Jan. 28. 2015

PJ-96

CHAPTER 5

REC #2    HATONN

MON., MAY 23, 1994      12:58 P.M.      YEAR 7, DAY 280

MON., MAY 23, 1994

CONSTITUTION-FEDERALIST PAPERS

(Chapter 2)

CONSTITUTION: ARTICLE 1

SECTION 1, PARAGRAPH 1

All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States which shall consist of a Senate and House of Representatives.

Federalist Papers, Excerpts:

No. 45, Par. 9, James Madison:

....The powers delegated by the proposed Constitution to the federal government are few and defined. Those which are to remain in the State governments are numerous and indefinite. The former will be exercised principally on external objects, as war, peace, negotiation, and foreign commerce: with which last the power of taxation will, for the most part, be connected. The powers reserved to the several States will extend to all the objects which, in the ordinary course of affairs, concern the lives, liberties, and properties of the people, and the internal or­der, improvement, and prosperity of the State. [H: And next, you shall see how insidiously the words are redefined and a takeover of authority through such as "war" (and declara­tions thereof), "emergency" and thus and so are usurped to finally come to mean: a takeover by the "federal" hierarchy to take from the States and The People that which is right­fully theirs to determine. Just as with "taxes", there is spe­cific authority--needing No Amendments. The Constitution, for instance, clearly states that there shall BE NO TAX ON PERSONAL INCOME AND ALL THE (TAX) AMEND­MENTS COMING FORTH ARE, THEREFORE, UNLAW­FUL!]

 

The operations of the federal government will be most exten­sive and important in times of war [H: Against the "several" united States.] and danger; those of the State governments in times of peace and security. As the former periods will proba­bly bear a small proportion to the latter, the State governments will here enjoy another advantage over the federal government. The more adequate, indeed, the federal powers may be rendered to the national defense, the less frequent will be those scenes of danger which might favor their ascendancy over the gov­ernments of the particular States.

 

If the new Constitution be examined with accuracy and candor, it will be found that the change which it proposes consists much less in the addition of NEW POWERS to the Union than in the invigoration of its ORIGINAL POW­ERS....

 

CONSTITUTION: ARTICLE 1 

SECTION 2. PARAGRAPH 1

 

The House of Representatives shall be composed of Mem­bers chosen every second Year by the People of the several States, and the Electors in each State Shall have the Qualifi­cations requisite for Electors of the most numerous Branch of the State Legislature.

 

Federalist Papers, Excerpts:

 

No. 39, Par. 5, James Madison:

 

....The duration of the appointments is equally conformable to the republican standard and to the model of State constitu­tions. The House of Representatives is periodically elective, as in all the States; and for the period of two years, as in the State of South Carolina. The Senate is elective for the period of six years, which is but one year more than the period of the Senate of Maryland, and but two more than that of the Senates of New York and Virginia. The President is to continue in office for the period of four years; as in New York and Delaware the chief magistrate is elected for three years, and in South Carolina for two years. In the other States the election is annual. In several of the States, however, no explicit provision is made for the im­peachment of the chief magistrate. And in Delaware and Vir­ginia he is not impeachable till out of office. The President of the United States is impeachable at any time during his continu­ance in office. The tenure by which the judges are to hold their places is, as it unquestionably ought to be, that of good behav­ior. The tenure of the ministerial offices generally will be a subject of legal regulation, conformably to the reason of the case and the example of the State constitutions.

 

Could any further proof be required of the republican com­plexion of this system, the most decisive one might be found in its absolute prohibition of titles of nobility, both under the federal and the State governments; and in its express guar­anty of the republican form to each of the latter. [H: now I ask you: What is there NOT TO UNDERSTAND?]

 

....Each State, in ratifying the Constitution, is considered as a sovereign body independent of all others, and only to be bound by its own voluntary act. In this relation, then, the new Consti­tution will, if established, be a federal and NOT a national con­stitution.

