‘SPACE  --  GATE – THE VEIL REMOVED’ – PHOENIX JOURNAL #3 - CHAPTER  7

 

 

REC  #2    HATONN

 

SUN., AUG. 20, 1989   10:30 A.M.   YEAR 3, DAY 004

 

WHO  GETS  SAVED

 

“Besides the President and the other officials designated as suc­cessors, the Pen­tagon has developed COG plans for evacuating forty-six key officials at any time of the day or night.  These forty-six, named in the Joint Emergency Evac­uation Plan, or JEEP, would be moved by helicopter to bunkers and command posts.  Each has been issued a JEEP-1 identification card.  Most of the JEEP-1 cardhold­ers are military officers who work for the Joint Chiefs of Staff.  An ad­ditional 248 JEEP-2 card­holders—disaster relief spe­cialists, senior Pentagon of­ficials and others—would be airlifted to bunkers and command posts but only between the hours of 9 a.m. and 5 p.m.  An attack after business hours would mean JEEP-2 cardholders would have to get in their cars and drive to their desig­nated locations.  In all, more than l,000 political and military offi­cials have been deemed important enough to the continued operations of govern­ment to warrant evacuations.

 

“So odd is the business of planning for doomsday that nothing may be taken for granted.  Thus, COG planners have assumed that the coordinates for Mount Weather and Raven Rock have already been en­tered into the targeting devices of the Soviet Union’s long-range missiles.  Because of this, there are other secret civilian and military bunkers.  Specialists from FEMA and the Pentagon have di­vided the country into 10 different re­gions, among which there may be as many as 50 different ‘fallout re­sistant’ command-post bunkers, each linked with the others by satellite, ground-wave and high-frequency transmis­sions.  Any one of these facilities is equipped to function as an emergency White House, coordi­nating the functions of a new, re­constituted government.  Theoretically, any se­cret command bunkers could be used by the President or his suc­cessor during or after a nu­clear strike, allowing COG planners to play the ul­timate high-stakes shell game.  The attacker could never be certain which bunker was the “right” one.

 

“Like ‘command and control,’ secrecy and deception would also be­come watch-words of the COG planners.  In its essence, dur­ing the heavy expenditures of the Reagan years, COG, or Pro­ject 908, which is one of its official titles, was a crash program designed to manufacture mobile and secure communications sys­tems, establish the regional centers to which a government un­der attack could safely be relocated and replicate the most im­portant government services, in­cluding allocation of food and medicine and coordination of disas­ter relief.  Be­cause it was so sensitive, the Reagan administration decided to remove much of the pro­gram from congressional over­sight.  EVEN MANY SENIOR PEN­TAGON OFFICIALS WERE UNAWARE OF ITS EXIS­TENCE.

 

“For all the planning and money that went into the COG pro­gram, there have been some embarrassments.  One plan called for plac­ing new communications gear capable of withstanding the elec­tronic pulses created by nuclear explosions into specially con­figured 18-wheel tractor-trailers.  The first two prototype trucks were com­plete in 1984, but when they were dispatched on a test run in rural Vir­ginia that fall, disaster struck.  IN ONE INSTANCE, A ROAD BUCKLED UNDER THE TRUCK, WHICH WAS FAR HEAVIER THAN ORDINARY ROADBEDS CAN ACCOMMODATE.  THE TRUCK SANK INTO THE PAVEMENT, IMMOBILIZED.  THE OTHER TRUCK GOT WEDGED BE­NEATH A HIGHWAY OVER­PASS.  EVIDENTLY, SOME­ONE HAD NEGLECTED TO CHECK CLEARANCE HEIGHTS FOR BRIDGES.” (Hatonn is too embar­rassed to even comment that you might miss all this.)

 

“Some of the communications gear itself caused problems.  Offi­cials say THE COMPUTER SYSTEMS OF DIFFERENT GOVERN­MENT AGENCIES HAVE NOT BEEN ABLE TO COMMUNI­CATE WITH EACH OTHER PROPERLY.  COL­LECTIVELY, THE SYSTEMS COST BILLIONS OF DOL­LARS TO DESIGN, BUILD AND INSTALL.  Three years ago, intelli­gence officials say, it was discovered that five such systems could not commu­nicate with one another at all.  To rec­tify the problem, new ‘interface modems’ were designed, but intelligence officials say the modems have interfered with the systems’ ability to send and receive infor­mation, in some cases by as much as 75 percent.  In one instance, a missile-launch protocol (a de­tailed series of data needed to arm, fuse and launch a missile) took several seconds to transmit; the transmis­sion is supposed to be almost instantaneous.  In selected reports to Congress, military officials say, COG planners misrepre­sented the results of tests on the system.  ‘Congress was treated to a successful demonstration,’ says one source, ‘except the re­sults were rigged’.  At one briefing, in December, 1985, con­gressmen were told that the communications systems were ‘operational’, even though they were not capable of functioning properly at the time.

