simple and uniform, a knowl­edge of them in one part would involve a knowledge of them in every other, and the whole State might be competently repre­sented by a single member taken from any part of it. On a comparison of the different States together, we find a great dis­similarity in their laws, and in many other circumstances con­nected with the objects of federal legislation, with all of which the federal representatives ought to have some acquaintance. Whilst a few representatives, therefore, from each State may bring with them a due knowledge of their own State, every rep­resentative will have much information to acquire concerning all the other States: The changes of time, as was formerly re­marked, on the comparative situation of the different States, will have an assimilating effect. The effect of time on the internal affairs of the States, taken singly, will be just the contrary. At present some of the States are little more than a society of hus­bandmen. Few of them have made much progress in those branches of industry which give a variety and complexity to the affairs of a nation. These, however, will in all of them be the fruits of a more advanced population; and will require, on the part of each State, a fuller representation. The foresight of the convention has accordingly taken care that the progress of pop­ulation may be accompanied with a proper increase of the repre­sentative branch of the government.

 

The experience of Great Britain, which presents to mankind so many political lessons, both of the monitory and exemplary kind, and which has been frequently consulted in the course of these inquiries, corroborates the result of the reflections which we have just made. The number of inhabitants in the two kingdoms of England and Scotland cannot be stated at less than eight millions. The representatives of these eight millions in the House of Commons amount to five hundred and fifty-eight. Of this number, one ninth are elected by three hundred and sixty-four persons, and one half, by five thousand seven hundred and twenty-three persons. (Burgh's Political Disquisitions.) It can­not be supposed that the half thus elected, and who do not even reside among the people at large, can add anything either to the security of the people against the government, or to the knowl­edge of their circumstances and interests in the legislative coun­cils. On the contrary, it is notorious that they are more fre­quently the representatives and instruments of the executive magistrate than the guardians and advocates of the popular rights. They might therefore, with great propriety, be consid­ered as something more than a mere deduction from the real representatives of the nation. We will, however, consider them in this light alone, and will not extend the deduction to a consid­erable number of others who do not reside among their con­stituents, are very faintly connected with them, and have very little particular knowledge of their affairs. With all these con­cessions, two hundred and seventy-nine persons only will be the depository of the safety, interest, and happiness of eight mil­lions--that is to say, there will be one representative only to maintain the rights and explain the situation of twenty-eight thousand six hundred and seventy constituents, in an assembly exposed to the whole force of executive influence and extending its authority to every object of legislation within a nation whose affairs are in the highest degree diversified and complicated. Yet it is very certain, not only that a valuable portion of free­dom has been preserved under all these circumstances, but that the defects in the British code are chargeable, in a very small proportion, on the ignorance of the legislature concerning the circumstances of the people. Allowing to this case the weight which is due to it, and comparing it with that of the House of Representatives as above explained, it seems to give the fullest assurance that a representative for every thirty thousand inhabi­tants will render the latter both a safe and competent guardian of the interests which will be confided to it. PUBLIUS

 

END OF CHAPTER THREE

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