 

The next relation is to the sources from which the ordinary powers of government are to be derived. The House of Repre­sentatives will derive its powers from the people of America; and the people will be represented in the same proportion and on the same principle as they are in the legislature of a particular State. So far the government is national, not federal. The Sen­ate, on the other hand, will derive its powers from the States as political and coequal societies; and these will be represented on the principle of equality in the Senate, as they now are in the existing Congress. So far the government is federal, not na­tional. The executive power will be derived from a very compound source. The immediate election of the President is to be made by the States in their political characters. The votes allot­ted to them are in a compound ratio, which considers them partly as distinct and coequal societies, partly as unequal mem­bers of the same society. The eventual election, again, is to be made by that branch of the legislature which consists of the na­tional representatives; but in this particular act they are to be thrown into the form of individual delegations from so many distinct and co-equal bodies politic. From this aspect of the government it appears to be of a mixed character, presenting at least as many federal as national features.

 

The difference between a federal and national government, as it relates to the operation of the government, is by the adver­saries of the plan of the convention supposed to consist in this, that in the former the powers operate on the political bodies composing the Confederacy in their political capacities; in the latter, on the individual citizens composing the nation in their individual capacities. On trying the Constitution by this crite­rion, it falls under the national--not the federal character; though perhaps not so completely as has been understood. In several cases, and particularly in the trial of controversies to which States may be parties, they must be viewed and proceeded against in their collective and political capacities only. But the operation of the government on the people in their individual ca­pacities, in its ordinary and most essential proceedings, will, in the sense of its opponents, on the whole, designate it, in this re­lation, a national government....

 

No 45, Par. 7, James Madison:

 

....The State governments may be regarded as constituent and essential parts of the federal government; whilst the latter is no­wise essential to the operation or organization of the former. Without the intervention of the State legislatures, the President of the United States cannot be elected at all. They must in all cases have a great share in his appointment, and will, perhaps, in most cases, of themselves determine it. The Senate will be elected absolutely and exclusively by the State legislatures. Even the House of Representatives, though drawn immediately from the people, will be chosen very much under the influence of that class of men whose influence over the people obtains for themselves an election into the State legislatures. Thus, each of the principal branches of the federal government will owe its existence more or less to the favor of the State governments, and must consequently feel a dependence, which is much more likely to beget a disposition too obsequious than too overbearing to­wards them. On the other side, the component parts of the State governments will in no instance be indebted for the appointment to the direct agency of the federal government, and very little, if at all, to the local influence of its members.

 

The number of individuals employed under the Constitution; of the United States will be much SMALLER THAN THE NUMBER EMPLOYED UNDER THE PARTICULAR STATES. There will consequently be less of personal influence on the side of the former than of the latter. The members of the legislative, executive, and judiciary departments of thirteen and more States, the justices of peace, officers of militia, ministerial officers of justice, with all the county, corporation, and town of­ficers, for three millions and more of people, intermixed and having particular acquaintance with every class and circle of people must exceed, beyond all proportion, both in number and influence, those of every description who will be em­ployed in the administration of the federal system....

 

No. 52,Par. 3, James Madison:

 

The qualifications of the elected, being less carefully and properly defined by the State constitutions, and being at the same time more susceptible of uniformity, have been very prop­erly considered and regulated by the convention. A representa­tive of the United States must be of the age of twenty-five years; must have been seven years a citizen of the United States; must, at the time of his election, be an inhabitant of the State he is to represent; and, during the time of his service, must be in no of­fice under the United States. Under these reasonable limita­tions, the door of this part of the federal government is open to merit of every description, whether native or adoptive, whether young or old, and without regard to poverty or wealth or to any particular profession of religious faith.

 

The term for which the representatives are to be elected falls under a second view which may be taken of this branch. In or­der to decide on the propriety of this article, two questions must be considered: first, whether biennial elections will, in this case, be safe; second, whether they be necessary or useful.

 

First. As it is essential to liberty that the government in gen­eral should have a common interest with the people, so it is par­ticularly essential that the branch of it under consideration , should have an immediate dependence on, and an intimate sym­pathy with, the people. Frequent elections are unquestionably the only policy by which this dependence and sympathy can be effectually secured. But what particular degree of frequency may be absolutely necessary for the purpose does not appear to be susceptible of any precise calculation, and must depend on a variety of circumstances with which it may be connected. Let us consult experience, the guide that ought always to be fol­lowed whenever it can be found.