 

“Problems with COG, which might have come to light eventu­ally, surfaced when someone blew a whistle.  In 1983, then De­fense Sec­retary Caspar Wein­berger and the Joint Chiefs of Staff as­signed the Army the job of devising and maintaining the COG communications system under Project 908.  The Army, in turn, assigned the job to its Information Systems Command, based at Fort Huachuca, Arizona.”

 

WHO  GETS  PAID

 

“For help on Project 908, the Information Systems Command turned to a com­pany based in Arlington, Va., the Betac Corpora­tion.  A con­sulting firm com­posed of former intelli­gence and communications specialists from the Pentagon, Betac was awarded a ‘sole source’ contract to devise and maintain se­curity sys­tems for parts of the COG communications system.  The ‘main ba­sis for select­ing the Betac Corporation for this contract ef­fort,’ according to an Army con­tracting document, ‘was because no other company has its unique experience, busi­ness status and role in C31 architecture.’  Internal Army docu­ments indicate the value of Betac’s Army contract in 1983 at $316,672.  By 1985, it had risen to nearly $3 million.  By 1988, Betac had multiple COG contracts worth $22 million.

 

“A civilian intelligence officer responsible for security at the Infor­mations Sys­tems Command was curious about Betac, ac­cording to Army and congressional sources.  Thomas Golden wanted to know whether regular Army personnel could supply the services Betac was being paid to provide.  Golden would not talk with a U.S. News re­porter.  But military and congressional sources say he became curi­ous after learning that a number of Army officials who had worked with Betac at Fort Huachuca and elsewhere were retiring from the Army and being hired back, un­der the auspices of Betac.  As paid consultants to the Army, some were earning up to $400 a day.  Sel­dom had the Pentagon’s revolving door spun more quickly.  Golden also dis­covered that Eugene Renzi, a colonel who was deputy chief of staff for oper­ations at the Information Systems Com­mand, had been a key player in the award of the Betac contract.  Golden learned that Renzi’s son was now working for Betac.

 

“Pointing fingers at COG was a risky business.  Gicola Thorndike, a senior Army contracting officer at Fort Huachuca, says she was forced out of the Army after demanding repeatedly to review the Betac contract.  But Golden had authority to re­view parts of the contract.” (Now, friends, does this look just a bit strange?)  “In July of 1987, when investigators from the Army inspector general’s staff came to Fort Huachuca asking questions about Betac, Golden talked.  Under an offer of confi­dentiality.  Golden told of his concerns about the Betac con­tract.  Within weeks, Golden’s comments had leaked back to Fort Huachuca.”  (But of course, why else stage the sce­nario?)

 

UNANSWERED  QUESTIONS

 

“It was a bad sign.  The Army’s inspector general has enjoyed a strong reputa­tion for integrity, but the Golden affair shot a huge hole through it.  The Army IG began another investigation to determine who had leaked Golden’s com­ments.  But word of the new investi­gation quickly leaked, and before the inves­tigators even left for Fort Huachuca, officials at the Information Sys­tems Com­mand had begun destroying documents.  When the Army in­vestigators arrived at Fort Huachuca, they were told the docu­ments had been destroyed in com­pliance with ‘routine classi­fied-documents disposal’ procedures.  According to a copy of their report, the Army investigators con­cluded that Renzi had retali­ated against Golden.  But they found no other impropri­eties and recommended that the in­vestigation be closed.  Renzi received a reprimand.  The affair was over.  Or so it seemed.