 

The scheme of representation as a substitute for a meeting of the citizens in person being at most but very imperfectly known to ancient polity, it is in more modern times only that we are to expect instructive examples. And even here, in order to avoid a research too vague and diffusive, it will be proper to confine ourselves to the few examples which are best known, and which bear the greatest analogy to our particular case. The first to which this character ought to be applied is the House of Com­mons in Great Britain. The history of this branch of the English Constitution, anterior to the date of Magna Charta, is too ob­scure to yield instruction. The very existence of it has been made a question among political antiquaries. The earliest records of subsequent date prove that parliaments were to sit only every year; not that they were to be elected every year. And even these annual sessions were left so much at the dis­cretion of the monarch that, under various pretexts, very long and dangerous intermissions were often contrived by royal am­bition. To remedy this grievance, it was provided by a statute in the reign of Charles II that the intermissions should not be pro­tracted beyond a period of three years. On the accession of William III, when a revolution took place in the government, the subject was still more seriously resumed, and it was declared to be among the fundamental rights of the people that parliaments ought to be held frequently. By another statute, which passed a few years later in the same reign, the term "frequently", which had alluded to the triennial period settled in the time of Charles II, is reduced to a precise meaning, it being expressly enacted that a new parliament shall be called within three years after the termination of the former. The last change, from three to seven years, is well known to have been introduced pretty early in the present century, under an alarm for the Hanoverian succession. From these facts it appears that the greatest frequency of elec­tions which has been deemed necessary in the kingdom for binding the representatives to their constituents does not exceed a triennial return of them. And if we may argue from the de­gree of liberty retained even under septennial elections, and all the other vicious ingredients in the parliamentary constitution, we cannot doubt that a reduction of the period from seven to three years, with the other necessary reforms, would so far ex­tend the influence of the people over their representatives as to satisfy us that biennial elections, under the federal system, can­not possibly be dangerous to the requisite dependence of the House of Representatives on their constituents.

 

Elections in Ireland, till of late, were regulated entirely by the discretion of the crown, and were seldom repeated, except on the accession of a new prince, or some other contingent event. The parliament which commenced with George II was continued throughout his whole reign, a period of about thirty‑five years. The only dependence of the representatives on the people consisted in the right of the latter to supply occasional vacancies by the election of new members, and in the chance of some event which might produce a general new election. The ability also of the Irish parliament to maintain the rights of their constituents, so far as the disposition might exist, was extremely shackled by the control of the crown over the subjects of their deliberation. Of late, these shackles, if I mistake not, have been broken; and octennial parliaments have besides been established. What effect may be produced by this partial reform must be left to further experience. The example of Ireland, from this view of it, can throw but little light on the subject. As far as we can draw any conclusion from it, it must be that if the people of that country have been able under all these disadvantages to retain any liberty whatever, the advantage of biennial elections would secure to them every degree of liberty, which might depend on a due connection between their representatives and themselves.

 

Let us bring our inquiries nearer home. The example of these States, when British colonies, claims particular attention, at the same time that it is so well known as to require little to be said on it. The principle of representation, in one branch of the legislature at least, was established in all of them. But the peri­ods of election were different. They varied from one to seven years. Have we any reason to infer, from the spirit and conduct of the representatives of the people, prior to the Revolution, that biennial election would have been dangerous to the public liber­ties? The spirit which everywhere displayed itself at the com­mencement of the struggle, and which vanquished the obstacles to independence, is the best proofs that a sufficient portion of liberty had been everywhere enjoyed to inspire both a sense of its worth and a zeal for its proper enlargement. This remark holds good as well with regard to the then colonies whose elec­tions were least frequent. Virginia was the colony which stood first in resisting the parliamentary usurpations of Great Britain; it was the first also in espousing, by public act, the resolution of independence. In Virginia, nevertheless, if I have not been misinformed, elections under the former government were septennial. This particular example is brought into view, not as a proof of any peculiar merit, for the priority in those instances was probably accidental; and still less of any advantage in septennial elections, for when compared with a greater fre­quency they are inadmissible; but merely as a proof, and I con­ceive it to be a very substantial proof, that the liberties of the people can be in no danger from biennial elections.

 

The conclusion resulting from these examples will be not a little strengthened by recollecting three circumstances. The first is, that the federal legislature will possess a part only of that supreme legislative authority which is vested completely in the British Parliament; and which, with a few exceptions, was exer­cised by the colonial assemblies and the Irish legislature. It is a received and well-founded maxim that where no other circum­stances affect the case, the greater the power is, the shorter ought to be its duration; and, conversely, the smaller the power, the more safely may its duration be protracted. In the second place it has, on another occasion, been shown that the federal legislature will not only be restrained by its dependence on the people, as other legislative bodies are, but that it will be; more­over, watched and controlled by the several collateral legisla­tures, which other legislative bodies are not. And in the third place, no comparison can be made between the means that will be possessed by the more permanent branches of the federal government for seducing, if they should be disposed to seduce, the House of Representatives from their duty to the people, and the means of influence over the popular branch possessed by the other branches of the government above cited. With the less power, therefore, to abuse, the federal representatives can be less tempted on one side, and will be doubly watched on the other.

 

No. 53, Par. 1, James Madison:

 

I shall here, perhaps, be reminded of a current observation "that where annual elections end, tyranny begins." If it be true, as has often been remarked, that sayings which become prover­bial are generally founded in reason, it is not less true that when once established they are often applied to cases to which the rea­son of them does not extend. I need not look for a proof beyond the case before us. What is the reason on which this proverbial observation is founded? No man will subject himself to the ridicule of pretending that any natural connection subsists be­tween the sun of the seasons, and the period within which hu­man virtue can bear the temptations of power. Happily for mankind, liberty is not, in this respect, confined to any single point of time, but lies within extremes, which afford sufficient latitude for all the variations which may be required by the vari­ous situations and circumstances of civil society. The election of magistrates might be, if it were found expedient, as in some instances it actually has been, daily, weekly, or monthly, as well as annual; and if circumstances may require a deviation' from the rule on one side, why not also on the other side? Turning our attention to the periods established among ourselves, for the election of the most numerous branches of the State legislature, we find them by no means coinciding any more in this instance than in the elections of other civil magistrates. In Connecticut and Rhode Island, the periods are half-yearly. In the other States, South Carolina excepted, they are annual. In South Car­olina they are biennial--as is proposed in the federal govern­ment. Here is a difference, as four to one, between the longest and shortest periods; and yet it would be not easy to show that Connecticut or Rhode Island is better governed, or enjoys a greater share of rational liberty, than South Carolina; or that ei­ther the one or the other of these States is distinguished in these respects, and by these causes, from the States whose elections are different from both.

 

In searching for the grounds of this doctrine, I can discover but one, and that is wholly inapplicable to our case. The im­portant distinction so well understood in America between a constitution established by the people and unalterable by the government, and a law established by the government and alter­able by the government, seems to have been little understood and less observed in any other country. Wherever the supreme power of legislation has resided, has been supposed to reside also a full power to change the form of the government. Even in Great Britain, where the principles of political and civil lib­erty have been most discussed, and where we hear most of the rights of the constitution, it is maintained that the authority of the Parliament is transcendent and uncontrollable as well with regard to the constitution as the ordinary objects of legislative provision. They have accordingly, in several instances, actually changed, by legislative acts, some of the most fundamental arti­cles of the government. They have in particular, on several oc­casions, changed the period of election, and, on the last occa­sion, not only introduced septennial in place of triennial elec­tions, but by the same act, continued themselves in place four years beyond the term for which they were elected by the peo­ple. An attention to these dangerous practices has produced a very natural alarm in the votaries of free government, of which frequency of elections is the cornerstone; and has led them to seek for some security to liberty, against the danger to which it is exposed. Where no constitution, paramount to the govern­ment, either existed or could be obtained, No constitutional se­curity, similar to that established in the United States, was to be attempted. Some other security, therefore, was to be sought for; and what better security would the case admit than that of selecting and appealing to some simple and familiar portion of time as a standard for measuring the danger of innovations, for fixing the national sentiment, and for uniting the patriotic exer­tions? The most simple and familiar portion of time applicable to the subject was that of a year; and hence the doctrine has been inculcated by a laudable zeal to erect some barrier against the gradual innovations of an unlimited government, that the ad­vance towards tyranny was to be calculated by the distance of departure from the fixed point of annual elections. But what ne­cessity can there be of applying this expedient to a government limited, as the federal government will be [H: My, the found­ing fathers WERE, after all, dreamers--were they Not?] by the authority of a paramount constitution? Or who will pretend that the liberties of the people of America will Not be more se­cure under biennial elections, unalterably fixed by such a con­stitution, than those of any other nation would be, where elec­tions were annual, or even more frequent, but subject to alter­ations by the ordinary power of the government?

 

The second question stated is whether biennial elections be necessary or useful. The propriety of answering this question in the affirmative will appear from several very obvious con­siderations.