 

“But others besides Golden had begun raising questions about the COG pro­gram.  Fred Westerman had worked for more than 20 years as an Army counter-intelligence officer before retiring to open his own consulting firm, Systems Evaluation, Inc.  Doc­uments show that his company was awarded a contract to pro­vide security for COG fa­cilities around the country.  According to Westerman’s attorney, Francis Mroz, Westerman discovered that his part of the COG pro­gram was riddled with security problems, such as inadequate alarms, faulty locks and flimsy doors.  Mroz also says his client became con­cerned about ‘waste and abuse,’ such as payments for work not properly done.  Af­ter Westerman proposed tighter controls, he says, the Army de­clined to re­new his contract.  He has sued the Army and FEMA for what he says are un­reimbursed costs.  In court papers, he has alleged that unidentified government agents have conducted a campaign of se­cret surveillance, break-ins at his office and wire­taps.  His lawyer was a witness to one episode in which an alleged govern­ment agent kept watch on Westerman’s move­ments.  When the agent’s license plate was traced, it was found to belong to a cou­ple in Delaware, who knew nothing about the vehicle.  A Jus­tice De­partment attorney has since launched an investigation” (Now we know about the justice system, don’t we?) “of Westerman to deter­mine whether he committed any fraud in the COG pro­gram.  In an extraordinary move, the gov­ernment has also sought to classify Westerman’s civil suit.

 

“Congressional investigators eventually became aware of some of the concerns about COG, having heard complaints informally through contact in the Pen­tagon. Representative Les Aspin (D-Wis.), the chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, was espe­cially perturbed by the Army’s initial investiga­tion into the COG program.  In a report, Aspin’s investigators concluded that the Army’s inspector-general system was compromised.  And in a stinging letter to Army Secretary John Marsh dated Oct. 24, 1988, Aspin said he was ‘concerned about the objec­tivity and competence of the investiga­tion.’  Aspin wrote that the ‘confidentiality of the in­vestigation was breached almost imme­diately by the head of the in­spector-gen­eral inspection team.’  Aspin’s investi­gators concluded that the Army had failed to ex­ercise adequate oversight over the COG pro­gram.  They also found that the sole-source contract to Be­tac should not have been allowed.  Betac officials say they know of no investiga­tion of any of their contracts.  They declined to discuss the COG program because of its classified nature.”

 

COVER-UPS  AND  FAT  CONTRACTS

 

“For the Congress, the first long look into the COG program was not a heart­ening one.  In response to Aspin’s letter, the Army has re­opened its investiga­tion of the Army’s inspector general and the COG program.  Those familiar with this latest inquiry, and with the ongoing congressional inquiry, say intelli­gence officials are dis­turbed by what they describe as attempted cover-ups of wrongdoing, possible fraud and woefully inade­quate oversight of multimillion-dollar contracts.  Investigators have been told of double billing by some COG contractors to separate agencies of the Government for the same work.  It was also learned that other contracts, valued at millions of dollars, were increased, some by as much as 50 percent, without input by any contract-oversight office or without any demon­stration of need.  Pentagon sources say the COG program has awarded con­tracts worth tens of millions of dollars to former mili­tary of­ficials who worked on COG while they were in the Pentagon.  `The program,’ says a key official, referring to a troubled multi­billion-dollar antitank weapons system that was scrapped by Congress, ‘is another DIVAD.’  Says another: ‘It is a real mess.’

 

“Things could get messier still.  Subpoenas have been issued, and a grand jury continues to hear evidence.  Congress is set to hold hearings this fall on the lack of oversight of classi­fied, or ‘BLACK’” (You see, dear ones, you have it again in their own words: BLACK PROGRAMS) “Pentagon programs like COG.  For one of the na­tion’s most secret national-security programs, the glare of publicity is bound to be embarrassing.  That one of the nation’s most impor­tant national-security programs was jeopardized by the very people in charge of it would be the most wounding development of all.”

 

I wish to acknowledge the reporter of this well done article: Steven Emerson.

 

Now I want to quote a shorter insert article by Merrill McLoughlin in the same journal.

 

FROM  ‘DUCK  AND  COVER’  TO  ‘RUN  LIKE  HELL’

 

“Perhaps the seeds of optimism were sown way back after the great flood, when Noah and his passengers trooped off the ark onto Mount Ararat, two by two, eager to get on with being fruit­ful and multi­plying.  It was then that God promised never again to ‘destroy ev­ery living creature.’  And ever since human beings have maintained a stubborn hope that it is possible to survive the worst.

 

“Nothing has changed in the Nuclear Age.  The first great fad, af­ter the Soviets detonated their first A-bomb, was blast shel­ters—win­dowless, thick-walled buildings that might protect in­habitants if they didn’t happen to be located pre­cisely at ground zero.  But such buildings were far too expensive to build, so federal offi­cials launched a multimedia educational campaign.  KNOW THE BOMB’S TRUE DANGERS blared the films and pamphlets.  To avoid them, simply ‘duck and cover.’  Millions of schoolchildren spent untold hours ducking under desks and covering their head to the tune of air-raid sirens.