 

No man can be a competent legislator who does Not add to an upright intention and a sound judgement a certain degree of knowledge of the subjects on which he is to legislate. A part of this knowledge may be acquired by means of information which lie within the compass of men in private as well as public sta­tions. Another part can only be attained, or at least thoroughly attained, by actual experience in the station which requires the use of it. The period of service ought, therefore, in all such cases, to bear some proportion to the extent of practical knowl­edge requisite to the due performance of the service. The pe­riod of legislative service established in most of the States for the more numerous branch is, as we have seen, one year. The question then may be put into the simple form: does this period of two years bear No greater proportion to the knowledge req­uisite for federal legislation than one year does to the knowledge requisite for State legislation? The very statement of the ques­tion, in this form, suggests the answer that ought to be given to it.

 

In a single State, the requisite knowledge relates to the exist­ing laws which are uniform throughout the State and with which all the citizens are more or less conversant; and to the general affairs of the State, which lie within a small compass, are Not very diversified, and occupy much of the attention and conver­sation of every class of people. The great theater of the United States presents a very different scene. The laws are so far from being uniform that they vary in every State; whilst the public af­fairs of the Union are spread throughout a very extensive region and are extremely diversified by the local affairs connected with them, and can with difficulty be correctly learned in any other place than in the central councils, to which a knowledge of them will be brought by the representatives of every part of the em­pire. Yet some knowledge of the affairs, and even of the laws, of all the States, ought to be possessed by the members from each of the States. How can foreign trade be properly regulated by uniform laws without some acquaintance with the commerce, the ports, the usages, and the regulations of the different States? How can the trade between the different States be duly regulated without some knowledge of their relative situations in these and other points? How can taxes be judiciously imposed and effec­tually collected if they be Not accommodated to the different laws and local circumstances relating to these objects in the dif­ferent States? How can uniform regulations for the militia be duly provided without a similar knowledge of some internal cir­cumstances by which the States are distinguished from each other? These are the principal objects of federal legislation and suggest most forcibly the extensive information which the representatives ought to acquire. The other inferior objects will re­quire a proportional degree of information with regard to them.

 

It is true that all these difficulties will, by degrees, be very much diminished. The most laborious task will be the proper inauguration of the government and the primeval formation of a federal code. Improvements on the first draught will every year become both easier and fewer. Past transactions of the govern­ment will be a ready and accurate source of information to new members. The affairs of the Union will become more and more objects of curiosity and conversation among the citizens at large. And the increased intercourse among those of different States will contribute Not a little to diffuse a mutual knowledge of their affairs, as this again will contribute to a general assimilation of their manners and laws. But with all these abatements, the busi­ness of federal legislation must continue so far to exceed, both in Novelty and difficulty, the legislative business of a single State, as to justify the longer period of service assigned to those who are to transact it.

 

A branch of knowledge which belongs to the acquirements of a federal representative and which has Not been mentioned is that of foreign affairs. In regulating our own commerce, he ought to be Not only acquainted with the treaties between the United States and other nations, but also with the commercial policy and laws of other nations. He ought Not to be altogether ignorant of the law of nations; for that, as far as it is a proper object of municipal legislation, is submitted to the federal gov­ernment. And although the House of Representatives is Not im­mediately to participate in foreign negotiations and arrange­ments, yet from the necessary connection between the several branches of public affairs, those particular branches will fre­quently deserve attention in the ordinary course of legislation and will sometimes demand particular legislative sanction and co-operation. Some portion of this knowledge may, No doubt, be acquired in a man's closet; but some of it also can only be derived from the public sources of information; and all of it will be acquired to best effect by a practical attention to the subject during the period of actual service in the legislature.

 

There are other considerations, of less importance perhaps, but which are Not unworthy of Notice. The distance which many of the representatives will be obliged to travel and the ar­rangements rendered necessary by that circumstance might be much more serious objections with fit men to this service, if Not limited to a single year, than if extended to two years. No ar­gument can be drawn on this subject from the case of the dele­gates to the existing Congress. They are elected annually, it is true; but their re-election is considered by the legislative as­semblies almost as a matter of course. The election of the rep­resentatives by the people would Not be governed by the same principle.