 

“The trouble was that even the experts didn’t know the bomb’s true dangers.  And as it became clear that the most acrobatic ducker wouldn’t survive a ther­monuclear blast, officials changed their ad­vice from ‘duck and cover” to ‘run like hell’ and tried to design evacuation plans.  In the mid-1950’s, scien­tists re­alized that even if you ran, you couldn’t hide.  The real danger of the bomb was a silent, invisible and highly mo­bile by-product called “fallout”.  By 1962, and the Cuban missile crisis, fallout shelters were the order of the day.  Families stocked backyard bunkers with food, water and weapons.

 

“The early 1980’s brought the last great burst of civil-defense en­thusiasm.  Al­though his advisers never figured out just where he got his information, Ronald Reagan was convinced that the Soviet Union had invested in ‘a great civil-de­fense program’ and called for a matching American effort.  Building shelters for all Ameri­cans would cost a budget-shattering $70 billion” (well, still cheaper than the S & L bailout) “or more.  So fed­eral offi­cials concentrated in­stead on ‘crisis relocations planning.’  Once again, the planners de­signed evacuation mea­sures.  The private sector, too, pitched in.  AT&T set up shel­ter for key ex­ecutives.  And in LaVerkin, Utah, a developer built 240 underground con­dos complete with outdoor scenes painted on the ‘windows.’ 

 

“For those without access to such facilities, Reagan’s deputy Under Secretary of Defense, T.K. Jones, had some advice.  ‘Dig a hole, cover it with a couple of doors and then throw 3 feet of dirt on top.  It’s the dirt that does it.  If there are enough shovels to go around, everybody’s going to make it.”

 

Now, let us turn briefly to the military scenario for coping with doomsday:

 

FIGHTING  BACK  AFTER  AN  ATTACK

 

“The U.S. military has its own scenario to cope with doomsday.  In a nuclear attack, the Pentagon would certainly be targeted, so plans have been laid for the nation’s military elite to wage war from other places.  There are secret bomb shelters and air­borne command posts.  The most likely underground bunker is lo­cated five miles north of Camp David in the Maryland hills.  Its offi­cial name is the Alternate National Military Command Center, but it is known more commonly as Raven Rock or, simply Site R.”  (Now, surely no one in the en­emy camp could pin point that location for missile attack—it is so thoroughly SECRET in location.)  “Raven Rock is said to be able to withstand ev­erything but a direct hit.” (Well, no need to worry about that as obviously no one would be able to pin point five miles north of Camp David in the Maryland hills.)  “The nation’s war plan­ners could stay there a long time, too.  Ac­cording to mili­tary docu­ments, Raven Rock has a medical clinic, a barber shop and a din­ing hall.  There is also a chapel, a laundry (self-service only), a racquetball court and a place to cash checks.

 

“The President and top military leaders could take to the air, if need be, board­ing one of four specially equipped Boeing 747’s called Na­tional Emergency Airborne Command Posts (NEACP’s) kept at An­drews Air Force Base near Washington.  The NEACP’s can stay airborne for 12 hours and travel up to 6,000 miles without refueling.  They carry tons of communica­tions equipment linked to a satellite net­work, as well as com­mercial telephone systems.

 

“If the Strategic Air Command is unable to carry out its mis­sion from its under­ground headquarters at Offutt Air Force Base out­side Omaha, it, too, can take to the air.  SAC maintains several four-en­gine jet aircraft code-named ‘Looking Glass,’ each of which can carry a 28 person airborne command staff—in­cluding intelligence, weather, logistics and battle special­ists.  These craft can remain aloft for more than 8 hours.  One of the jets is kept airborne at all times.”  Re­porter: Douglas Pasternak

 

Well, there you have it—since it will only take Earth about 250 mil­lion years to recover from radiation contamination—who knows if those 747’s can stay air­borne long enough—well, per­haps if the hy­draulics don’t fail and they don’t need refu­eling.

 

Rest well tonight, brothers, knowing that you are in capable hands!

 

Another respite, Dharma, as I don’t know how your brothers feel but you are turning green, chela.  Someone is apt to guess you are one of those little green men from Mars with antennae and bug eyes.

So be it, Hatonn to stand-by.  SALU

 

http://fourwinds10.com/journals/pdf/J003.pdf