 

A few of the members, as happens in all such assemblies, will possess superior talents; will, by frequent re-elections, be­come members of long standing; will be thoroughly masters of the public business, and perhaps Not unwilling to avail them­selves of those advantages. The greater the proportion of new members and the less the information of the bulk of the mem­bers, the more apt will they be to fall into the snares that may be laid for them. This remark is No less applicable to the relation which will subsist between the House of Representatives and the Senate.

 

It is an inconvenience mingled with the advantages of our frequent elections, even in single States, where they are large, and hold but one legislative session in a year, that spurious elec­tions cannot be investigated and annulled in time for the decision to have its due effect. If a return can be obtained, No matter by what unlawful means, the irregular member, who takes his seat of course, is sure of holding it a sufficient time to answer his purposes. Hence, a very pernicious encouragement is given to the use of unlawful means for obtaining irregular returns. Were elections for the federal legislature to be annual this practice might become a very serious abuse, particularly in the more distant States. Each house is, as it necessarily must be, the judge of the elections, qualifications, and returns of its mem­bers; and whatever improvements may be suggested by experi­ence for simplifying and accelerating the process in disputed cases, so great a portion of a year would unavoidably elapse before an illegitimate member could be dispossessed of his seat that the prospect of such an event would be little check to unfair and illicit means of obtaining a seat.

 

All these considerations taken together warrant us in affirm­ing that biennial elections will be as useful to the affairs of the public as we have seen that they will be safe to the liberties of the people.

 

No 52, Par. 1, James Madison:

 

From the more general inquiries pursued in the four last pa­pers, I pass on to a more particular examination of the several parts of the government. I shall begin with the House of Rep­resentatives.

 

The first view to be taken of this part of the government re­lates to the qualifications of the electors and the elected. Those of the former are to be the same with those of the electors of the most numerous branch of the State legislatures. The definition of the right of suffrage is very justly regarded as a fundamental article of republican government. It was incumbent on the con­vention, therefore, to define and establish this right in the Con­stitution. To have left it open for the occasional regulation of the Congress would have been improper for the reason just mentioned. To have submitted it to the legislative discretion of the States would have been improper for the same reason; and for the additional reason that it would have rendered too depen­dent on the State governments that branch of the federal gov­ernment which ought to be dependent on the people alone. To have reduced the different qualifications in the different States to one uniform rule would probably have been as dissatisfactory to some of the States as it would have been difficult to the conven­tion. The provision made by the convention appears, therefore, to be the best that lay within their option. It must be satisfactory to every State, because it is comfortable to the standard already established, or which may be established, by the State itself. It will be safe to the United States because, being fixed by the State constitutions, it is Not alterable by the State governments, and it cannot be feared that the people of the States will alter this part of their constitutions in such a manner as to abridge the rights secured to them by the federal Constitution....

 

No. 57, Par. 4, James Madison:

 

....Let me now ask what circumstance there is in the consti­tution of the House of Representatives that violates the princi­ples of republican government, or favors the elevation of the few on the ruins of the man? Let me ask whether every circum­stance is Not, on the contrary, strictly comformable to these principles, and scrupulously impartial to the rights and preten­sions of every class and description of citizens?

 

Who are to be the electors of the federal representative? Not the rich, more than the poor; Not the learned, more than the ig­norant; Not the haughty heirs of distinguished names, more than the humble sons of obscure and unpropitious fortune. The elec­tors are to be the great body of the people of the United States. They are to be the same who exercise the right in ev­ery State of electing the corresponding branch of the legisla­ture of the State.

 

Who are to be the objects of popular choice? Every citi­zen whose merit may recommend him to the esteem and con­fidence of his country. No qualification of wealth, of birth, of religious faith, or of civil profession is permitted to fetter the judgment or disappoint the inclination of the people.

 

If we consider the situation of the men on whom the free suffrages of their fellow-citizens may confer the representa­tive trust, we shall find it involving every security which can be devised or desired for their fidelity to their con­stituents....

 

END OF CHAPTER TWO

 

* * *

 

I think that through these understandings you will find that you have moved just about as far away from the truth of the Constitution as you can get. You have men who stay in office for 30-plus years and whose property and POWER over you grows ex­ponentially with each passing session. Do you not see that if you removed this longevity of office and desire for the funds in greedy fashion and limited the qualifications as now expressed through "LAWYERS", you might be able to reclaim some righteous FREEDOM and WISDOM in that which comes forth from your unlawful, incredibly corrupt systems of intended an­nihilation of your nations. So be it.

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